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ABSTRACT

THE NECESSITY OF PRODUCING EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION PRPGRAMS
NATIONALLY IN ORDER TO PRESERVE THE NATIONAL CULTURE
IN THE ARAB STATES: CASE STUDY OF THE STATE OF KUWAIT

FEBRUARY

RASHID A.

1991

AL-WALAYTI

B.A., KUWAIT UNIVERSITY
M.A., JOHNSON STATE COLLEGE
ED.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by:

This

Professor Robert J.

Miltz

study deals with the phenomenon of dependency on

imported western television programs
The primary concern of this study

in the Arab states.

is that the Arab culture

is under siege by western culture through the massive
importation of western television programs.
jeopardize the continuity of the

imported materials

has no connection with the authentic culture,
in

influx has

indigenous national Arab

culture since the content of most of the

help

This

which needs

its promotion and enhancement.

The aim of this study is to search for the reasons
that cause the Arab governments to depend heavily on
imported western programs rather than the nationally
produced programs.

This study concludes with some

suggestions to promote the production and airing of Arab
•

•

Vll

nationally produced programs which could provide a solution
or alternatives to the

issue,

or at least reduce

its

impact

in order to preserve and promote the national Arab culture.
The study examines and analyzes the experiment of the
Arabian Gulf States Joint Production Programs Institute
(AGJPPI)

as the first professional and successful Arab

educational television production and seeks the secret
behind

its

success.

The state of Kuwait

case study

for the research,

as a model

of Arab television systems.

is selected as a

and presents Kuwait television

vm

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
ABSTRACT.
LIST OF TABLES..
LIST OF FIGURES.

Chapter
I.

INTRODUCTION

1

Statement of Problem.
2
Statement of Purpose.
7
Significance of the Study.
9
Methodology. 10
Rationale for Use of the Case Study as a Method. 11
Selection the Case. 14
Data Gathering. 17
Definitions. 22
Organization of the Study. 24
Limitation. 27
Conclusion. 28
II.

31

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

31
32
40
47

Introduction.
Western Literature
Arabic Literature.
Conclusion.
III.

TELEVISION

IN THE ARAB STATES

49

Introduction. . 49
The Arab States. . 50
Media and the Arab World. . 55
Background History of Television in the Arab
. 62
States...
Western Influence on Arab Television. . 65
. 67
Radio.
. 72
Television.... • * * * * * * * *
Television and Governments in the Arab States.. . 77
The Political Function of Arab Television. . 82
. 87
Political Broadcasting Under Nassir.
. 97
One-Way Medium.
.104
Conclusion.

ix

IV.

TELEVISION AND CULTURE IN THE ARAB STATES

109

Introduction.109
General Perspective..
The U.S Cultural Impact.Ill
Television and Arab Culture.120
Entertainment..
The Foreign Channel.168
News..
Conclusion..
V.

THE CASE STUDY: THE STATE OF KUWAIT

183

Introduction.183
Location and Topography.184
Background History.18 5
Kuwait Under Britain.191
Post-Oil Era.198
Resources.201
Population.204
Political Background.210
The Iraqi Invasion.211
The Political System.213
Historical Background of Broadcasting in Kuwait.217
Introduction.217
Radio.218
Television.227
Background of Kuwait Television.230
The Structure of Television System in Kuwait..235
Policies and Strategies of Television System..239
Censorship.241
Advertising.243
Types and Characteristics of Broadcast
246
Programs.
246
Government Politics.
253
Entertainment.
261
Western Programs.
268
Television and Culture in Kuwait.
281
Conclusion.
VI.

THE EXPERIMENT OF THE ARABIAN GULF STATES JOINT
PROGRAMS PRODUCTION INSTITUTE (AGJPPI).
Introduction.
Background of the AGJPPI.
Objectives of the AGJPPI..
The Experiment of "Iftah Ya Simsim"
The Secret of the AGJPPI Success...

x

289
290
292
293
298

VII.

REASONS FOR DEPENDENCE ON IMPORTED WESTERN
PROGRAMS..........

308

Introduction..

Reasons for Dependence on Western Programs.3 09
Obstacles Facing National Production.317
Suggestions and Alternatives for Importing
Western Programs.322
Final Conclusion, Closing Remarks, and
Recommendation for Future Studies.343
BIBLIOGRAPHY.347

xi

LIST OF TABLES

Table

Page

!•

Percentage of imported television programs in 1973
and 1983..

2.

Prices for United States television films in some
Arab states..

3.

Percentage of imported TV programs in 1973, 1983,
and in prime time 198 3 in some Arab states.131

4 .

Program structure of some Arab countries according
to categories.17 0

5.

TV transmission hours by type of program,

1985.257

6.

TV transmission hours by type of program,

1986.258

7.

Classification of program categories and percentage
of broadcast time as a fixed standard (the main
channel).259

8.

Classification of program Categories and percentage
of broadcast time (the second channel).260

9.

Imported television hours and their classification
according to types of programs in Kuwait in 1987...266

10.

Number of featured films broadcast in Kuwait in
1987 (average of 2 hours each).266

11.

Imported television broadcast

12.

Number of

featured

in Kuwait

films broadcast

in

1988....267

in Kuwait

in

1988 .

267

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure

Page

1.

Number of radio sets per

1000 people.71

2.

Number of television sets per 1000 people.78

3.

Distribution of television transmitters on global
basis..

4.

Imported programs as a percentage of estimated total
Arabic region television broadcast time.129

5.

Distribution of type of TV program materials in
some Arab states.169

6.

National income and expenditure for Kuwait in
1986.203

7.

Revenue of the state

8.

Structure of Kuwait television.238

income

in percentage terms.203

xiii

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

This

study is a descriptive and critical

analysis of

the phenomenon of the broadcast of Western television
programs by state controlled television systems within the
Arab states.

A case study of Kuwait television

and compared related state television
A review of

literature

the Arab

states

national

culture.

of destruction,

in other Arab states.

indicates that state television in

is not reflecting the
Therefore,

indigenous

undermining the national

review of the

literature also

this phenomenon are
to knowledge
national

lacking.

culture by
daily basis.

indicates that studies of

Such a study should contribute

about the potential

programs

life and

state television became a tool

depending on Western programs broadcast on a
The

is presented

impact of alternative

and national production,

which would serve

to preserve and promote the culture and heritage of the Arab
peoples.
The goal

of this research is to develop hypotheses and

suggested alternatives

for appropriate and effective methods

by which nationally produced educational programs within
state television may be developed and
programs would

serve the national

preferable alternative to

implemented.

Such

culture as a viable and

importing Western programs.

1

2
Statement of Problem

The state of Kuwait,
world,

as well as the rest of the Arab

depends very heavily on massive

television programs to

fill

imports of western

its broadcast time.

This

practice has had a pervasive negative effect on the Islamic
Arab national
matter
with

culture.

A central

factor in relation to this

is that all television systems

in the Arab states -

few exceptions- are governmental televisions and run

very tightly either directly or

indirectly by the state

governments.
Current
to

60%

figures show that Arab states

of their broadcast programs,

import

an average of

in some Arab states the percentage goes higher,
alarm
are

50%,

and

to 80%.

The

increases when we review the types of programs that

imported.

Statistics

show that entertainment programs

were the predominant types of programs
educational programs were broadcast
hours.

from 40%

imported—whereas

for the

least number of

The danger the entertainment programs poses arises

from the misconception that they may be enjoyed as an
innocent pastime,

are good

for diversion in leisure time,

and that there are no particular

intellectual

ideas or biases connected with them.

In fact,

or cultural
Herbert

Schiller calls this misconception "the biggest deception
history."1

Erik Barnouw,

broadcasting,

puts

in

chronicler of American

it this way:

"To me,

entertainment is a

3
poisonous concept.

The

idea of entertainment

is that

nothing to do with the seriousness of the world,
fills up an

idle hour.

Actually,

implicit in every kind of
far more

there

fictional

is an

story.

it has

but that

it

ideology

Fiction may be

important than non-fiction in forming people's

opinions."2
The considerable
designed

import of western programs originally

for peoples of western cultures

break down,

if not destroy,

is threatening to

Arab people's

indigenous culture

and to disrupt the cultural continuity of Arabs'
Regardless of the programs'
focus,

content or original

heritage.
cultural

these programs present ludicrously distorted models

of western cultural values as distinct alternatives to those
of the national culture.
There have been many exhortations

in recent years

among concerned thinkers within the Arab world pleading for
"cultural

security"

to counter the massive waves of

westernization through the
programs and to prevent

importation of western television

further cultural

researchers are arguing that
programs

invasion.

Arabic

importing western television

is an opening of the back door for the

of western values?

they call

inasmuch as people

in the Arab world are beginning to

alien
dual

in their own culture.
cultural

(depicted,

society,

moreover,

it

importation

"imported civilization"
feel

This situation is causing a

since the values of an alien culture

in an unreal,

distorted,

and

4

exaggerated way for "entertainment" and commercial purposes)
are being mindlessly superimposed on the original one
without realistic examination or intelligent criticism.

The

danger is that people can start to devalue and forget their
own national language,

art,

and cultural mores under the

ubiquitous influence of an alien culture as presented to the
masses via the television medium.
Arab scholars,
vanishing,

Samir Amin,

noted that "Currently,

one of the

cultures are

not because they are isolated but as a result of

the double standard in culture.

In developing countries,

are observing cultural destruction,

we

and the aim is to impose

a western style model by ridiculous and ironic means."3
If we assume that an elementary function of the
television medium is to reflect and represent a society's
culture,

it is obvious that television in the Arab counties

does not perform that function,

certainly not under the

prevailing heavy load of western programming.

Douglas Boyd,

one of the western scholars who studied television in the
Arab countries,

noted:

"There is very little that is

uniquely Arab in Arab world television."4
therefore,

It is obvious,

that television in the Arab states neither

reflects the indigenous culture nor plays a major role in
the process of development,

but has simply been functioning

for the most part as an entertainment medium,
tool,

political

and consumptive means for western goods.
in a meeting between UNESCO and the Arab states

5
Broadcasting Union

(ASBU),

it was warned that even though it

might be an advantage to import ready-made educational
materials due to the availability of well-produced materials
and saving time and money,

should be based on local

conditions and programs must be relevant to the society's
problems,

concerns,

and developmental needs.

The meeting

emphasized the importance of making use of local production
elements.

In 1978,

the Arab Educational Technology Center

requested its member states to submit reports on the extent
to which they were using educational media materials prior
to a seminar held in Kuwait about educational technology in
the Arab countries.

All the reports raised the issue of

educational film production and all countries expressed the
fact that they lack capabilities in this field,
equipment,

staff and funds,

ranging from

to creative specialists.

The

reports reflected widespread agreement that imported
educational films had not been found suitable for
educational programs.

At the end of the conference,

the

member states recommended establishing an Arab institution
for the production of educational films.
Teaching and preserving the national culture
important element

in the process of a country's development.

In its 1973 report,
Educational

is a very

the International Commission

for

Development recommended that people should learn

how to enact constitutional
security against spontaneous

legislation which can provide
imitation

in the educational

6

field and against westernization which might be exercised
under the cover of technical aids.

The McBride Commission

states that media and advertisement should be very attached
to culture,

traditions,

and development goals,

not attached

commercial interests.5
The function of television in the Arab states should
not be confined to preservation of the national culture but
should also be to defend it from any kind of distortion.
The present situation is working to foster interest in
western civilization at a time when its influence should be
mitigated.

To open the doors widely for western programming

means to put the national culture and its people at the
mercy of the giant foreign corporations that produce and
distribute the material which is aired,

programming which

manipulates people's tastes and thoughts rather than
fulfills the national government's responsibility toward its
people.

As Herbert Schiller pointed out,

and read and hear,
go,

what they wear,

"What people see

what they eat,

where they

and what they believe they are doing have become

functions of an informational system that sets tastes and
values according to its own self-reinforcing market
criteria."6
Studies show that there is a contradiction between
educational strategy and television broadcasting strategy,
if we assume there is a strategy.

Arab educators are

accusing television of destroying what education builds due

7

to the absence of clear and purposeful broadcasting
strategy.

They are calling for cooperation from the

television industry,

in an effort to halt the present

tendency to undermine the goals of Arabic education.7

It is

undeniable that Arab governments do not have a clear
national strategy for television broadcasting.

Because

imported programs meet neither the goals of national
development nor with indigenous people's need,
the Arab states,

especially children and women,

minorities in
are being

harassed and unsettled by these television programs.
Sadik,

the Director of the Egyptian television system,

of the leading Arab television systems,

Sarnia
one

admitted that

Egyptian television has no clear strategy for selecting some
of its programs which are being broadcast.8
Programs must be created that give authentic
expression of the Arab culture and therefore,

the television

system of the Arab states need to play a better role in
preserving the national culture and contribute to the Arab s
cultural continuity.

statement of Purpose

The purpose of this study is to explore the issue of
dependence on imported western programming on the part of
the Arab states'

television industry.

The main question which arises is why television in

8

the Arab states depends so heavily on ready-made western
imports,

despite the fact that these programs have negative

effects on the national culture and their irrelevance to the
process of national development.

Why not depend on

nationally produced programs reflecting one's own culture
and values,

as do programs produced in most other parts of

the world?
The study intends to examine the obstacles that hinder
the improvement of the Arab states'
production,

national television

both qualitatively and quantitatively.

The

working assumption is that Arab states depend on western
programming because of deficiencies and insufficiencies in
Arab television production,

problems that exist because of

the nature of prevailing public policy.
Through the process of answering the main question,
the study should answer several other related questions
arising from the major question,
(1)

including:

What negative effects do these imported western

programs have on the Islamic Arab culture?
(2)

What have Arab governments done to reduce the

import of western programming?
(3)

What have Arab governments done to improve

national television production?
(4)

For how long in the future will the Arab states

depend on imported western programs?

(5)

What have Arab states done to protect the

9
national culture?
(6)

What is the role of private enterprise in Arabic

television production,
government,

what is its relationship with

and what types of problems are they facing which

hinder improvement in their production?

Significance of the Study

The significance of this study is four-fold.

It will

examine:
(1)

How television can play a much better role in

preserving the national Islamic culture in the Arab states.
(2)

How television can protect the national Islamic

culture by rejecting alien values reflected in imported
western programs.
(3)

How Arab television production can be improved

and be a good alternative for imported programs.
(4)

How the nationally produced programs can in many

ways accelerate the process of development.
Finally,

after identifying the obstacles which

presently hinder programs toward self-sufficiency and selfinterest on the part of Kuwait's national television
industry,

this research study will offer suggestions and

recommendations for moving toward this goal.

The premise of

the study is that Arab educators should be in the forefront
in advocating and developing changes in public policy and

10

planning by which the medium of television

in the Arab

states will help to honor and preserve rather than sabotage
the Islamic culture.

Methodology

In order to answer the main question of this research,
it

is very

important to know and understand other

that are related to the subject,
put

so the main

issues

issue can be

in the appropriate context.
This

is a descriptive study and critical

understand the situation in the Arab states,
understand the situation in the world.

analysis.

To

we must

Taking a panoramic

and comprehensive look at the global media and culture
situation and how it

functions

is essential to understand

how other countries are affected with respect to this media
system.
South,

Understanding the relationship between North and
developed and developing countries.

East and West,

is

significant as a key to understanding and analyzing the
issue under study.

There

is a very close relationship

between the past and present,

impossible to separate.

To go

back to the historical roots of the problem is absolutely
essential

in order to understand the present situation.

Study of the history and development of television
broadcasting

in the Arab states and the circumstances under

which Arab television has emerged,

which to a

large extent

11
shaped the present situation,

is also essential.

Such a

study will lead us to understand the present circumstances
surrounding contemporary television broadcasting and how
that is affecting the function of television in the Arab
states.
Since the main purpose of this study is to explore how
to preserve the Arab states'

culture,

it is fundamental to

give an overall description of the Arab Islamic culture and
how it is being affected by western television.

The case

study focusing on the state of Kuwait will be discussed in
detail as example of the Arab states in general.

A case

study was used as the methodology for this research.

In

this type of research the case study method is very helpful
as a general approach to the problem in the whole Arab
world.

The Arab world is vast,

comprising more than twenty

states,

and it would be beyond the scope of one dissertation

to study each one of them in detail.

The case study method

can provide appropriate and ample guidance for comprehensive
understanding and general review of the situation in the
Arab world.

Rationale for Use of the Case Study as a Metho_d

The primary concern of this study is to examine the
phenomenon of dependency on imported western programs in the
Arab states'

television.

The research method includes

12
discussion along with descriptive analysis.
A qualitative case study is suggested as a method for
this research.

A case study method is well suited,

particularly in this kind of research,
phenomenon.

Sharan B. Merriam

(1988)

to study a bounded
noted that case study

research should be used when certain questions are raised
about a phenomenon and when a certain end product is
desired.9

This method is designed to illuminate a general

problem and to make generalizations—to some degree—to look
at a situation as a whole.

A case study model can be

developed to represent the phenomenon and also can simplify
the complexity of the research.
Case study research and,
case study,

in particular,

qualitative

is an ideal design for understanding and

interpreting observations of educational phenomena.
McMillan and Schumacher

(1984)

noted that

The purpose of most descriptive research is limited to
characterizing something as it is, though some
descriptive research suggests tentative causal
relationship.
There is no manipulation of treatment or
subjects; the research takes things as they are.
Historical research does not deal only with the dead
past,

but also can deal with contemporary events.

research,

In this

both past and contemporary events will be

overlapped.

Yin

(1984)

describes the historical case study

approach:
The case study is preferred in examining contemporary
events, but when the relevant behaviors cannot be
manipulated.
Thus, the case study :r!1*fS!12!!J''two
the same techniques as a history, but it adds two

f
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sources of evidence not usually included in the
historian's repertoire:
direct observation and
systematic interviewing.
Although case studies and
histories can overlap, the case study's unique strength
is its ability to deal with a full variety of evidence-documents, artifacts, interviews, and observations.11

Case studies have the advantage of permitting
researchers to observe the growth effect,
depth.

and change in

Close analysis of a single Arab state may lead to a

clearer understanding of the situation in the whole Arab
world and the relationship of variables that affect
television's function in the Arabs'

culture.

Yin

(1984)

noted that a case study is a design particularly suited to
situations where it is impossible to separate the
phenomenon's variable from their context.
The goal of this study is to develop hypotheses about
appropriate and effective methods to reach a level of selfsufficiency for national television programs in the Arab
states.

It is hoped that the results of the analysis in

this case study could be used as suggested guidelines for
future activities in the service of national culture.

It is

also hoped that an analysis of the case study data will
contribute to an increased understanding of conditions that
block the improvement of Arabs'

television so it would

participate in and contribute to the preservation of the
national culture.

14
Selecting the Case

Selection of the specific subject of a case study
needs to be done carefully in order to assure that the
subject is typical of those we wish to generalize.
Therefore,

Kuwait television was selected as an analysis

unit for this study.

Kuwait television is a good example of

an Arab television institution for many reasons.
Kuwait television has a fairly long history of
broadcasting compared to that of other Arab states.
the oldest television station in the Gulf region.

It is
Since

Kuwait is the first state in the Arabian peninsula to have
its own television system,

Kuwait television played an

important role in the development of television broadcasting
in the area,

and obviously paved the way for other Gulf

states to follow suit.

The wealth of the government,

because of the oil revenue,

afforded the government the

opportunity to expand the television system technically to
the ultimate,
Thus,

developing a modern broadcasting system.

Kuwait has the highest average number of television

receivers in the Arab states per capita and the second in
the world after the U.S.

:

400 sets for each 1,000 people.

One of the unique aspects of Kuwait is that the number of
television sets are more than the number of radio sets in
the state unlike any other country in the world.
technical point of view,

From a

Kuwait television is well Known for

15
its powerful transmission signals,

which cover a vast area

both in the Arabian peninsula and the Gulf area to Iraq and
Iran.
Moreover,

Kuwait television is considered a leading

production center especially for the Gulf region.

Its

production is distributed and viewed in many Arab states and
all Gulf states in particular.

Kuwait is the headquarters

of the Arabian Gulf States Joint Programs Production
Institution

(AGJPPI),

which originated the first successful

educational series of the Arabic version of the American
program "Sesame Street" and other successful educational and
documentary productions.
With respect to the issue of cultural
perspectives,

invasion

there is no doubt that Kuwait is falling prey

to cultural domination and is a target in this matter.
Kuwait is one of the Arab states which has a special channel
to serve the non-Arab community broadcast in English called
the foreign channel,

filled heavily with imported foreign

programs,

shows,

the U.S.

A whole separate channel to serve the "non-Arab

community"

serials,

and films which are usually from

is a good justification for allowing more

imported foreign programs to be broadcast by the state.
As a matter of fact,

Kuwait and other petro-dollar

Gulf states are more vulnerable to this type of invasion
than other less wealthy Arab states,

due to the availability

of television and VCRs among the people and the financial

16
capability of the wealthy governments to purchase foreign
programs.

Kuwait television also overlaps with other Arab

television systems through formal regional and national Arab
treaties.
The case study chapter will cover a general view of
Kuwait as a state,

television broadcasting history and its

development to the present,
system,

the structure of the broadcast

policies and strategies of broadcasting,

of programs that are being broadcast.
that the main purpose of this study,

and types

It is in this chapter
the issue of dependence

on western programs and the obstacles that hinder and deter
national production,
analysis,

will be discussed.

From the overall

this study should provide some solutions,

suggestions,

and recommendations that would help to overcome

these obstacles and improve the national production,

thus

contributing toward the goal of preserving the national
culture.
In the case study chapter the experience of producing
an Arabic version of "Sesame Street" will also be discussed
as a good example of the first professional successful
educational programs experience in the Arab states.

It can

be used as a foundation on which to establish and build
national educational television production in the Arab
states.
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Data Gathering

The purpose of this research is to present an
intensive case study of an Arab television model.

The

methods of gathering data in this research are to study the
phenomenon of domination of western programs on Arab
television and to answer the questions posed by this
research,

(A)

which will consist of the following:

Documentary Data
These documentary data are usually governmental data.

They are either published or unpublished documents,
them formal,

some informal.

Basically,

some of

these documents

include the following sources:
1-

Documents and reports of the Arab League meetings.

2-

Documents and reports of Gulf Cooperation Council

3-

Documents and reports of Arab States Broadcasting Union

(GCC).

(ASBU).
4-

Documents and reports of government of the state of

Kuwait.
5-

Documents and reports of Kuwait television.

6-

Documents and reports of other Arab and regional

educational and media organizations.

(B)

Field Data
These data were gathered by the researcher and cover
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the main issues investigated by this research which in turn
serve as guidance in data gathering for the research.

The

field data was gathered because much of the information
needed for the research is not available from other sources.
These field data include observations and personal
interviews.

Observation:
Observation is a primary source of data and a useful
data gathering research technique in a case study.
research,

In this

observation will play a main role both in

collecting and analyzing data.

The observation will cover

historical events of the past as well as those carried in
the present.

The observations will provide descriptions,

explorations,

and detailed examinations of the whole

environment of broadcasting in the state of Kuwait,

regarded

as a model since Kuwait is part of the Arab world's larger
environment.
The observation will trace the historical development
of the problem and try to explore the connection between the
past and the present.

There are many events in the past

which can be help us to understand and examine the present
situation.
The observation will emphasize the strong attachment
between television and western programs by observing the
type of western programs broadcast and their negative
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influence on the national culture.

Also,

the observation

will include the discovery of the relationship between
television and other variables which effect the function of
state television in the Arab states.
government,

politics,

These variables are

broadcasting policies and strategies,

democracy in broadcasting,

entertainment,

and the structure

of broadcasting and how it operates and functions.
As a result of these observations,

we will understand

why television is not serving to support the national
culture.

We will,

as well,

observe and examine positive

attempts and experiments of some of the successful
nationally produced education programs and organizations,
such as the Arabic version of "Sesame Street"

series.

Interviews
Another source of data for this study is personal
interviewing.

Personal interviews are a common means of

collecting qualitative data.

The importance of interviewing

as a means of collecting data is explained by Patton

(1980):

We interview people to find out from them those things
we cannot observe...we cannot observe feelings,
thoughts and intentions.
We cannot observe behaviors
that took place at some previous point in time.
We
cannot observe situations that preclude the presence of
an observer.
We cannot observe how the people have
organized the world and the meanings they attach to
what goes on in the world.
We have to ask the people
questions about those things.
The purpose of
interviewing then, is to allow us to enter into the
other person's perspective.
in this study,

personal interviewing was an important method
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of collecting data that could not be collected through
observations

(such as past events that are impossible to

replicate).

All interviews in this research were direct and

person to person.

The aim was to collect certain

information and the questions were predetermined ahead of
time.
Interviews included conversations with top officials
from both the governmental sector and private sector of
Kuwait.

The governmental sector was represented by the

Ministry of Information, which is the institution
responsible for television broadcasting in Kuwait.

Some of

these interviews were formal,

The

other were informal.

interviews also covered executive managers of institutions
and enterprises which deal with Kuwait television in the
fields of production and supplies,
programs,

importers of western

western television companies'

educational production enterprises,

franchise holders,

and people who are

involved in educational program production and have
expressed a concern about the relationship between
television and culture in the Arab world.
The aim was to study the phenomenon in more depth from
the various perspectives of people who work and are involved
directly on the site of the study and who could observe
things that we could not.

The main questions of the

interviews included the following:
(1)

Why does Kuwait television import western
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television programs? And is there any need for them?
(2)

What do you think about the positive or negative

impact of the content of these programs on the culture and
the people?
(3)

Why does Kuwait television not depend entirely on

nationally produced programs for its daily broadcasting?
(4)

Is it possible to ban all western programs and

nationalize the entire spectrum of programs broadcast in
Kuwait?
(5)
production?
(6)

What obstacles face implementation of national
How can we reach a level of self-sufficiency?
What has the government done to improve national

television production?
(7)

What has Kuwait television or government done to

protect the national culture through television
broadcasting?
(8)

Why is there such a concentration on

entertainment programs over educational and cultural
programs?
(9)

What do you think are the solutions and

alternatives to importing western programs?

(C)

other Sources of Information
Other sources of information and data were gathered by

the researcher through sources which include literature,
annual reports and statistics,

public and government
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documents,

minutes of meetings,

research and studies,

final reports and recommendations of

seminars and conferences,
journals,

official and academic

officials'

logs,

periodicals,

and publications of national and international

institutions and organizations.

Basically these sources are

those listed in the bibliography.

Definitions

The term "Arab Culture"

is misleading and inaccurate.

It has been used very commonly by many authors and writers
as a synonym for "Islamic Culture," which is the correct and
accurate term,

since Arab people derived their whole culture

from Islam's teachings and law—the Holy Koran and the
prophet Muhammad's life,

as the only source generating their

way of life.
People,

especially in the west,

to indicate Muslims,

used the word "Arabs"

probably because Arabs are the ones who

carried the message of Islam to the world in its earliest
stages.

Arabic,

too,

is the language of the Koran -the last

words of God revealed to the humankind- and the language of
Muhammad.
The word "Arab," as well,

is inaccurate.

At the

present time it is very hard to define who the Arabs are and
who are not.

Historically,

the Arabs are those tribes who

inhabited the Arabian peninsula after the Marib Dam in Yemen
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burst.

They were two major Arab tribes who inhabited the

north and the south of the peninsula.

Those tribes who

inhabited the north were called "Adnani" and those of the
south were called "Qahtani",

thought to be more purely Arab

than the "Adnani," the Arabs of the north.
After Islam was revealed to prophet Muhammad,

the

Arabs carried the message of Islam to other non-Arab
neighboring countries.
of other races,

The Arabs began to mix with people

thus spreading Islam across vast areas of

Asia and Africa.

People in those countries adopted Islam

and started speaking Arabic.
instance,

The people of Egypt,

for

considered at the present time a major Arab state,

historically were known as a race of Coptic people;
people of north Africa,
Morocco,
states,

such as Libya,

Tunisia,

the

Algeria,

and

considered at the present time to be an Arab
are historically known as the Moorish people.

The term "Arabs"
researcher,

is used very commonly by the

not to be racist,

but with the intention of

defining a certain geographic and political region on the
world map which forms the members of the Arab league.

In

addition to the formal treaties that connect the member
governments of the Arab league in connection with their
policies and strategies,
religion,

culture,

they also share a common legacy of

history,

and language.

In this respect,

the researcher would like to express and affirm his advocacy
of Islamic unity.
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The term "foreign programs" or "western programs"

is

used to refer to those programs which are produced in nonXslamic countries in general and whose content does not
necessarily harmonize with the rules and customs of Islamic
culture.

Obviously,

I am referring to those programs of

western Europe and the United States,

who are major

producers and worldwide distributors of television programs.
The term "educational television programs"

is used not

in the formal sense of education but rather in the sense of
non-formal education,

on the assumption that every

television program's content should be constructive as
possible,

with positive objectives which lead toward

accumulating knowledge on the part of the viewers over the
long term.

The type of these educational programs is not

important as long as they represent the national culture and
do not contradict the rules of Islam.

Organization of the Study

This study is divided into seven chapters.
outlines the framework for the study.
review of the literature.

Chapter I

Chapter II is a

It reviews the prominent

literature written on the subject which is the concern of
this study,

and is divided into two parts.

The first part

review the English language sources written mostly by
western authors and writers,

while the second part reviews
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the Arabic literature on the subject written by Arab writers
and authors.
Chapter III introduces the reader to television in the
Arab states and gives general views of media and television
in the Arab world.

This chapter covers several crucial

topics that concern television as a medium in the Arab
states such as western influence on Arab television,
government strong control on television,
function of Arab television,

the

the political

and the characteristic of being

a one-way medium.
Chapter IV discusses the main concern of this study of
the aspect of television and culture in the Arab states.
This chapter illustrates the role of U.S government in
homogenizing the world cultures through "made in America"
materials.

The chapter also illustrates how the imported

western television programs affected the Arab culture
negatively and how the Arab life style and patterns were
changing to western life styles as a consequences of the
extensive exposure to western television programs,
especially those of the entertainment genre.
Chapter V is the heart and the core of this study.

It

narrows down the situation and the issue from the Arab world
in general to the state of Kuwait specifically as the case
study of this research.

In this chapter,

the situation in

the state of Kuwait is discussed in depth through critical
analysis in order to provide a thorough basis for the
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conclusions of this study.
covered,

In this chapter many topics are

beginning with a brief history of the evolvement of

the state of Kuwait to the present and the status of Kuwait
before and after the oil era which caused an upheaval in all
aspects of life and changed all expectations.
Besides covering the present structure of the state of
Kuwait,

the chapter makes a critical analysis of the

development of broadcasting in Kuwait and its evolvement
until present time with special emphasis on the television
medium.
The diagnosis of Kuwait television requires tackling
of some critical
broadcasting,

issues such as policies and strategies of

censorship,

broadcast programs,

types and characteristics of

and the foreign channel.

Most important

in this chapter is the relation between television and
culture in Kuwait and how western programs played a chief
role in disturbing the continuity of its people's culture,
and negatively affecting the pattern and customs of the life
style of the indigenous culture in Kuwait.
Chapter VI describes and analyzes the successful
experiment of the Arabian Gulf States Joint Programs
Production Institution

(AGJPPI).

The chapter reviews the

secrets of success of this experiment which made it the
first successful and professional Arab television
production,

one which could be used as an excellent small-

scale model and serve as a firm foundation for a Pan-Arab
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television production industry.
Chapter VII presents results,
solutions,

analyses,

and conclusions of the study.

proposed

In this chapter

reasons for dependence on imported western programs are
identified.

Also in this chapter some of the problems and

obstacles that have been hindering national television
production are listed.

As a result of these analysis,

this

chapter offers some suggestions and solutions as an
alternative to importing,

or at least reducing the

dependence on western programs while serving to enhance
national production.

The chapter,

conclusion of the study,

is climaxed by the final

encompassing the recommendations

and the out-look for future studies in this field of
television and culture which may promote the preservation of
the Arab national culture.

Limitation

This study deals with television in the Arab states in
terms of cultural dimension only,

primarily as a consequence

of imported foreign western programs.

However,

there are

other important dimensions in Arab television which must
also be studied and researched.

The researcher encourages

other scholars and researchers to analyze other aspects of
Arab television from different dimensions and perspectives.
During the research process,

the researcher faced some
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difficulties in finding sufficient information and available
sources.

The researcher had found that Arabic libraries

holdings on the subject of Arab media in general and
television in the Arab world in particular are scarce and
poor.

This research concentrates on the state of Kuwait,

only as a model.
studied,

Television in other Arab states should be

researched,

and analyzed in detail as well.

Conclusion

The television situation in the Arab states is not
functioning along the right path.

It neither promotes nor

protects the authentic Arab people's culture.
The heavy dependence on broadcasting alien western
ready-made programs constitutes a very dangerous phenomenon
in the Arab television and a negative aspect in its
function.

This negative phenomenon,

which started

simultaneously with the emergence of television in the Arab
world,

has helped to create a dual culture society and which

started to threaten the people's ingenious culture.
The peril

in these imported programs lies in the

promotion of western culture and the implication of the
supremacy of western values,

which aims in the long run to

superimpose western culture over Arab culture.

There is an

urgent need for drastic reform in the function of Arab
television and reconsideration of the type of programs to be
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broadcast.

Arab governments are requested to make maximum

use of television and to make it work in the service of the
people's culture and need,

not only protecting it but also

fending and enhancing it.
The western media invasion through television programs
and software must be stopped in order to protect Arab
identity.

Dependence on western programs must be

eliminated.

The quality and quantity of national and local

production must be enhanced so as to reach a level of selfsufficiency.
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Chapter II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Introduction

The phenomenon of dependency on western programs is
not exclusive to a specific geographical area in the world,
rather it is a worldwide phenomenon.

Therefore,

it is not

only an issue threatening the culture in the Arab states but
an issue threatening the global cultures in other parts of
the world,

especially in developing countries where the more

they depend on western programs the more the risk exists
that their culture may perish.
The body of this review of literature is divided into
two parts.

The first part focuses on the one-way flow of

information of western television programs as global issue.
All of this literature is English sources and was written by
western writers.

The second part focuses on the same

phenomenon in the Arab states,

although some literature

pertaining to the first part has touched very slightly on
the issue in the Arab states.
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Western Literature

Among those first scholars who started to trace and
analyze the phenomenon and became extremely discontent and
sensitive to the issue is Herbert I.
work in 1969,

Schiller.

In his early

Mass Communication and American Empire.

Schiller illustrated the relationship among different
variables of the equation in this matter.

Schiller's

emphasis was on the strong connection between the American
media technology industry and the American militaryindustrial complex.

He sees that American television

exports are part of the American military activities which
are part of the American government foreign policy to
subjugate the world in order to achieve economic goals.
Schiller also sees that all these operations are done
through a complicated and organized operation network of
military,

economic,

and media systems.

Later in 1976 and in a more specified work about media
and culture,

Schiller developed his theory of cultural

imperialism in his study Communication and Cultural
Domination.

In this work,

he explained in more details the

role of the multi-national corporations and advanced
technology,

especially in the field of media,

training programs,

tourism,

and western media curriculum and theory

in spreading American culture to the rest of the world since
World War Two under the cover of Free Flow of Information
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doctrine.

Schiller accused the U.S government of reviving

colonialism over the new independent countries through
attempting to homogenize the world's cultures and turning it
into a global village with the help of its advanced
technology so as to exploit it economically by controlling
it culturally.

Schiller argues that the present global

structure of the world information system is unbalanced and
unfair and it has been set up to meet the U.S interest only
and to match the U.S foreign policy.
In their joint work,

National Sovereignty and

International Communication.
that developing countries'
autonomy,

Schiller and Nordenstreng argue

national boundaries,

national

and the independence they have gained in the last

few decades have been violated and have become meaningless.
The new advanced media technology in the age of the direct
satellite can penetrate all these boundaries so that the
future of these countries can be determined by those who own
and control these satellites.

The unregulated flow of

western programs can impair not only the cultural identity
but also the national media policy in the receiving
countries.

As a result,

these developing countries have

last their sovereignty over their national land and have
become not only economically but culturally dependent on
western products,

a situation which threatens the cultural

continuity of these countries as long as they are within the
sociocultural orbit of developed countries.
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There are other sources which relate to Schiller's
topic and support his theory of cultural colonialism.
related work is Picture-Tube Imperialism:
Television on Latin America,

The Impact of ij.s

by Alan Wells,

follows and supports Schiller's theory.
case studies of Latin America,

A

in which he

Wells presented two

the focus of his study.

Wells concludes that the purpose of Americanization of Latin
America television and life style has an economic end
according to consumerism theory.
Jeremy Tunstall

in his work The Media are American:

Anglo- American Media in the World,

gave a good panoramic

and comprehensive look at the media situation,
structure,

strategy,

and impact on the world,

review of its historical development.

its
along with a

Tunstall discussed

many media issues in different parts of the world.

Tunstall

argues that the problem of cultural identity is part of a
large problem of national

identity.

Tunstall sees that a

country with a high national identity tend to have a strong
cultural

identity and vice versa.

Therefore,

he listed as

having Africa the least strong national unity in all
countries.
national

Tunstall emphasized the relationship between

identity and the role of media.

Another study,
Information:

by Anthony Smith The Geopolitics of

How Western Culture Dominates the World,

demonstrates the power of American media in all its aspects
either in producing,

distributing,

or disseminating
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information all

over the world.

Smith supports his thesis

with number and statistics on the massive amounts of budget
expenditures and exports spent overseas to transmit American
ideologies.
world

Smith reviewed in a critical manner the old

information order and the struggle

order,

for new information

which was a struggle between governments of the

powerful

and powerless to maintain cultural domination over

developing countries.
Smith believes that the Free Flow of Information
doctrine

is blocking cultural development and that

technology
cultural

is a primary factor in multiplying the danger of

domination.

Smith also sees that the western

approach of modernization is

in conflict with culture and

social heritage when applied in developing countries.
Another study by Armand Mattelart,
Corporations
detail

and the Control

of Culture,

Multinational
emphasizes

the role of multinational corporations

of cultural

imperialism.

in the

field

Matterlart argues that the

function of these corporations
colonial

in more

is the same

function of the

governments of the past in dominating and

exploiting the wealth developing countries.

Mattelart also

emphasizes on the relationship between these corporations
and the ruling elite
UNESCO

in the developing countries.

is an active organization

conducted and published many studies
is the

in this

in this

field.

It

issue since

organization which sponsored the Free Flow of

it
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Information doctrine.

Perhaps the most reasonable and most

concentrated study which focuses and exposes in depth the
international one-way flow of western television programs
was done by Kaarle Nordenstreng and Tapio Varis in their
wor^ Television Traffic- A one Wav Street?.

They surveyed

most countries and presented a worldwide map of television
programs'

flow.

Unlike other studies in the field

,

this

study went further in analyzing the issue in depth by
collaborating with other world scholars to reach a solution.
At the end of the study,

the authors suggested a general

framework as an alternative solution.
A decade later in 1983,

a similar updating study was

done by the UNESCO as a follow up,
Flow of Television Programs.
to the study,

entitled International

A few more things were added

such classification of programs categories,

duration of imported programs,

and sources of imported

programs..all that in comparison with domestically produced
programs.

The result of the study indicated no clear

changes in the global situation in comparison with the 1974
figures.

The imported programs still constituted more than

one third of the total time of broadcasting.
Another study published by the UNESCO is Trans¬
national Communication and Cultural Industries,
Guback and Tapio Varis and others.

by Thomas

The study's focal point

is that TNCs have largely contributed to the cultural flow
of programs and to the circulation of materials,

in
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Par^icular between developing and developed countries.

The

study concluded that TNCs role have an economic and cultural
impact,

that they are very active in the media field,

and

that their role can not be disregarded.
In 1980,

the UNESCO published its first comprehensive

study of world communication problems in what has been known
as "Sean MacBride Commission Report," an effort of two years
of research published under the title Communication and
Society Yesterday and Tomorrow:

Many Voices.

One World.

The

report raised the issue of disparity and the huge gap in all
media aspects between developed and developing countries and
the issue of one way flow of information which caused a
severe damage to developing countries cultures.

The

conclusion of the study recommended a fairer and more
balanced flow of information between north and south,

and

called developing countries to strengthen their independence
and self-reliance through strengthening their cultural
identity:
Establishment of national cultural policies, which
should foster cultural identity and creativity, and
involve the media in these tasks.
Such policies should
also contain guidelines for safeguarding national
cultural development while promoting knowledge of other
countries.
It is in relation to others that each
culture enhance its own identity.
There are two other studies more specialized than the
one mentioned above.
Africa,

by Sydney W.

countries,

The first one is Broadcasting in
Head,

in which he surveyed all African

including Arab African countries.

Head observed
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that Africa is facing many problems and media has not been
used to its capacity in the process of development despite
the huge potential the media can play.

Head also criticized

the western approach being applied to broadcasting systems
Africa and warned that alien techniques,

methods,

institutions cannot be exported to Africa without
appropriate modification.

Head believes that there is an

opportunity for creative adaptation based on Africa's lack
of information infrastructure,

Africa's need to use the

media in coping with problems of economic and social
development,

and Africa's special political demands upon the

media.
The other study is Elihu Katz and George Wedell and
others,

Broadcasting in the Third World:

Performance.
studies.

Promise and

which used eleven developing countries as case

The study conclusion is that broadcast media and

particularly television in developing countries are in
general purveying a homogenized brand of popular culture,
either copied or borrowed from broadcasting in the west.
The study warns that maintaining this situation is certainly
destructive of indigenous political and cultural self
expression.

The study criticizes the structure of

broadcasting in developing countries and the control of
government.

Therefore,

much room for dissent,

they

(the governments)

however constructive,

did not leave

and did not

leave much room for the inherited culture values of the
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society either.
Katz and Wedell call for more authentic selfexpression in broadcasting and assert that broadcasting
serves not only the goals of national integration and
economic development,

but also the goals of culture

rediscovery and creativity.
developing countries'

Katz and Wedell argues that

mistake has been in imitating western

styles and the solution to that is to establish their own
style of broadcasting system based on their own theory,
demands,

needs,

Boyd A.

and circumstances.

Douglas is one of the few western scholars who

showed interest and studied Arab broadcasting in depth.
his study,

Broadcasting in the Arab World,

In

he surveyed and

analyzed form critical point of view all radio and
television systems in the Arab states.
study,

At the end of his

Boyd discussed some of the critical Arab broadcasting

problems as an outside viewer.

Boyd observed several things

that characterized the programs content in Arabic
television:

massive import of western programs,

concentration on entertainment materials,
government,
medium.

political propaganda,

strong control of

and it is a one-way

Boyd concluded that there is very little uniquely

Arab in Arab television.

Boyd also pointed out that the

obsession of predominantly western style images in all
television aspects,

from equipment,

creativity,

and content has caused negative

theory,

training,

production,
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consequences on the style of Arab television.

Arabic Literature
The second part of the literature I have reviewed was
written since 1980.

it was very difficult to find a major

study prior to that date,
reasons.

in which there are several

Television is still considered a new field in the

Arab states either for governments or people.

As a matter

of fact not too many Arab states have institutions to teach
media studies,

nor do they seem to wish to have them.

Only

a few Arab states have academic institutions of higher
education,

and these are criticized for their inadequacy.

There is still a big demand and urgent need to discover
television in all

its dimensions in the Arab states.

Most of Arabic research are superficial and lack
critics and objective analysis.
descriptive survey studies.

Many of them are purely

I am going to review several of

the better major studies.
One of these studies is by Awatif Abdulrahman Issues
of Media and Culture Subservience in the Third World.
her study,
cultural

In

she followed and supported western theories of

imperialism of Schiller,

Nordenstreng.

Mattleart,

and

Even though she concentrates on the press,

she analyzes the issue from a broad perspective rather than
a narrow one and tackles the issue in the Arab states as
part of a global

issue rather than a regional one.
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Therefore,

she attempts to examine the external

the issue rather than the internal factors.

factors of

Abdul- Rahman

focuses on the international efforts to solve the problem
between north and south within the global framework but she
could not come up with any solutions or alternatives for the
Arab states.
In another study more narrow than the first,
Rahman focuses on the issue in the Arab states.
work,

Abdul-

In her

The Dilemma of Developmental Media in the Arab world,

she tackled the issue of cultural invasion from the press.
Abdul-Rahman concludes that the main dilemma that hinder the
media from playing a developmental role in the Arab world is
the absence of specific media theory for the Arab world
which would fits with its needs and demands.

Therefore,

Abdul-Rahman presents at the end of her study a general
headlines theory for the Arab world as an alternative for
western theories.
national cultural

Part of her theory called for preserving
identity through media in a very general

statement.
Another study is by Mustafa Masmudi,
pioneer Arab scholars in this field.
comprehensive work,

one of the

In his distinguished

The New Information Order,

Masmudi in

one segment of his study focuses on the danger of the
cultural
identity.

invasion and the importance of preserving cultural
Masmudi also presents a general frame work on how

to implement media in the service of preserving the culture.
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Masmudi also devotes part of his thesis to the situation in
the Arab world.

He presents a general evaluation of the

media situation in the Arab world and reviews some of the
constraints that face media development between the Arab
states and within Arab states.

He also criticizes Arab

media policies and strategies.
Accordingly and as a conclusion to his study,

Masmudi

has presented for the first time a new strategy of new Arab
information order to be applied in the Arab states.

The

purpose of this strategy is to enhance the performance of
the Arab media.

Part of the strategy was to counter the

cultural penetration through achieving media immunity to
achieve what he called it cultural security.
strategy however,

Masmudi's

was still very general and idealistic and

could not deal with the existing problems at the existing
level.

The strategy ignored the existing problems and was

set as if the circumstances were ready for such a strategy.
Masmudi,

however,

did not explain how the strategy could be

applied successfully under the actual circumstances.
A similar study to that of Masmudi was published by
the Arab League Education,
(ALESCO) .

Culture,

and Science Organization

The study was a report by the Arab Commission to

study issues of media and communication in the Arab world
which is also headed by Masmudi.
Media Present and Future:
and communication.

The study is called Arab

Toward New Arab Order for Media

Like other studies,

this study was not
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tackling television issues in particular,
tackling media issues in general.

rather was

Part of the study brought

attention to the threat of massive flow of western cultural
materials and their negative effects on Arab culture.

The

study also called for protecting the national culture and
enhancing national media policies and national television
production.

The study criticized the gap between media

institutions and other educational and cultural institutions
and called for more collaboration among them.
conclusion,

In

the study presented a general philosophical

strategy as a frame work foundation for Arab states'
national media policy.
A joint work by Yahya Abu Bakr,
Kandil,
media,

Sa'ad Labib,

and Hamdy

some of the prominent scholars in the field of Arab
is titled Developmental Media in the Arab States:

Needs and Priorities,

and published by UNESCO.

The authors

criticized the present Arab media policies and planning
strategies in general and proposed priorities and planning
as a first step for reform.

However,

priorities were more technical.
more collaboration among media,
institutions.

some of these

The study also called for
cultural,

and educational

The study criticized the importation of

educational programs and called it a major obstacle to a
successful

implementation of national development plans.

The report stated that a joint meeting between UNESCO
and Arab States Broadcasting Union

(ASBU)

held in Baghdad
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warned that while it might be advantageous in some ways to
import ready-made television programs,

popular science

materials as these were backed by greater production
resources and hence might represent cost savings.

The

scientific materials disseminated should be based on local
conditions,

make use of local production elements,

and deal

with issues and subjects that were relevant to the society
concerns and its problems,

its development needs and plans.

In the field of television,

the study suggested a few

shallow tips to improve Arab television policies.
again,

Once

the suggestions focused more on technical aspects of

television rather than on the content of programs.
In a seminar held in Tunisia conducted by the Arab
States Broadcasting Union
Issues in the Arab States,

(ASBU)

about Television Production

delegations from all Arab states

gathered to discuss the issue of television production.
Interestingly,

the participants in this seminar discussed

the issue of production as an independent issue which has
nothing to do with cultural invasion issue or the issue of
imported western programs.

Therefore,

the solutions and

suggestions the seminar came up with were empty of any
reference to programs'

relationship to education and culture

or the type of programs to be produced,
mostly on technical points.

and concentrated

The seminar in general

concentrated on the solutions more than on the problem,

in

other words without knowing and understanding the problem.
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Thus the solutions they came up with were not in accord with
the essence of the problem.

Even though the participants

have tackled some sensitive issues and solutions,

they fall

short of examining the basic problems.
One of the most important conferences in this field is
the one which was held in Riyadh,

Saudi Arabia.

The

conference was conducted by the Arab Education Bureau for
the Gulf States under the title of What Educators Want From
Broadcasters.

In this conference,

education leaders up to

the level of Ministers of Educations,
the level of Ministers of Information,

media leaders up to
and scholars in the

field of Islamic Arab culture from different Arab states
discussed the issue of media and education within the
context of the Islamic Arab culture.

The long debate and

argument discussions among the participants have revealed
huge gaps and obvious disagreement,

discord,

and lack of

cooperation between media and education institutions in the
Arab states.

The final report of the conference called for

more coordination and cooperation between media and
education institutions in the following fields:
1-

Unifying goals,

objectives,

2-

Instill Islamic Arab values in programs and curriculum

of both institutions,

plans of both institutions.

especially in children's programs.

The conference requested more attention given to children's
production locally to halt imported alien programs.
3-

Encounter the flood of cultural and intellectual
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invasion by two methods:
a- Immunization:

by selecting carefully television programs

which do not contradict with Islamic teachings,
b- Cure:

by encountering destructive values by the use of

persuasion in both education curriculum and on television
programs.
4-

The participants also requested that all broadcasted

programs must be in accordance with Islamic teachings,

with

more concern should be given to Islamic programs.
5-

The conference emphasized the importance of reinforcing

the Arabic language in both media and education institutions
as a supreme Arabic value.
May be the most realistic study and the best of what
has been written about Arab television is by Sa'ad Labeeb.
In his work Studies in Arab Television.
the present function of Arab television,
objectives,

planning and policies.

Labeeb criticizes
structure,

Labeeb emphasizes on the

importance of planning in Arab television policies.

Labeeb

also presents from his point of view the objectives of
planning in Arab television policies.
About the issue of cultural

invasion,

Labeeb stresses

the role of television and other media aspects to repel the
current invasion.
the

Unlike other literature,

Labeeb is one of

few writers who demands a merger between religion and

television in Arab states since religion has been vital
element in Arab culture throughout the history,

and still
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is.

Labeeb went even further by saying that religion

teachings should determine the general frame work of any
television and culture policies.

Labeeb also focused on the

Arabic language as an important vital element in the Islamic
Arab culture as well.

Labeeb called for supporting local

production and suggested very briefly a few general tips on
how that could be done.
Husain Abu Shanab in his study,
i.D..the. State of Kuwait,

Communication Policies

noticed that drama programs and

entertainment programs always constitute the larger
proportion of the daily broadcast programs in Kuwait
television.

He also noticed that imported news usually

range around 60% of the total broadcast news,
major concern of his study.

which was the

Abu Shanab very briefly called

for encouraging local production either on state level or on
Pan-Arab level to address Arab people's national issues
within well prepared and studied media policy.

Conclusion
As we have noticed from the review of literature
above,

they all share and agree to preserve and protect the

national culture through television medium and programs'
content.

They all called for halting and reducing foreign

programs and increasing national programs.

However,

them elaborated and explained how that can be done.

non of
This

study will address this question of how we can implement
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television programs in the service of national culture by
depending on national production through discovering of the
obstacles that hinder this kind of national production.
This study will also suggest at the end of the thesis some
solutions as an alternative to the present situation.

Chapter III

TELEVISION IN THE ARAB STATES

Introduction

This chapter serves as an introductory chapter to the
study.

It gives a general overview of television in the

Arab states and other critical issues related to it.

It

describes in critical analysis the function of Arab
television since its emergence as a medium in the Arab world
and the governments'

approach and perception of this medium.

This chapter gives a historical background of Arab
television and the western influence on this medium in
particular,
days.

and broadcasting in general,

since the early

The chapter also illustrates the relationship between

television and Arab governments which to great extent
affected its constructive function.
As a consequence of the relationship between
governments and the states'

television industry,

chapter covers many connected issues,

this

particularly the

aspect of the political function of Arab television and the
fact of

its being a political oriented medium.

An important

part of Arab political broadcasting and its political
orientation is its development in this direction during
Nassir's reign,

a part which cannot be ignored in the
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history of Arab Broadcasting.

Last but not least,

the

chapter covers one of the common features that characterize
Arab television,

that of being a one-way medium.

The Arab States

The land of the Arab nation is a unique land.

People

look at it differently according to their individual
perspectives.
with oil.

To economists,

it is a land of sponge filled

Sociologists look at it as an arena in which

modern technology is engaged in struggle with the most
deeply-rooted traditions of the past.

To anthropologists,

it is the land of mankind's ancient civilization.

Novelists

and film makers imagine it to be a region of desert sand,
oasis,

and palm trees replete with scenes from the Arabian

nights.
world.

Politicians look at it as the sixth power in the
And of course,

on top of all that,

billions of

people look at it as the land of origin of the three major
religions of the world.
From a cultural point of view,
Education in their third conference,
Kuwait in Feb,

1968,

the Arab ministers of
which was held in

described the Arab nation in its final

report as follows:
The Arab nation is a single nation with deep historical
roots, the Arab people are united in respect of their
common land, culture, language, history, interests and
will; Arab nationalism is the human, civilizational,
cultural, social, and historical reality of the nation
and concepts, principles and goals which spring from
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and express that reality.
The Arab nation has a human
and civilizing mission which has been manifested
throughout the ages and which has contributed to
progress and development and to the buildinq of the
World civilization.1
From the geographical point of view,

the Arab World

occupies a vast area which is estimated at approximately
13,738,000 square kilometers,
surface.

or 10.8% of the earth's

It extends over an expanse of 7,000 kilometer,

from the Atlantic Ocean in the West to the Arabian Sea and
the Indian Ocean in the East,

a distance equal to one sixth

of the circumference of the earth.2
From the demographic point of view,
the Arab land,
172,558,000,

according to 1980 census,

the population of
was estimated at

for making an average density of 12.5 persons

per square kilometer.

There is,

however,

a considerable

disparity in this respect between different parts of the
Arab World,

ranging from a minimum of 1.3 persons per square

kilometer in Mauritania to a maximum of 575.1 in Bahrain.
The low population density of the Arab World is
attributed to its large desert area,

which is estimated to

constitute some 68 per cent of its total area.
areas are excluded from the calculation,

When desert

the Arab World's

mean population density becomes 40 inhabitants per square
kilometer.

If the total population is evenly distributed

over arable and potentially arable land,
would increase to 288

the average density

inhabitants per square kilo-meter,

a

figure greater than the corresponding figure for the United
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Kingdom,

one which would be regarded as ranking high on a

world wide scale.

The total population of the Arab World is

expected to increase to approximately 295,000,000 by the end
of this century.3
While the Arab World constitutes nearly 10.8 % the
world's surface,

its people count for only 3.4% of the

world's population and their share of the world's income is
only 1.1%.

Per capita consumption of electricity in the

Arab World is only 2% of the corresponding figure in the
developed countries.

The Arab World's energy consumption in

general amounts to only 3% despite the fact that the Arab
World is the world's largest source of energy.4
Regardless of what has been said about the wealth of
the Arab World,

its total share of the world's income is not

commensurate either with its geographic area or its
population.

It must be realized that the Arab countries are

still poor countries,

and their resources are in need of

development.
Despite the common factors shared by the Arab states,
there is also a huge disparity among Arab states,
aspects.
$300,

in many

The annual per capita income in North Yemen is

while it is $22,000 in the U.A.E,

statistics.

In educational services,

according to 1978

we observe that formal

schooling started in some Arab states as late as the Sixties
or the Seventies while other states have had schools and
educational

institutions for centuries.
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We find different types of governmental structure in
the Arab states

(monarchy,

republic,

and revolutionary),

single party system and multi-party system,
different types of economic systems
free enterprise)*
to another.

States'

and we find

(socialist- oriented and

constitutions vary from one state

Whereas some states have temporary

constitutions,

others have no constitution,

and while in

some states the constitution calls Islam the state's
official religion,

others call the state a secular state.

In terms of media,

this disparity is obvious in the press,

radio,

and

television.

Using the UNESCO scale of 20

television set for each 1000 inhabitants,

one finds that

most Arab states are above that scale with the exception of
Sudan,

Somalia,

Oman,

South Yemen,

According to UNESCO figures,

and North Yemen.

Kuwait is on top of the list of

Arab states for the highest average availability of TV sets:
400 TV sets per 1000.
Yemen,

At the bottom of the list comes South

with 18 sets for each 1000 inhabitants,and North

Yemen with 6 sets 1000 inhabitants,
In terms of the press,

constituting 0.2% only.5

Lebanon is the only Arab state that

passed the UNESCO scale of 100 copies for each 1000
inhabitants.
Despite of all that has been said,
unity of the Arab states,

however,

about the

one should not be too optimistic

about this illusion of Arab unity.

As a matter of fact,

Arab unity around the slogan of what has been called "Pan-
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Arabisin''

is probably the biggest lie in the Arab history.

After decades of calling for this ideology,
be nothing but a myth.

it turned out to

To know more about this,

we should

look at the practical side.
In reviewing the history of the Arabs,

I found no

shred of evidence that the Arab people have ever unified at
any time under the name of "Arabism".

In fact,

the first

and the only times that the Arab people have succeeded in
unifying themselves were under the Islamic dogma.

Probably

that is why no Arab unity existed before the emergence of
Islam.
At the present time,
accord.

the Arab states are not in

They never have been so since the turn of this

century with fall of the Islamic Ottoman Caliphate and the
emergence of

Western colonialism over Arab land— and even

after their independence from Western countries.

In fact,

we observe Arab people's unity before independence during
the struggle against the colonialists was much stronger than
after independence.

There are many disagreements among Arab

states'

they are usually in constant dispute

governments;

among themselves and they had never been in accord at any
time— and if they did it never lasted long.
While many people believe that the major dispute among
Arab states is political,

the fact is that the main dispute

among Arab states is an ideological one which is more
profound than the political;

actually politics is part of
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the ideology and the disparity among Arab politics reflects
the disparity in their ideologies.

We find Arab states have

<^ifferent idealogies in which the structure and other infra¬
structures are derived from this ideology.

This

differentiation in ideologies was reflected in the media
policies and it justifies the constant dispute among Arab
states.
There is no doubt that the Arab World is living in an
ideology dilemma.

The search for an alien ideology as an

alternative for its indigenous ideology has led the Arab
World astray.

All the ideologies the Arab states experience

right now are unsuitable for the indigenous Arab atmosphere,
they all were exported to the Arab land by the west during
the colonial period.
Since the emergence of Islam in the seventh century
until the fall of the Turkish Ottoman Empire in the
twentieth century,

we find that the Arab people have had

only one dominant and firm ideology,
has maintained their stability,

the Islamic dogma,which

prosperity,

and unity.

Media and the Arab World

Communication in its basic doctrine and principle is
not a new form of knowledge.

It was known and practiced by

the people in the past throughout the ages.

But it is

entirely new in this age of electronic communication in its
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style,

methods,

content,

theories,

pattern,

and techniques.

Media in its modern form as a new technology is a new medium
the Arab World in all its notions and practices.

And

since the Arab World is still new to this type of technology
it is still vague to many people and has been utilized by
many randomly in circumstances where

other notions and

misconceptions interfere with it.
It took the Arab World quite a long time to realize
the appreciation of media in its modern form.
underestimated

It has been

by Arab states for a long period of time.

The political situation in the Arab World and the ArabIsraeli conflict is probably the main key to realizing the
power of media.
The Arab League covenant which was declared on March
22

1945 did not give media the attention it deserves;

fact,

no attention was directed to media affairs.

in

Perhaps

this default can be attributed to the lack of Arabic
institutions specializing in the field of media;
of Arab public opinion,

furthermore the notion of the power

of media and technology at the time,
#

2,

the neglect

was immature.

Article

which was about cultural affairs and transportation,

has ignored the subject.
intentional,

Gassan Atiyya believes that was

on the grounds that media is considered a state

responsibility,

and the covenant was trying to avoid any

kind of violation to state sovereignty.

It was cautious in

interfering in any state internal affairs.6

Ironically,

at
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that time not too many Arab states had their broadcasting
system as yet,

and many of them had not gained their

independence yet.
It seems that the Arab-Israeli conflict and the
aggravation of the political events
the Arab

image

in the Middle East,

in the rest of the World have

forced the Arab

states to start changing their media policy from state
to Arab

league

level

and

level

so as to give more attention to Arab

media matters— especially to

improve the Arab

politically abroad.

the Arab League has not given

the

issue the attention and the boast

launch was weak,
no

However,

disorganized,

firm grassroots,
It

started

in

in the world

The

unplanned,

had

factors.

1954 with a narrow approach by

establishing media and
cities

it deserves.

narrow minded,

and lacked vital

image

information offices

in some major

for the primary purpose of Arab

propaganda on the Palestinian question.
called Arab media and

These offices were

information offices.

These offices

were under joint auspices of the Arab League and Arab
ambassadors

in these countries.

In 1953,

a Department of

Information and publication was established and,
the

in 1959,

organization of this department was expanded somewhat to

include other committees and offices;

however,

in general,

the

role of these organizations was

and

it had no effective activities worth mentioning.7

Rahman Al-zamil who studied,

limited and primitive

analyzed,

Abdul

and evaluated the
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role and activities of these offices and organization has
pointedly criticized them.

Their establishment and

operation was not based on a serious clear study and lacked
many vital

elements

in the planning process.

Al-zamil

concluded that these offices had failed to set a strategy of
clear objectives to achieve positive results.

He

recommended to abolish these offices;

he attributed

however,

the responsibility to the Arab League-- the organization
which maintains surveillance of these offices'
He charged that

it was responsible

decision making process,

weak policy,

It was not until January
tackled
agenda.

for the

for an

first time the

operations.

ineffective

and vague goals.8

1964 when the Arab summit
issue of media

in their

Once again the reason was a purely political

one.

It was because of the aggravation in the Arab-Israeli
conflict during the

Israel

direction of Jordan river.
the
have

file

must be considered
only to political

media

had

Arab leaders

in countering Israeli aggression,
and economic weapons.

simple

for en Arab

But the recommendation of the

and hardly touched on the

and general

statement,

as

second

The summit,

summit concerning the subject of media,

below the need,
one

upon reviewing

is one of the primary weapons that

failed to set a clear strategy

framework.

of that

In this summit,

regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict,

agreed that media

however,

operation intending to detour the

final
fall

report
far

issue except

follows;

"

for

Arab states
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must establish the necessary strategy to tackle political,
economic,

and media

In March

issues".9

1964,

the

first meeting of Arab ministers of

information was held in Cairo two months after the summit
and according to the summit's recommendation.
meeting,

In this

the Arab ministers set basic alternatives and

general headlines

for an Arab media

framework.

Simply,

demanded reorganization of the media department,

they

and more

coordination between Arab Embassies and media centers
abroad.

The goal

of all these moves was the Palestinian

question.10
Despite the

fact that the media

agenda of every summit since
to

1964,

issue has been on the

no attempts had been made

set a clear and specific strategy and all the

recommendations came
summit,

which was

in general headlines.

in September

following

in article

ministers

of

#

10:

1964,

recommended the

"Give the necessary commands to

information to set an Arab social

media that assure presentation of Arab
the general
the

brevity,

recommendation

from Arab

leaders

this time the

the

vagueness,

strategy

issues.".

for

Despite

and lack of many details,

is considered to be the

first

for a certain media strategy,

indication
even though

summit recommended social media strategy

instead of political
unexpected.

The second

strategy which was rather unusual and

Muhammad Masalha believes that the consensus on

function of political media at the time was a premature
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among Arab states

.11

The third summit
light to states'
kinds of media

in

1965

governments

forms.

in Morocco gave the green

for more monopolization of all

The summit urged the governments of

member states to tighten their grip and control
media

in their states and to halt the severe air waves

hostility among the members
among Arab states.
the

over the

in order to improve relations

The third article of the

summit recommended the

final

following:

1- Utilization of press and broadcasting and all
media

should be

report of

forms of

in the service of the Arab question.

2- Adherence to limiting objective discussion and
constructive criticism in tackling Arab
press

and air waves campaigns and all

forms of media.

3- Review and revising of the press laws
enactment of

issues and halting

in each state and

legislation that would prohibit any media act

which might cause any offence to any Arab state or might
directly or

indirectly offend the head of states.12

However,

all

these recommendations did not have the

chance to be enacted,
agreement.
involved

and the members could not keep their

Once the summit was over,

the Arab states got

in more disputes and disagreements among themselves

through the media,

and generated even more severe hostility

than before until they all
Days War defeat.
in the media

awoke to the tragedy of the Six

The defeat was considered by many a defeat

field more than a defeat on the battle

field.
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Indeed,

the Six Days War defeat is considered a major shock

which draw a clear cut line in Arab media history.

Al-zamil

observed an obvious disparity between Arab media activities
and policies before and after 1967 defeat.
with the exception of the educated class and political
commentators, neither Arab leaders nor Arab people have
given a thought prior to the defeat to media affairs
beyond the limits of Arab states' borders.13
Al-zamil observes that Arab governments began to think
of media more seriously and logically than ever right after
the defeat.

The Arab Ministers of Information,

in their

September 1967 meeting which was called exclusively to
discuss the defeat— admitted the failure of their policy in
the field of media and that these mistakes and shortcomings
contributed to the defeat.

The participants demanded a

reevaluation of the whole situation and reconsideration of
the issue.

The meeting came up with only one final

recommendation by the end of their meeting,
attitude:

reflecting their

"Create a media policy to persuade world opinion

with respect to the justice of Arab issues".14
On the contrary,
meeting,

in their previous February 1967

held a few months before the war occurred,

the

participants were not enthusiastic about the issue and the
final report of that meeting did not mention it.
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Background History of Television in the Arab States

The start of the first Arab television broadcasting
system is not really known.

Whereas some writers believe

that the first formal Arab television station was built in
IracJ

1956,

others believe that there were other private

television stations before the Iraqi station.

It seems that

the first television station in the Arab states began in the
early 1950's as non-official beginning when the French and
the Americans established the first television stations in
the Arab states.
started first,

Even though it is not quite sure who

it is believed that the French built the

first television station in MOROCCO in 1954.

Around that

time the American Army built another station at Wheelus Air
Base in Libya and two more stations in Saudi Arabia.
in 1956,

Then,

the Iraqi launched their television as the first

official Arab television.
Television did not start in all Arab states as a
governmental television,

especially those states which

started earlier than others.

As we have seen,

some of them

started in the form of foreign military activity as in the
cases of Libya and Saudi Arabia.

In some Arab states

television started in the form of commercial services,
for example in Morocco

(1954)

as

where television began by the

French on a commercial basis in Rabat and Casablanca,

in

Lebanon where the Lebanese Television Company was founded in
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1956,

and the Lebanon and the Orient Television Company

founded in 1962.

In Kuwait,

television broadcasting was

launched by a private station owned by a businessman who
happened to be an RCA dealer.

In Bahrain

(1973),

a

commercial station whose revenues were derived exclusively
from advertising and which was established by the Americanowned International Radio and Television Corporation,

the

government owned 20% of the station's capital.
Television did not start in all Arab states at the
same time or even within a short period of time.

As a

matter of fact we find disparity and a huge gap in time
among Arab states in establishing their television services.
We see that some Arab states started their television
service relatively late compared to other Arab states.
such as Morocco,

Libya,

Iraq,

and Lebanon started their

television as early as in the 1950's.
Arab
Yemen,

such as Qatar,

Some

We find that other

United Arab Emerits,

Oman,

and North

did not have their television service till mid and

late seventies or even in the eighties as the case in
Somalia.

Sometimes we see a time span as long as twenty

five years.
Although television in the Arab states did not start
with government sponsorship,

all television systems in the

Arab states at the present time are under extraordinarily
tight governmental control either directly or indirectly,
reach the level of exaggeration in all

its aspects
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including supervising,directing,
operations.

In Dubai

(U.A.E)

funding,

control,

and

we find the only commercial

television station in the Arab World; however,

even this

station is highly supervised by the government.

Another

special case is Lebanon; television in Lebanon began on a
commercial basis with two television companies,
substantial outside financing.
until

1978,

both with

This situation continued

when the two companies were merged into a single

service owned jointly by the government and the private
sector.

In the special case of the civil war in Lebanon,

there exist different televisions stations representing
different fighting sects.
Through the years of government control,
television has changed slightly.

policies of

In the early days

advertising used to be prohibited;

now,

most Arab states

allow advertising in their television broadcasting even in
very strict states such as Saudi Arabia and Iraq.
though advertising is permitted,
certain limit.
fee.

Even

it has to be within a

Most Arab states do not have a television

In some Arab states a fee takes the form of charge

added to the electricity bill.
The technical development of television in the Arab
states has grown very rapidly in all its related aspects
particularly in the last two decades,

especially in the rich

oil Arab states either in receiver ownership,
training,

land coverage,

transmission power,

facilities,
broadcast
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hours,

station numbers,

and channels availability.

At the present time

,

there are more than 116

television stations in the Arab states,

some of them linked

together in a microwave network such as "maghrebvision".
Similarly,

stations within a single state may be linked by

satellite,

as is the case in Sudan and Algeria.

The Saudi

television network which links a number of cities in Saudi
Arabia is perhaps the largest and newest television network
in the Third World.

Western Influence on Arab Television

Western influence has a great presence in Arab media
in general and Arab television in particular.
influence is not recent.
this influence,

This

When we trace the back ground of

we find it was going on since the early

stages of establishment of television.
Western countries have had a great influence on and
played a vital role in introducing and establishing
broadcasting in general in the Arab states.
not only television but it also radio,

It influenced

before that.

western influence has continued and still exists,
the westerners had left the Arab land.

This

even after

In any case,

radio

and television are considered a western invention in the
first place.
This influence began during the colonial era when the
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Westerners established the foundation for Arab broadcasting
for their own purposes,

to be more specific,

during World

War II when the Allies and the Nazis built broadcasting
stations in some parts of the Arab world to spread
propaganda for their policy during the war and to serve
their own interests as colonists.

Obviously,

the Westerners

did not establish these stations for the benefit of the
indigenous people so it would seem that if World War II had
not broken out Westerners would not have bothered to
establish these stations.
Probably the first words the Arab people heard through
the air waves was
The British,

...THIS IS BERLIN...and THIS IS LONDON!15

French,

Italians,

and the Germans are actually

the first ones who introduced broadcasting to the Arab
World,

each one according to his location in the Arab World.

That's why we see the Arab states which were not under
western colonialism begin their broadcasting services
relatively late comparing to other Arab states which were
under western colonialism.

Douglas Boyd attributes the late

radio service in Saudi Arabia to the absence of foreign
influence on government decisions at the time:
There had been no such early need for a radio
broadcasting service in Saudi Arabia, as in Egypt,
Lebanon, and Iraq.
No foreign power was at the time
influencing government decisions.
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Radio
In reviewing history of colonial periods,

we observe

that the French introduced radio broadcasting to their
colonies in the Arab states in Morocco,

Algeria,

Tunisia,

and Lebanon.

The British introduced it in their colonies in

Egypt,

Sudan,

Libya,

Palestine,

Kuwait,

U.A.E,

and South

Yemen.
In Egypt,

Egyptian radio had an Anglo-American and

Anglo-French birth.

In 1931,

Egypt had two radio stations,

each one owned by an Englishman and a Frenchman;

both

stations were advertising European and American products.
Broadcasting occurred in Arabic,

English,

and French,

English concerts and dance records were in daily use.

but
Thus

there was a background of some 25 years of strongly AngloAmerican,

and French- influenced radio when the Voice of the

Arabs began in July 1953.17
Later,

the British company,

Marconi,

set the first

pattern of radio broadcasting in major cities before it
expanded it services in the following years with agreements
with the government.

In Libya,

broadcasting began in 1939

by the Italians when they established a radio station in
Tripoli.

The station was called "RADIO MARRELLI" but it was

destroyed during World War Two.

Libya also experienced a

military broadcast service which was operated from both the
British and the Americans Armed bases till the 1969 coup.
Sudan,

the British began radio transmission in April 1940

In
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from a small room in the post office of the city of Umm
Derman,

funded by the budget designated for Allied

propaganda.

The function of the station was give updated

news of the war.

The British authorities distributed

receivers in the public square to encourage people to listen
to the station.

The station was expanded in 1942 and two

programs were added,

one broadcast in English only; the

other was for the fighting troops.

Once the war was over,

the Allies terminated the station's propaganda budget and it
almost ceased operating,

but British authorities interceded

and continued to subsidize the station.18
In Somalia,

broadcasting was introduced by both the

British in 1943 and the Italian in May 1951 to serve their
colonial purposes,

since the British dominated the north and

the Italian dominated the south.

Both stations were

broadcasting in English and Italian besides the Arabic
language.

In Palestine and Jordan,

the British built a

radio station in 1936 during the mandate authority,

one of

the early and prominent radio stations in the Arab World.
The special concern of the British in this station is due to
the Palestine strategic location and because it is the focal
point of Arabs,

British,

and Jews.

broadcasting in three languages,
Hebrew.

In Iraq,

Arab world,
gifted,

The station was

Arabic,

English,

and

the Germans had the best stronghold in the

where they built a powerful station with their

skilled,

and talented announcer,

Yunis Bahri,

to
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propagandize for them.
In Kuwait,

the British also built a small radio

station for the Allies to counter the powerful Nazi station
in Iraq for which all program materials were provided by the
Germans.

In South Yemen,

radio started in Hay 1954 with the

local relying station of the BBC Arabic service from London
and the Cypress-based,

British-operated station.

Programing

was broadcast via a transmitter rented by the colonial
government from the British telecommunication company cable
and wireless.19

In North Yemen,

broadcasting began in 1947

when an American delegation gave the ruler at the time,
Yahya,

a gift of a CB device which could operate as a

transmitter;

he used this device to start broadcasting

despite the rarity of receivers among his people.20
U.A.E,

Imam

In

the British forces brought a radio station for their

own use and built it in the sheikdom of Sharja.
In Saudi Arabia,
in the Kingdom,

despite the late public use of radio

the King,

acquired from his friend,

Marconi agent H.st John Philby,

British

a portable transmitter that

would accompany him when he traveled,

to keep him in touch

personally with the vast Kingdom and the outside World where
he purchased and installed a network of transmitters in
various cities in the Kingdom.21

In May 1949,

a contract with International Electric Company

the King had
(IEC)

a

branch of ITT to build a medium wave transmitter in the
Western provence of the country.

Later the same company had
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another contract to build another station in Jiddah.22
The French were very active
In Lebanon,

in 1937,

transmitters.
September,3

in their colonies as well.

they constructed two

radio

One medium wave station to operate

1938

and a short wave to operate

stations were operated by the French.

in

in 1940.

Both

The purpose was to

counter Italian and Nazi German propaganda beamed at Syria
and Lebanon

from the Arabic division at radio of Berlin.23

In Morocco,

the French built a radio station in 1928 during

their occupation.

In Algeria,

radio broadcasting began in

1925 when the French government built a radio transmitter to
serve one million French colonists.

The expansion was

O

continued,

and by the end of the war,

covering most of the country.
when the national
Morocco,

the

humiliating

It was not until January 1963

government took over the stations.

In

situation was even worse and it took on a
formal

aspect when the French had an agreement

with the Moroccan government
Telephone,

the transmission was

and Telegraph

monopoly was expanded to
communication.
broadcasting.

In Feb

for a monopoly over Post,

(PTT).

In November 1924

the

include all electronic

1928,

the French started radio

Under the French protectorate,

the mission of

radio was to serve French

interests,

and those

News and other programs were

of the empire.

those of the settlers

tightly supervised by the Resident General.
the

Director of Radio Morocco.

He appointed

Perhaps that's why radio

in
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Morocco did not play any part
independence.
influence.
service
The

in

in Tunisia,

in the struggle

the French also had a very strong

The colonial government broadcast a radio
1930 to serve primarily the French colonists.

broadcast materials consisted

imported
French

for

from France.

Even after

largely of materials
independence

in

1956

staff helped operate the Tunisian station and the

French channel maintained

its broadcasting.

Television

In the

field of television,

the history of

development was not much different than it was
and

large television was also

by westerners.
most active

in

in radio.

By

introduced to the Arab World

Whereas the British and the French were the
introducing radio,

the Americans had joint

the British and the French as a up coming force
introducing television,

competing with them,

becoming the only predominant force
television

its

in

and years

later

in the field of

in the Arab World.

Jeremy Tunstall attributes the American presence to
military and economic objectives

"Television,

especially,

had a very American-influenced birth in the Middle-East.
One

factor was the early presence of television stations on

the Persian Gulf used by the USAF and American oil
companies.

There was also much activity by RCA,

with whom
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the United States government was directly
establishing television
balance to Soviet

involved

in both Syria and Egypt

in

(as a

financing of the Aswan dam)...American

influence has been especially strong in the birth of
television
In

in the

fact,

stations

oil

it

states of the Persian Gulf."^

is believed that the

first television

in the Arab World were built by the U.S Army,

American armed

when

forces established low-power English language

stations utilizing the technical Americans standard for both
military base personnel

at Wheelus Air Force Base

in Libya,

and the U.S Military Training Mission at Dhahran Inter¬
national Airport
American Oil
station

for

Company
its

Saudi Arabia.
The
in

Iraq

This

1956,

British trade

(ARAMCO)

9000

first

in

in Saudi Arabia.

employees

Moreover,

the Arabian-

built a similar low power
in the Eastern province of

station still

operates.

formal Arab television station,
was

fair.

established

imported originally as part of a
In

1966,

the British company,

Marconi,

won a contract with the Jordanian government to build a
Jordanian television system.

In South Yemen,

television was

introduced by the British during their occupation of South
Yemen.

The purpose was to

people's thoughts

find a means of

distracting

from the outcomes of the revolution in

neighboring North Yemen and from listening to the popular
Egyptian
the

radio programs which were attacking very severely

British presence

in South Yemen and demanding that
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people revolt against the British occupation.

The station

was destroyed during the struggle against the British and it
took the new regime two years to resume broadcasting.
U.A.E

(United Arab Emerits),

the British started a

television company on August 6,
company,

Thomson,

in

1969 owned by the British

but in same year the regional government

took over the station.25

in Oman,

television broadcasting

began in November of 1974 by a German company which operated
and maintained it according to an agreement with the
government.

Another Oman station was established in 1975,

operated by a British company under contract with the
government.

It was not until 1979 that the government took

over the two stations.26
In the North Africa Arab states,

it is

believed that the

French built the first television station in the Arab World
and in Africa as well.
from

(PTT)

In 1950,

two French firms obtained

Post Telephone Telegraph a 50-year monopoly on

Moroccan Television to broadcast in both Arabic and French.
In Algeria,

the French built the first television station

during the occupation but the station was destroyed during
the liberation war.

After rebuilding the station,

some

radical French destroyed the transmitter in order to prevent
the Algerian people from listening to president Degoal
statement that declared the independence of Algeria.

The

French rebuilt the station again in 1963.27
In Libya,

the U.S Army Forces built one of the first
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television stations

in the Arab World in Wheelus Air Base to

entertain American personnel.
signed

in

1959

In Egypt,

the government

a contract with RCA to provide a

comprehensive television service

for Egypt and Syria.

were united under the name of United Arab Republic.
Lebanon,

the

Both
In

first television station was established with

the help of the French and the second television station was
established with the help from ABC.28
In Saudi Arabia,
involvement

in the Saudi television system,

and operation.
service

Saudi Arabia started

relatively

Until mid

there was a very strong American

1965,

both

in planning

its own television

late compared to other Arab states.

Saudi Arabia was the only big Arab state

which did not have

its own television system despite the

fact that the second television station in the Arab World
was

founded

personnel.

in Saudi Arabia by the U.S.A.F to entertain Base
Also another station was

Arab-American Oil

Company

founded earlier by the

(ARAMCO).

The American connection started when the Crown Prince
(Faisel),

who

later became King made a visit to American

Ambassador Parker T.
a

television system.

the

State

Edward W.
wrote

a

Department,
Allen,

Hart and asked him for help

in building

Ambassador Hart passed the request to
which,

in turn,

passed it to the FCC.

chief engineer came to Saudi Arabia and

report that served as a blueprint

between the two countries.

for an agreement

The Allen report called

for the
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responsibility of the U.S.Army Corps of Engineers

(COE),

who

had already constructed many governmental projects
throughout Saudi Arabia.

The responsibility was formally

defined in an agreement signed in January 1964 by Ambassador
Hart and Saudi government.

The

(COE)

firm of RCA to supply the equipment,
firm,

NBCI,

chose the American
and another American

for the operation and maintenance.

COE,

RCA,and

NBCI continued to carry out the development and expansion of
the Saudi television.29
In Bahrain,
International,

also,

an American company,

RTV

signed a contract in 1974 with the government

to operate a color commercial television service,

making

Bahrain the first Arab state to have color television and
the only commercial station in the region.

In fact the,

station's slogan was " The first color television in the
Arab world".

The government owned only 20% of the

enterprise and had one representative on its Board of
Directors.

In general,

the station was too Americanized.

There was no signs that it was an Arab station or operated
in an Arab state except fir its broadcast of Arabic news.30
The government assumed operation of the station in 1976
because of its poor facilities and to overcome rumors of a
CIA connection with the station.31
In North Yemen,

a group of international businessmen

headed by an American attempted in the 197 0s to gain a
government concession to operate a commercial television
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service in the capital city San'a,
income paid to the government.

with a percentage of the

Due to the political unrest

and military coups which changed governments,

such an

agreement could not be reached.

Television and Governments in the Arab States

One of the obvious features that characterized Arab
television is it strong relation to governments.

All

television stations in the Arab states are state systems.
They are owned,

controlled,

financed by the governments.

supervised,

operated,

and

There is no doubt that Arab

governments have realized the power of television as an
effective influence by whoever is using it over public
opinion.

It seems that Arab governments have no intention

of giving up this psychological weapon,

even partially,

at

least in the near future.
On the contrary,

we observe more and more control and

domination because television broadcasting has become part
of the national policy.

That justifies the tight control of

government over television and the absence of even a minimum
of public participation.

Democracy and television in the

Arab states have always clashed with government structure.
Herbert Schiller notes that whichever way decision-makers
move in any particular situation,

the central and

unprecedented fact is that information control

78

countries

Figure

2.

Number

of

television

sets

SOURCE:
Arab Media Present and Future;
Information Order, ALECSO, Tunis, 1987.

countries

per

1000

countries

people.

Toward New Arab

79

Figure

3.

Distributions
of
on global basis.

television

SOURCE:
Arab Media Present and Future;
Information Order, ALECSO, Tunis, 1987.

transmitters

Toward New Arab

80
has become part of national policy.

The techniques of

ideational packaging have become instruments for
manipulating popular support for
to)

(or,

at least,

indifference

governmental actions.32
If Arab governments are acknowledging television power

at the present time,

that was not the case when television

first started in the Arab World.
governments have discovered

It seems that Arab

the power of television years

after it started in their lands. As a new technological
invention,

not too many Arab leaders realized its power,

which probably explains the existence of private stations in
the early years and their disappearance in later years.

The

Arab states built their television systems relatively late
on the scene,

which is why we did not see as much attachment

between government and television in the past as we do now.
The attachment has increased over the years.

Governments

increasingly paid more attention and manifested more concern
about television as the years went by.

In fact,

television

received more governmental attention than any other aspect
of media— the press,

for example.

It seems that Arab governments were trying to
encourage their people to be attracted to television by
watching television as the ultimate voice of government
authority,

since the press is not necessarily the formal

voice of the government in some Arab states.

We observe

that Arab television has developed quite drastically in the
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past twenty years,

much faster than was expected despite the

fact that Arab television started in the mid-fifties and
early sixties.

Jeremy Tunstall observed that,

An unusual aspect of the Arab-Muslim World is that the
weak press tradition, combined with government
enthusiasm for television, leads to several countries
having television set ownership more widely diffused
than daily news paper sales.33
fact,

one of the main problems Arab television is

suffering from is the extraordinary censorship and the
unusual government control.

At a time when one of the

functions of television is to pose government activity,

we

find virtually the opposite in the Arab world where
government exercises censorship of television.
to its weakness as an institution,

In addition

poor human resources,

lack of technical training facilities,

it also lacks freedom

of creativity.
Arab television has often been used as a tool to
legitimize undemocratic government systems and in many cases
to legitimize illegal government actions,

since there are no

democratic governments in the Arab states.

There are only

two types of governments in the Arab states;
governments or military governments,
undemocratic.

either monarchy

and they both are

Since the state structure is not democratic

it was very natural that this would also be characteristic
of the states'
television,

institutions.

Democracy does not exist in

and criticism of governments,

and senior officials is prohibited.

heads of state,

In fact,

criticizing a
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head of state is considered the greatest unforgivable sin.
Mahmood El-sherif,

an Arab media activist holds Arab

governments responsible for the abuse of television,
Unfortunately, and because the means of communication
in the Arab countries were and still are owned and
controlled, overtly or covertly, by Arab governments,
these means have been used in certain instances for
negative purposes, and in the absence of a free
competition for quality, certain branches of the media,
like television, not only failed in discharging their
social responsibility, but were turned into proponents
of harmful pattern of behavior, and even moral
decadence. 4
The Arab committee studying media issues in the Arab
World,

in its report,

" Toward New Arab Information Order,"

expressed its deep disappointment in the weak performance
function of Arab broadcasting and blamed Arab governments
for the deterioration and admitted the low level that Arab
broadcasting has reached,
Concerning the core, Arab media has not reached the
level that adequately copes with its message in terms
of increasing the awareness of Arab citizens,
reinforcing his cultural identity, getting him involved
in his society's main problems, and contributing to the
social development. On top of that, Arab media probably
was in many cases the cause of Arab citizen living in
confusion and contradiction.
Arab media has been
utilized in many cases in the service of questionable
goals such as sustaining dispute and disagreement
instead of reinforcing brotherhood ties of the Arabs,
defending the justice of Arab issues, and contributing
to development programs of Arab societies.35

The Political Function of Arab Television

Media activists in the Arab World believe that there
is a big difference in the content of broadcast messages
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some twenty five years ago and those of today.

The

political content of programs has out-numbered any other
locally produced programs.

The political programs

constitute from 15% to 25% of the total programs broadcast
either on radio or television,

and the government monopoly

of the broadcast media has a lot to do with this political
function.36

The ruling elite in the Arab states has

utilized the media for political socialition of their states
to instill certain political values promoted by these ruling
elites.

Usually to increase the public loyalty to the head

of state,

the political system,

At the present time,

if we look at television in the

Arab states from any angle,
to politics.

and the state structure.

we find that it always relates

That give us the rationalization that we can

not separate television from two things,
of the other.
and,

second,

Tunstall,

First,

one a consequence

we cannot separate it from government

we can not separate it from politics.

who studied media in Arab states,

where else in the Middle East,

Jeremy

noted that every

the media have always had

strong political overtones.37
The evidence of what we are saying is that wherever we
go in the Arab states,

we see that television and radio

stations are always protected by the army,
states's institutions.

unlike other

And whenever there is a coup,

the

first thing done is to attack and take over television and
radio stations,

since broadcasting services became part of
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the political
government,

system.

It becomes the voice of the

the voice of authority.

As a consequence,

broadcasting stations become a main political target

for

every new regime and every anti-governments regime.
After a military coup took place
Qassim became to power.

in Iraq in 1958,

He was well known for his

for television and political broadcasting.

fondness

He was devoted

very extensively and exclusively to broadcasting to promote
his

own personal political philosophy

in a way that was much

worse than President Nassir of Egypt.

His daily television

appearance and speeches proved his attachment to television.
In

1963,

Qassim was overthrown in a coup and he was killed

near the television studio.
displayed on
In

live television.38

a

rebel

claimed the King
government.

is dead,

Forces

declaring a revolutionary republic

loyal to the king put down the rebellion

Also the same thing happened during the bloody

in South Yemen

groups of rebel
days

army group seized the radio station and

seven hours of battle to recapture the radio

station.39
coup

his body was

1971 during the unsuccessful bloody military coup

in Morocco,

after

Ironically,

of battles,

in January 1986.

The two struggling

forces and government forces

lived through

attacking each other through the air waves.

The battle to capture the television station make the
station go off the air
won the battle.

for days before the public knew who

In Lebanon,

since the

start of the civil
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war,

each

fighting group has

its own radio and television

station.
Television in all Arab states with no exception has
been used as a tool

of governments.

And it has been always

treated and looked at as the private property of the ruling
elite and,
head

to be more specific,

of the

state.

as a personal tool of the

Governments have always looked at

television as a monopoly tool

and they are the only class

who have the privilege of expressing their attitudes.
main

function

defend their

is to propagandize
internal

for the ruling class and to

and external policy.

Arab television has been overused
programs

The

in politics and

its

are overloaded with purely political content

reflecting the attitudes of certain people.

And

if Arab

governments have assigned high priority to radio and
television broadcasting,
higher
fact,

they have also assigned an even

importance to the political content of programs.

In

politics was the main concern of broadcasting

development

in the early years.

As a consequence Arab

governments were more concerned in utilizing television in
politics much more than to utilize
And

in

investing resources

resources

it

in social development.

in television than

for any other human and developmental

There are some Arab states
in desperate need
governments

in investing
services.

in which their people are

for basic human services:

however,

their

insisted on giving the top priority to building
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luxury television stations.40

Even though some analysts see

that the political phenomenon in Arab television can be
ascribed to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the political
seething in the Middle East in general,

the truth is most of

these programs do not deal with Arab issues as much as they
serve as propaganda for each state government.

State

government news always precedes and has priority over
national news no matter how important the latter may be.
News bulletins always start with the news of the head of
state and government officials no matter what the situation
is,

even in cases of national disaster.
Statistics and figures showed that political programs

and news in Arab television occupy the largest portion of
broadcast programs after entertainment programs,
average of 20%.
25%.

for an

In some Arab states the percentage reaches

UNESCO conducted research in behalf of the Gulf

Television Agency to find the reasons why International and
Western media do not use their news to the level the Agency
would desire;

the findings of the study indicate that most

of the Agency news does not take into account the common
sense of news ethics and norms of the west.
the state protocol news,
public,

It insists on

news which makes no sense to the

in addition to having a lack of professional

principles of news reporting in media broadcasting.
Muhammad Al-Sanousi,

former Under-Secretary Assistant for

Television Affairs in Kuwait,

told the writer in a personal
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interview that there are many exciting and powerful events
and news taking place in the Arab world,

but they are

rejected by the international news agencies primarily
because of poor and improper coverage.
In analyzing the content of these political programs,
we conclude that these programs usually aim to do the
following:
1- gain people's loyalty to the head of state.
2- Praise the political structure and the ideology of the
state.
3- Praise the performance of the government.
4- Defend the internal and external policy of the state as
the level of perfection.

Political Broadcasting Under Nassir

In studying media within Arab states,

one can not

ignore the role that Egypt under Nassir had played in the
development and shaping of Arab media,
field of political broadcasting,
aspects of this role.

regardless of the negative

It is beyond the scope of this paper

to cover this role in detail,
ignore it totally.

especially in the

however,

Inevitably,

it is unfair to

one must touch on the

political aspect of this role.
Perhaps one of the sharp turning points of Arab
government involvement in broadcasting was in the 1950s when
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Nassir of Egypt came to power.

When for the first time in

the Arab World the political broadcasting phenomenon was
launched as the main function and the clear,

strong,

and

formal relation between government and broadcasting was
established.
Nassir was the first Arab ruler to monopolize not only
radio and television but the press as well,

through what has

been called "nationalization of the press".

With that,

he

announced the official attachment between government and
broadcasting.

Since Nassir came to power,

he caused an

upheaval within the Egyptian broadcasting system which
afterward became a pattern for other Arab states:
1- For the first time in the Arab World Nassir put
broadcasting under direct government control through a
ministry of national guidance which later became in the Arab
states the ministry of Information.
2- He showed his appreciation of broadcasting by giving
special attention to developing broadcasting performance,
and increasing the number of employees and technicians.
3_ Increased transmission hours and variety of programs.
4- Increased transmission power to cover not only Egypt but
also the Arab World to achieve political purposes.

In less

than ten years transmission power increased 28 folds.
5- Increased and expanded external services.
Nassir set the first and the best example of how to
devote broadcasting to personal propaganda and politics and
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how to use it both as a personal and as a government tool in
the Arab World? which was followed later by all other Arab
governments.

Nassir played a major role in spreading the

political broadcasting
states,

phenomenon throughout the Arab

which was heretofore unknown?

at the very least,

he

helped to accelerate this type of expansion.
The role of broadcasting as an important and a vital
P°litical

force for transmitting ideas,

shaping public opinion,

mobilizing masses,

and reaching out to people was

invisible for Arab rulers until they awoke to hear Nassir's
voice endeavoring to topple their monarchies,
those of Iraq,

Jordan,

Saudi Arabia,

has been called of the Air Waves War.

especially

and Yemen,

during what

Nassir also called

for Arab liberation from Western colonialism in some Arab
states such as Algeria,

Oman,

and South Yemen.

Nassir

triggered the first spark through his popular and powerful
station,

"Voice of The Arabs" which was actually "Voice of

Nassir" and through the voice of the legendary and most
skilled announcer of all Arab times and Nassir's spokesman
"Ahmed Sae'id",

the Walter Cronkite of the Arabs.

The fast success and the amazing growing of the
popularity of the "Voice of the Arabs" program among the
people caused its broadcast hours to jump from half an hour
a day,

when it first began in July 1953 to seven hours in

July 1954.

In 1962 the average broadcast hours reached 22

hours and 15 minutes,

and grew to 24 hours in 1970.
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For so many years,

Egypt had been the knowledge center

for the Muslims and Arab World.

At the turn of the century,

Egypt became a major source of printed media and films for
the Arab states,
Arabs"

station,

and with the launching of the "Voice of the
Egypt completed its role as a center of

electronic media for the Arab states.
Nassir for the Arab World had played the same role
that Hitler did for Europe.

if Hitler realized the power of

radio to manipulate people's thought before other Western
leaders did,

Nassir also realized the power of radio and

television before other Arab leaders did.

Nassir suddenly

became a voice that attracted the attention of the Arab
people through air waves.

He was the first Arab figure to

master broadcasting as a political medium taking advantage
of the Arabic culture as an oral culture.43

Nassir's smart

utilization of broadcasting was not only directed against
Arab rulers in other Arab states but also against his own
people who opposed his regime and his personal enemies
outside Egypt,

a practice Which was followed as an example

by other Arab leaders.

Egypt is considered a pattern with a

special effects in terms of political programs.
fifties,
radio;

In the

the Egyptian regime concentrated primarily on

in the sixties increased attention was concentrated

on television as an additional tool to reach out to
audiences;

Nassir used both radio and television to evoke

enthusiasm and was promoting people's advocacy of his
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political and economic changes.

He also used it to develop

contempt for the regime's enemies he was fighting,

domestic

as well as foreign enemies.44
Nassir's voice succeeded very quickly and powerfully
in attracting audiences all over the Arab states in an
attempt to export the Egyptian revolution model to other
Arab states and to gather Arab people around his ideology.
He makes himself an Arab national hero through broadcasting,
especially after he raised his slogan for Arab Unity through
his famous racist movement,
For so long,

"Pan Arabisim".

Nassir's station was calling Arab people

to topple their monarchy government regime and to set up a
revolutionary governments especially in states such as
Jordan,

Iraq,

Saudi Arabia,

loyalty to the west.

and Yemen,

accusing them of

The quick and positive responses to

Nassir's calls in Iraq and North Yemen amazed Arab
governments and made them realize,
time,

probably for the first

of the power of broadcasting in mobilizing people

politically.

Arab governments found themselves unable to

counter Nassir's station due to their lack of powerful
transmission and skilled personnel.

During the vicious

campaign from Nassir's station attacking the Iraq
government;

the Iraqi government petitioned the American

Ambassador to Iraq with an urgent request that the U.S
supply high-power short and medium-wave transmitters in a
matter of days or few weeks at the latest because Iraq's
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transmitter's were too inadequate to match Nassir's
signals.45

In 1958,

as a result of Nassir's calls,

coup took place in Iraq.

a bloody

The full credit may go to Nassir's

station and its mouthpiece,

Ahmed Sae'id.

The fast success and powerful advancing of Nassir's
station took other Arab leaders by surprise.

its threat

extended to other Arab governments which were in dispute
with him ideologically.
Iraq,

After the early and fast result in

the Nassir station made the same demand to the people

in other Arab states there were where also positive results
in Algeria,

Libya,

and South Yemen.

That was a sufficient

to other Arab governments of the threat of broad¬
casting to their regimes.

All of a sudden,

the Arab

governments found themselves at a critical disadvantage.
In an attempt to repel Naasir's station and to deter
their people from listening to his provocative commentators,
Arab governments that opposed his ideology started to
accelerate establishing their own broadcasting systems to
emulate him politically in order to distract their people
from listening to him.

In fact,

one of the reasons that the

British-introduced television in South Yemen is to distract
people from listening to Nassir's station.

Also,

Arab

governments which were proponents of Nassir's ideology and
witnessed the success of his station and admired the
popularity of his broadcasting strategy were eager to
develop their own systems following his pattern.
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Meanwhile,

after witnessing the popularity and the

over-whelming success of his station,

Nassir was eager to

develop the power of his broadcasting system to make sure
that all Arab people,
his voice.

either in Asia or Africa,

During the Yemen War,

could hear

Nassir distributed 100,000

transistor radios sets to ensure that the "Voice of the
Arabs" would reach Yemeni tribesmen.46

Nassir wanted his

voice to reach the people not only in the Arab World,
also the people in the Third World as well.

but

Between 1952

and 1971 Egypt expanded its radio transmission power
seventy—

fold,

broadcast.47
Indonesia,

ahead of both France and Japan in hours

Since 1953,

India,

Egypt started broadcasting to

and Pakistan.

broadcasting to Turkey,

Iran,

And in 1954

it started

and East Africa.

Broadcast

hours jumped from 86 hours a week in 1953 to 339 hours a
week in I960.48
tremendously.

Broadcasting under Nassir has expanded
In 1962,

a United Nations report classified

Egypt radio as the World's largest and powerful external
service in daily transmission hours after the Soviet Union
(RM) .49
In addition to Nassir's success in utilizing
broadcasting for political reasons to mobilize people in
order to achieve his goals,

other circumstances helped him

to reach them:
1-

Nassir was the first Arab ruler to appreciate the power

of media and he took advantage of broadcasting both as a new
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technology and as a double-edged weapon.

He could reach his

far away Arab audience in Asia and Africa by radio waves,
which the printed media could not do.

Nassir did not want

to attract only the literate elite Arabs,

but also the

illiterate masses at the bottom of the pyramid.

The

enormous number of illiterate Arabs did not have to know how
to read to listen to his programs.
2-

He used broadcasting as a means of crossing national

borders,

whereas printed media could be easily banned by

those who opposed his ideology;

jamming techniques were not

available at the time.
3-

Nassir seized upon the opportunity that none of the Arab

rulers appreciated media as he did and not all Arab states
had their own broadcasting system;

their people had not yet

begun to pay much attention to broadcasting,
their governments did have stations,

and even when

they were not as

powerful and popular as Nassir's.
4-

As mentioned earlier,

Nassir took advantage of the

Arabic language as an oral language,

by which he could

communicate with his audience very strongly and with
emotionally overtones to provoke and stimulate them.
5-

The peak of political unrest in most Arab states during

the 1950s and 1960s helped Nassir to succeed to a great
degree,

since most Arab states at that time were still under

Western colonialism and had not yet gained their political
independence.

Their states had not been really defined yet,
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the struggle of power was continuing among different
factions,

none of the regimes were firmly established,

and

there was an absence of prominent charismatic leaders who
could rival Nassir.

The Egyptian revolution,

as the first

major revolution in the Arab World against the British,

was

the first spark of rebellion against colonialism in the Arab
states.

Nassir was trying to transmit this spark through

the broadcasting programs beamed to other Arab states,
promoting the Egyptian revolution as an ideal for similar
expected revolutions to model themselves after.
Thus,

Nassir was the first to capture and attract the

first generation of a government political broadcasting
audience long before any other Arab leaders did;

competition

was then created among other Arab governments to capture as
many audiences as they could to attract them to their side.
As a result,

politics and government propaganda became a

major factor in establishing broadcasting systems in other
Arab states either to support Nassir's ideas or to counter
propaganda from him.

Basically,

it is fair to say that the

emergence of broadcasting in the Arab states was due to a
cause not a need.
television,

Even after the introduction of

this political function of broadcasting has

automatically shifted as a natural consequences from radio
to the newly introduced medium,

in which this notion became

even more developed than it was in radio.
As a result of other Arab states'

reaction to Nassir's
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station which had set the first and best example for
devoting broadcasting to propaganda for his regime;

other

Arab governments followed exactly the same pattern setting
up the first priority and the ultimate objective of their
broadcasting system to be propaganda for their regimes.
Perhaps that is why we see all Arab televisions broadcast
are filled with political programs and news which
propagandize for the government and the regime,

making

television the voice of government only.

Nassir's

Also,

grip and centralization of control of the broadcasting
system,

his direct daily control and supervision,

together

with his strategy and technique in attacking his enemies,
was followed by other Arab governments.
It was years before the Arab people discovered that
Nassir's political broadcasting was based on fraud and
illusion and that they were being used for his personal
objectives.

The relation between Nassir and his political

broadcasting finally collapsed and came to an end when he
lost his credibility;

the Arab people who had been listening

to his stations and his emotional voice for years lost their
belief in him.

For years he had been promising the Arab

people to bring them triumphant victory over Israel,

and for

years had been promising to unite them very soon around his
ideology.

They finally discovered his lies and that they had

been fooled by the overtone of his speeches all these years.
Probably one of his biggest lies that neither history nor
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the facts could hide was perpetrated when he told the Arab
people during the six Days War that he had crushed the
Israeli army and that he had won the war he promised the
Arabs;

his own people discovered a few days later from the

enemies'

stations that they had lost the war in one of the

most humiliating and shameful wars in Arab history.

One-Way Medium

The basic concept of any communication medium is that
it is a two- way medium between the sender and the receiver,
or at least it should be.

if either side did not

communicate or did not communicate properly,

then the

communication will be ineffective or less effective.

The

fact is that the effectiveness of communication depends upon
the interplay and the interaction among the participants.
The variable degrees of communication usually cause
miscommunication and then misunderstanding which harm
generally the degree of effectiveness in getting the content
of the message across.
send messages,

Television as a medium can not only

but can also facilitate two-way communication

involving people's participation.
Studies have shown that one- way communication methods
are ineffective.

Everett Rogers explains why:

Self-development implies a different role for
communication than the usual top-down development
approach of the past.
Technical information about
development problems and possibilities and about
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innovation is sought by local systems from
the central government.
The role of government
nlw T Kagenfies' then' is mainly to communicate in
to Ho -1
th®se locally initiated requests, rather than
to design and conduct top-down communication campaigns.
Key elements in self-development approaches are
mass mobilization, and group efficacy,
*inhothe ?ain responsibility for development, planning
and execution being at the local level.^
If we try to apply this notion to television in the
Arab states,

we find that governments’

approach to

television is simply a "one-way medium,".
functions only as a sender;

Meaning it

as a consequence it became

useless and mal-functioning and lacks interaction.

Sydney

Head comments on this point:
Part of the reason for the lack is that officials of
some governments still tend to regard broadcasting as a
one-way medium.
They see it as a means of issuing
directives, orders, fiats, or edicts, rather than a
means of establishing a dialogue.
They see it as a way
of imposing conformity, rather than as a means of
developing consensus;
as a weapon of propaganda,
rather as an avenue of enlightenment.
Such officials
use the national broadcasting service as a personal
megaphone, rather than as a device for responding to
the wants and needs of those at the receiving end.
This one-way approach on the part of high officials
demands broadcasters as professionals..though their
generally low status is also a function of the
recruitment and training process.51

The above statement applies exactly to the situation
in the Arab states.
dialogue,

nor does it develop consensus.

enlightment,
states,

Arab television does not establish a
Rather than

it is an avenue of black-out in the Arab

and a one-way device which does not responds to the

needs of the people at the receiving end.

Everett Rogers

sees that the lack of authentic contact and understanding
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between the source of communication and the receiver is
likely to nullify the effects of whatever is transmitted
through media.

Lack of feedback,

Rogers says,

results in

"remedying where there is no pain" He notes that:
the inadequate communication between elite and masses
may...:Lead to conflict in which the frustrated masses
seek to communicate their needs by more violent
expression.
Perhaps the high rate of political
instability in less developed countries in the
1960's...is a manifestation of the communication gap
between elite and masses.
One reason for the frequent
failure of elite- directed programs of change is that
we know so little about the traditional audience.52
Yahya Abu Bakr and others believe that many Arab
scholars attribute the phenomenon of fundamentalist
movements in some Arab states to the weak content of the
religious message communicated by the media.

Therefore,

several Arab states are currently conducting a comprehensive
reexamination of the complementary roles of mosque and the
media.
Television does not create an immediate response and
feedback,

but that can be done through audience research

measures to test programs'

effectiveness among viewers and

to evaluate the communication level with the receiving end,
so as to be aware of the needs of the society and to
evaluate the performance of the television system as a
whole.

The benefit of this kind of research will be for

both sides,

the sender as well as for the receiver.

Perhaps

this is one of the negative sides of Arab television.
Since the emergence of television in the Arab states,

almost
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no serious study or research has been done to test viewers'
feedback in any of the Arab states.

As a matter of fact,

no

such study has been made before establishing television in
any of the Arab states to find out people's and society's
needs which could be addressed by television service.

A

neutral and objective study of the results of government
control of the Arab media

..on balance..was used more for

limited political ends than for social or economic
development.53

Apparently governments are not concerned

about the needs and the problems of the receiving end,
which also means that governments are less concerned about
the development process.

Thus,

there is no way that content

of programs can be changed and adapted to meet people's and
society's needs.
Many media managers believe that by themselves they
have the ability and knowledge to provide a well-round
broadcast schedule that include news, entertainment,
and educational programming.
For them, the statement
by former
French broadcast official Arthur Conte, "I
am the public" applies".54

Wilbur Shramm has emphasized that the media should not
be used merely to transmit orders from a ruling elite to its
charges,

but as a channel of communication through which the

people can participate in national government and in
development planning.55
Ignoring the other side's opinions has led,
accordingly,

to many other secondary phenomena within the

public themselves.

Since television does not reflect
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society's needs but reflects the needs of the ruling elite,
it became very logical for viewers to look at television as
a medium of monotonous programs.

Studies indicate that the

Arab states are the World's largest market for VCRs.

This

supports the argument that Arab viewers are not satisfied
with the types of programs offered by their government's
televisions.

Turning to a VCR is a reflection of

dissatisfaction.

Therefore, viewers'

stimulation is

essential to get the sender's message across.
there is no stimulation for viewers,

As long as

then there is a gap

between the sender and the receiver with no message getting
across.

Consequently,

the medium becomes worthless.

Arab viewers have also turned to foreign stations,
home satellite dishes,

and external service programs as

their sanctuary for seeking satisfaction and truth.
External services are very popular in the Arab states.
There are more than forty foreign stations broadcasting in
Arabic.

This issue is a national tragedy in itself,

considering the fact that their own government had lost its
credibility with the people who trusted foreign sources more
than their national government sources,

and despite the fact

that these foreign sources are not as authentic and reliable
as most Arab people believe—

especially when these foreign

sources have for a long time been considered by the Arab
people as implacable enemies and as their former colonists.
Very often these foreign sources present untrue reports and
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news and programs aimed at distorting images of the Arab
states,

taking advantage of their credibility to the Arab

people.
However,

it seems that the Arab viewers can not accept

the official stories any longer where truth is hidden and
criticism of government and officials is not only
unacceptable but also prohibited.

People in the Arab World

have started to realize that praising government officials
as the level of perfection does not alleviate their
suffering as a result of their being starved for learning.
All these factors have combined to create a mistrust
between people and governmental television.
beginning of this mistrust was in 1967,

Perhaps the

right after the Six

Days War when they were told that they were winning the war
against Israel and the Arab people awoke to the fact,
broadcast a few days later the foreign external services
programs,

that they had lost the war.

After the bitter

truth had manifested itself from foreign sources,
realized that government officials'
dependable.

people

stories are not

This type of situations has created animosity

between Arab governments and foreign external services,
especially during crucial political events.

Usually Arab

governments overcome this problem by jamming these stations.
John Merrill sees that this peculiar relationship
between broadcasting,

government,

and people in developing

countries happens only during the early stages of
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development where national leadership does not really want a
mass media system except for the elite communication:
In fact,

the leadership elite feels t-h**-

iS a dant?er • • not an Lse??. Utile
f*S g*ven to the masses..to their
participation in government, in their literacy
in
their
rights to know" and all such thinas
aii

•

when the^ation'is8fairly^ thlS
elite a^iabl^^ui an? haS “hat is considered by the
elite a viable political and economic base.56
“***■

Merrill's point is somewhat theoretical if the problem
is a matter of time.

Experiences have shown that developing

countries have been in the same situation for decades and
decades,

and the time Merrill speaks of has not yet come.

On the contrary,

one observes no improvement as time goes on

but becomes more and more deteriorated.

Perhaps, Merrill is

speaking of the natural process of development under natural
circumstances.

Wilbur Shramm,

however,

observes that

governments approach as a one-way medium is intentional and
they sustain it on purpose.

He notes:

The governments of the Third World countries are not
unaware of the power and value of the mass media, but
at the same time they realize that the media can be
very important in maintaining popular support and in
encouraging people to obey the government.
They also
seem to concentrate their use of this power in the area
of transmitting orders from the ruling elite to the
general population, instead of using it to permit the
masses of the people to participate in the national
government and in development planning.57
Lack of democracy in Arab television is a reflection
of lack of democracy in the political system of the states
in the

first place.

Since no democracy exists in the

government political structure,

it is very natural that
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there be no democracy in the government infrastructure.
Also centralization of television is part of the
centralization of the government structure.
Generally,

the phenomenon of one-way flow of

television programs is not only a state phenomenon but it a
global one as well.

Television programs flow internationally

in one direction and from top to bottom,
countries to developing countries.
on the state level in one direction,

from developed

These programs also flow
from those who have

access to the medium to the masses of people.

Conclusion

Television in the Arab states is ineffective,
functioning well,

not

not playing an important role in the

development process,

and has a marginal role.

can be counted for this situation.

Many reasons

The western influence in

Arab television since the days of establishment is very
evident in determining its function.
governments,

however,

The role of Arab

in this matter has a lot to do with

this state of affairs and holds a great deal for
responsibility of reaching this level of deteriaration.
The chapter has supported the view that the Arab
governments'

approach and comprehension of the medium is the

main question.

The chapter has covered several critical

issues associated with this misconception which has led to
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other minor issues,

some of the outcomes of the

governments'

misconception that the chapter has covered were

governments'

strong control of the medium,

function of Arab television,
medium,

the political

and the fact of being a one-way

and the lack of freedom and democracy in television

programs'

content.

While Chapter III covered these aspects of television
and governments,
Chapter IV,

it definitly didn't cover all

however,

issues.

will be concentrated on the relation

between television and culture in Arab states and other
issues not covered by Chapter III.

The next chapter will

discuss

in more detail the other aspects of Arab television

and

role

its

in respect to Arab culture.
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Chapter IV

TELEVISION AND CULTURE IN THE ARAB STATES

Introduction

This chapter touches on the main concern of this
study,

discussing the heart of the problems as they relate

to the connection between television and culture in the Arab
states.

Whereas Chapter III dealt largely with the relation

between television,

governments,

and politics,

this chapter,

concentrates primarily on the type and content of
broadcasted programs of Arab television.

First of all,

the

chapter illuminates the role of U.S government policy in
homogenizing the world cultures through "made-in-America"
media materials and massive export of U.S television
programs,

and through the Free Flow of Information doctrine.

The chapter then illustrates the impact of television
in the Arab people's culture and the impact of the content
of the imported western programs in affecting negatively the
original Arab culture.

These negatives effects were

reflected in people's mentality and shifts from an Arab life
style to western life styles and the daily life practice,
a consequence of the large exposure of western programs.
This chapter emphasizes on the role of the imported
entertainment programs and the foreign channels as a chief
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as
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carrier of alien western ideas.

All these combined aspects

seriously threaten the continuity of the indigenous Arab
culture.

General Perspectivp,

Any study of television in the Arab States,
confine

should not

itself to superficial measures such as the

availability of numbers of television receiver sets per
capita,

the type of transmission service

black and white or color),
number

these

is

number of availability of

and other hardware measures.

limitations to

it

number of transmission stations,

of transmission hours,

channels,

(whether

include essential

It should go beyond
factors

such as type

of programs broadcast and their relation to the society's
needs,

the

level

of

interaction between broadcast programs

and receiving audience,

the percentage of

nationally produced programs,
imported programs,
their relevance
societies,
performance
well

the

the percentage of

foreign

the type of these imported programs and

to the needs and demands of the Arab
function of television in general

and how

its

is contributing to the national culture and how

its programs

serve the needs of the society.

The concern of this study,
television and culture,
addressed.

locally and

the relation between

is the main focal point to be

It will review and evaluate the extent to which

Ill
television has served the national culture and whether its
programs have contributed to the indigenous national
culture.

In this regard,

actually what counts;

the content of programs is

it is the most important element in

the communication process.

"The content of the programming

is all that really matters,
determine,

in large measure,

for what is broadcast may
the cultural outlook and the

social direction of the new nations of generations."1 it
also reflects the state's television policy since state
television is the voice of the government.
'

Therefore,

content will be the focus of our discussion.

The U.S Cultural Impact

After the Second World War,

the United States emerged

as a new super power of what has been called the" American
Century".

But unlike other super power countries,

the

United States was distinguished from other super powers.
was not only in terms of military force,

political,

It

and

economic but it also added one more super feature that set
it a part from other super powers,

and that was its advanced

and sophisticated electronic communication power reflected
in all aspects of electronic media,

especially in the field

of commercial television programs.

The United States

through its media center -Hollywood- became the globe's
largest source for producing and distributing media software
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programs in a massive quantity for the rest of the World.
It took governments and scholars years before they
began to realize the peril of this phenomenon after it
manifested itself as a new imperialistic power,

after it

became clear to the international community that this
phenomenon is a threat to the globe's indigenous cultures.
It was not until decades later when the issue of the threat
of American media as a global phenomenon became an
international one.

New terms,

terminology,

phrases,

and

expression began to arise concerning this issue of "cultural
imperialism",

such as "Cultural invasion",

global village",
civilization".

"cultural alienation",

"electronic

and "imported

Many studies and much research have been

conducted on the issue,

especially in the last decade.

Many

seminars and conferences under international organizations
have discussed the issue,

demanding a safeguard of their

cultures and new world information order which would be
balanced and just.
One of the early scholars who warned of the threat of
the American media is Herbert I.
work,

Schiller.

In his early

MASS COMMUNICATION AND AMERICAN EMPIRE.

(1969)Schiller argues that the powerful American media is
part of the American military industrial complex which would
dominate the world to achieve economic purposes.

The

American military build up was simultaneous with and
extremely relevant to the electronic communication
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technology industry built up through the giant multi¬
national corporations,
satellites.

especially in the field of space

Schiller reaches the conclusion that the

invasion of "made- in- America" products is not a matter of
casual coincidence but rather an international wellorganized conspiracy planned for years as a long term
strategy of the U.S government foreign policy to dominate
the world.
The U.S had to put an incredible effort in this matter
to monopolize world's media.

To do so they had to invent

what has been called the "Free Flow of Information" doctrine
and "worldwide access to news".

The U.S launched a

comprehensive campaign and spared no effort to get it
recognized and backed up by international organizations.
However,
the

the U.S

first had to break the European monopoly on

world's information,

which took them two decades,

their

power eclipsed that of Europe after they began utilizing the
space satellite as a new communication medium.
Schiller observes that the "free flow of information"
doctrine began with the emergence of the U.S as an colonial
power,

not after the Second World War.

The principle served

as an excuse for breaking the British and French Empires'
monopoly targeted by American media which accused them of a
world information monopoly and of distorting the American
image by confining their coverage of America to Hollywood
scandals,

violence,

rubbery and crimes in Chicago.
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In 1914,

Kent Cooper,

former executive manager of the

Associate Press published a book,

Barriers Down,

criticizing

the international grip of the European news cartels,

the

first public official statement summing up the U.S policy
came immediately after the war.
Assistant Secretary of State
Senator),

outlined,

January 1946,

William Benton,

the

(who was to become a U.S

in a State Department broadcast in

the government position on the meaning of

freedom of information:
The State Department plans to do everything within its
power along political or diplomatic lines to help break
down the artificial barriers to the expansion of
private American news agencies, magazines, motion
pictures, and other media of communication throughout
the world.... freedom of the press and freedom of
exchange of information generally- is an integral part
of our foreign policy.2
John Foster Dulles,

the former Secretary of State declared

that "If I were to be granted one point of foreign policy
and no other,

I would make it the free flow of

information."3
In June of 1944 the directors of the American Society
of Newspaper Editors adopted a resolution urging both major
political

parties to support "world freedom of information

and unrestricted communication for news throughout the
world."

In September of 1944,

both houses of Congress

adopted a concurrent resolution followeing closely the
recommendation of the editors and publishers.
of

In November

1944,

the directors of the American Society of newspaper

Editors,

declared that "most Americans and their newspapers

115
will support the government's policies

...and action toward

removal of all political,

legal and economic barriers to the

media of information,

...our government should make this

and

abundantly clear to other nations."4
In spring of 1945,

a delegation of the American

Society of Newspaper Editors in conjunction with the AP and
UPI toured the world on Army transport planes— including 22
major cities and 11 allied and neutral countries— to
promote this doctrine.

On December 14,1946,

Assembly adopted Resolution 59,

the General

which declared that "freedom

°f information is a fundamental human right,

and is a

touchstone of the freedoms to which the United Nations is
consecrated," and the freedom "implies the right to gather,
transmit,

and publish news anywhere and every-where without

fetter."5
Within a few years,

the American media industry

dramatically developed a massive production that invaded the
rest of the world.
products was

The immense influx of American media

tremendous and impressive especially in the

last three decades.
Depending on American programs became inevitable and
avoiding them was impossible and threatened developing
countries as well as developed countries such as Europe and
even neighboring Canada.
The American commercial television products has become
an important and flourishing national export since early
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•60s.

In 1964, Wilson P.

Dizard,

a former U.S.I.A official,

mentioned that
American TV products,

for better and worse,

f°rKt®ievlsion

are setting

Programming throughout the
yinUCh the same way HollYWOod did for the motion
40 Years ago.
The United States now leads all
other countries combined twice over as a program
exporter...Foreign sales were until a few years ago, a
source of random profits peripheral to revenues from
syndication at home... Today, overseas sales accounts
for 60 per cent of all U.S. television syndication
activities and represent the difference between profit
and loss for the entire industry.6
In 1967,

Dizard told a congressional committee that

"The amount of
million a year,

[TV commercial]

export now approaching $100

is such that the television screen is

becoming the main source of the "America Image"

for

increasing millions of people abroad."7
Jack Valenti,

president of Motion Picture Export

Association of America,

reported before the Subcommittee on

Government Operations of the,

U.S.

Senate Foreign Relations

Committee:
American motion picture occupy perhaps half of the
screen time of theaters of the world...Nearly half of
the theatrical revenues of MPEAA members is derived
from foreign showings...In 1976, the gross foreign
billings of our members from theatrical films and
television programming came to approximately
$700,000,000, with theatrical movies accounting for a
little more than two thirds.
The foreign theatrical
market represented 49.5 percent of total film rental
grosses.
For television, the foreign market accounted
for 23.4 percent of grosses.8
Commissioner of FCC Fowler stated that media
activities in the U.S.

which was no more than 2% of the

total American G.N.P in 1880,

had reached 66%

in 1980.9
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William Davidson,

in his book The Amazing Rar.p

(1983),

estimated the American media industry to be approximately
$150 billion and that it will increase by 20% annually and
constitute 40% of the total economic activities in the U.S.
market.10
In 1974,

UNESCO conducted a study indicating that most

developing countries with television systems import more
than half of its broadcast programs,
total

and that 75% of the

import of television programs comes from the United

States.

Despite this enormous export,

the U.S.

imports no

films or serials except of 2% of educational programs.11
1982,

UNESCO statistics

In

indicated that 74% of the world's

radio sets and 80% of the world's TV sets are in the
industrialized countries.12

The developing countries

imported 80% of its news from the industrialized countries
(mainly from U.S,

Britain,

and France)13

despite the

inconsistency that these news programs were irrelevant to
the conditions in the developing countries.
Needless to say,

the free flow of information doctrine

did not do the good to human culture that was claimed for it
in its early days.

On the contrary,

it put other cultures

in jeopardy threatening to homogenize the charm of the
world's seperate cultures and to deteriorate the situation
in the world.

It caused and propounded international

problems between what has been called North and South,
exacerbating the huge gap and disparity between developed

118
and developing countries,

particularly in terms of media and

cultural affairs.
During the early

-70s,

developing countries realized

the injustice of the present world information order and the
hazard that it presented.
structure shock,
continuity,

In breeding primarily on cultural

it caused semi-termination of cultural

which maintained a cultural imperialism

reminiscent of the political and economic imperialism of
colonial times.
A variety of calls arose from different parts of the
world,

especially from the Third World countries,

a new and just world information order.
intent,

however,

demanding

To achieve this

it was not an easy task.

The developing

countries had to struggle hard for years for this crucial
demand.

Within many conferences,

debates sponsored by regional,

meetings,

seminars,

national and international

institutions such as the non-allied movement, UNESCO,
the U.N,

and

and

many proposals have called for more socially

responsible reporting,
information,

a free and balanced flow of

and a large share of the international spectrum

so that all countries can derive some of the benefits and
profits of satellite distribution.

The United States,

supported in many cases by Western Europe,

rejected these

proposals as unacceptable restrictions on the free flow of
information and the free market.14
UNESCO,

the strongest advocate of the free flow of
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information doctrine at one time,

has veered noticeably away

from its formerly unquestioning support and adopted in
October 1972 the Declaration of Guiding Principles on the
use of Satellite Broadcasting for the free flow of
information.

In November 1972,

the U.N General Assembly

supported this view by a Vote of 102 to 1,

the United States

casting the single dissenting vote.15
The General Conference,
held in Nairobi in 1976,

in its nineteenth session

instructed the Director General of

UNESCO to undertake a review of all problems of media in
contemporary society.

He accordingly established the

International Commission for the study of communication
problems in the world,

with a membership of fifteen media

experts from all over the world— or which come to be known
as the Sean MacBride commission.

Within two years the

commission submitted its comprehensive study in a report
called Many Voices.
1978,

One World.

In its twentieth session in

the General Conference adopted unanimously the

principles set forth in the Declaration of Media.
General Assembly of the United Nations,

The

in its 33rd session,

adopted a resolution assuring the importance of the
establishment of a new international information order,
supporting the efforts in this field and the U.N role in
achieving this goal.16
Generally speaking,

however,

despite all these efforts

and endeavors by the developing countries to hold the threat
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of the American media at bay,

there was no indication of a

change in the situation and the Americans'
as the globally predominant programs.
countries are in relying on them,

programs remained

it appears that more

especially thoe with newly

established television systems such those in Africa and
Asia.

It seems that the achievements of developing

countries were theoretical more than pragmatic and they
still could not put them into action.

Obviously,

it was not

expected the situation could be changed within a short
period of time.

It is quite evident that it will take the

developing countries years to recover from the old order
before they will be able exercise the new information order.

Television and Arab Culture

It is already been noted that Western countries have
had a great influence in establishing the foundation of Arab
television during the colonial era.
states was not

Television in many Arab

established by the national governments but

by the colonial Western governments.

Despite the fact that

Westerners have left Arab land a long time ago,

and although

the Arab States have gained their political independence
years ago,

the Western influence still exists and continues

to have amajor presence on Arab television,

probably even

greater than before.
This Western influence was never discontinued and
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became
this

greater and greater as the years went by.

Actually,

influence was simultaneous with and relevant to the

development of Arab television systems.
television developed,

the more Western

The more Arab
influence existed.

This applies not only to the Arab states whom whose systems
were

founded by colonial governments but also to other Arab

states whose television was established under the national
governments.

It seems that Western influence does not

depend on who established television;
beyond this

issue as we going to see.

Most people assumed,
developed,

the problem goes

the

that the more Arab television was

less Western

influence would be.

experience has proved totally the opposite.

In

fact,

If Western

influence during the colonial era was through hardware
equipment and only a

few programs

burgeoned to an uninterrupted
after they
fact,
was

it

influx of software programs

left up until the present time.

As a matter of

establishing Arab television during the colonial

only considered the

coming

for several years,

in the
After

first primitive step

era

for a giant

future with many additional giant steps.

independence,

the newly independent Arab states

thought they could handle the business of television.
Surprisingly,
business,

that was not the case.

was to a

Television a serious

large extent beyond their limits and

capabilities to handle.

Despite the assumption that Western

influence will vanish with the declaration of

independence,
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the truth is that television has nothing to do with
independence.

The relation between television and the

Western connection has continued through the supply of
ready-made programs.
Through the years,

television has proved that it is

not merely a matter of hardware equipment.
importantly,

in the long run,

The software content,
That,

probably,

not perceive.

however,

More

there is also a software side.
is a double- edged weapon.

was the point that most Arab governments did
That was definitely that was the gap through

which Western influence could penetrate.

They could fill

the span of air time not only with ready -made imported
Western software but also with ready made Western ideas and
taste.
Probably one of the features that clearly
characterized Arab television in connection with Western
countries is the massive import of software tapes.
Ironically,

at the time when Arab States were putting their

concentration on television as hardware equipment,

the

Western countries were putting their emphasis on software
tapes.

However,

the problem still is not simply a matter of

software programs:

does it cease at this limit?

Elihu Katz

explains why:
In examining the situation of broadcasting in
developing countries, one must look beyond the
importation of tapes and films to the importation of
program ideas and formats.
What is not directly
imported may be—at second glance—imported as a model
or "stimulus" for local translation salesmen, for the
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international marketeers who come equipped not only
with packages of videotape, but with catalogs of ideas
which are also for sale. ^

Television in the Arab States has played an
indisputable role

in changing social

in general which,

as a consequence,

people's

social behaviors.

television

this

there were early signals

expectation of attachment between people and

new medium,

In general,
by all

changed the patterns of

Since the appearance of

in the Arab States,

iri*3

life and social values

the Arab people are attracted to and fascinated

types

television,

which applied to radio before television.

of electronic media technology such as radio,
and video.

Many

field studies suggest that the

concentration of radio and television in the cities of Arab
states have

accelerated the

areas to the city,

immigration

from the peasant

since enjoying these mediums

is

considered by the peasant an advantage of living

in the

city.
When radio was
and abundant.
introduction

still

Despite

a

the transistor,

set.

from the people
changed the

there was a strong desire

even by low-income people to

People who had a set got unusual
in the neighborhood,

social

intricate the

respect

and ownership somewhat

status of the person.

"In many Arab countries a radio
larger and more

it was popular

its relative expense before the

among the Arab population,
acquire

a young medium,

Boyd noted that

is a status symbol:

set,

the

the higher the status."
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Wlibur Shramm delineates the situation in an Arab village:
°nce in an isolated village in the Middle East I
watched a radio receiver,the first any of the villagers
had seen,put into operation in the head man's house.
The receivers promptly demonstrated that knowledge is
power.
It became a source of status to its owner; he
was the first to the news, and controlled the access of
others to it.
For him and all others who heard, the
noisy little receiver became a magic carpet to carry
them beyond the horizons they had known.
But the most
impressive demonstration of the impact of that radio
was the scene when a group of villagers-who had
previously known higher government chiefly through the
tax collector or a soldier- heard for the first time a
spokesman of their leaders invite them to take part in
governing their country.
The surprise, the
incredulity, the rather puzzled hope in their faces
made an unforgettable picture.19
The rapid spread of radio in the Arab States went
above Shramm's scale which was adopted by the UNESCO:
sets for every 1000 population.
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With the exception of few

Arab states the average of radio sets for every 1000 capita
ranged from 150 sets to 204 sets,

and in the rich oil

countries the figure reached 465 for every 1000 capita.20
From 1971 to 1975 the number of radio sets jumped from
10,000,000 to 18,300,000,
to television,

an increase of 83%.

With respect

the case is not much different.

The UNESCO

estimated the minimum of TV sets to be distributed as 20
sets per 1000 capita,
limit,

but the Arab states went above this

reaching an average of between 4 0 and 56 sets.

In

rich oil Arab states the figure probably is the highest in
the world:

484 sets per 1000 capita,

UNESCO statistics.21

according to 1981

Between 1971 and 1975,

the number of

television sets in the Arab states have increased from
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1,900,000 to 3,400,000 sets.^
The special chemistry between television and the Arab
people can be attributed perhaps to the social and cultural
environment.

Television is considered a recreation medium

privately as well as publicly.

One of the unique viewing

pattern in the Arab culture is to watch television in
groups,

either in coffee houses,

local restaurants,

in the front yard of private residences,
invitation for passersby to join them,

or even

an implied

part of the Arab

cultural concept of hospitality and brotherhood.

Television

is also considered a major pastime for a family centered
Arab culture.

Acquiring a TV set is considered a big

advantage and is an essential house appliance for any family
household,

especially in family- oriented Arab societies.

It is not unusual that purchasing a TV set may be a priority
over any other household appliance even in rural areas,
since it serve as a recreational device around which the
family members can gather.

Douglas Boyd who studied

television in the Arab States observed that television
service is a reality in all Arab countries,
alike,

rich and poor

and it has no competition:

there is very strong motivation among the poor to
acquire a television receiver: In Egypt it is not
unusual for a television set to be purchased by village
leaders before electricity reaches their area. In poor
section of Cairo, an extended family may pool resources
to purchase a used black and white set from a
neighborhood dealer.23
Muhammad A.

Subhi depicts the impact of television
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transmission on people's behavior when it first began in
some cities in Saudi Arabia—Riyadh and Jiddah.

He noted

that people were so interested in television that during
evening broadcasting hours the radio audience rate had
dropped in the areas of television coverage.

Also,

traffic

in the streets of the capital city of Riyadh and Jiddah had
declined during the television broadcast hours.
recreation was

Outdoor

dramatically reduced as people began to

prefer to stay in their houses to watch television
programs.24
Through the years,

Arab people became well known for

their fondness for watching television,
addiction for watching television.

actually their

In 1982,

the Arab center

for audience and viewers research conducted research on five
Arab states

(Iraq,

Sudan,

Morocco,

Jordan,

and Kuwait)

determine their television viewing patterns.

to

The conclusion

of the study suggested that the average time the Arab
viewers spent on watching television ranged between 3 and 4
hours a day despite the relatively short broadcasting day.
However,

this percentage increased on the weekends and

during the holidays and special occasions when the
transmission becomes longer.25
The power of television shocked both the structure of
the society and the structure of the family.
unfortunately,

was negative.

The impact,

Since the function of

television was not utilized constructively,

the outcome was
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not positive or even neutral.
Generally speaking,

television in the Arab States did

not play any positive role in contributing to the promotion
of the national culture or even in preserving it.

To the

contrary to a large extent television was the cause of
undermining the national culture.

in many cases,

intentionally or unintentionally television caused a
distortion of the image of the indigenous culture.
Although all Arab states have stated explicitly that
their main goal of television broadcasting is to protect and
enhance the values of the culture,

actually that was merely

theoretical more than actual and has nothing to do with
reality.

None of the Arab states could translate this

statement into action.
Arab states'
stated goals.

On the contrary,

we find that most

broadcasts do not meet with their officially
In Egypt,

for instance,

broadcast law was

enacted as follows:
To enhance the standard of all kinds of arts, to
encourage favorable habits and customs, and to
discourage improper ones. To deal with social problems
and to exhort adherence to moral and ethical values, to
revive the literacy, scientific and artistical Arab
heritage. To acquaint the people with the best products
of human civilization.26
In reality,

in reviewing Egyptian television programs,

totally the opposite is true.
are imported;

More than 40% of the programs

and while entertainment occupies the largest

portion of air time,

Islamic programs occupies only 1% of

the total air time.

In radio time,

46% is devoted to
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entertainment,

20% to news,

9% to culture,

education:"As this breakdown suggests,
service.".27

During Nassir's reign,

it is not a highbrow

Egyptian television was

offering American and British series,
close relation with the Russians,

and l% to

and,

because of his

he was also showing

programs from socialist countries.
Despite its tough and distinctive position,

and

despite its adherence to Islam's teachings in its broadcast
programs compared to other Arab television,
is no exception in this case.

Saudi television

Article 22 of the new

communication policy stated that the "Saudi media have a
holy duty to communicate the message of Allah to both
Muslims and non-Muslims kindly and wisely."28
1974,

However,

in

Saudi television purchased 1800 hours of Western

programs,
serials,

a package which included 165 feature films,
452 cartoons,

documentaries,

348

and 835 soap operas and

mostly from the United States.29

The Western

programs on the first channel in Saudi television constitute
15% while they constitute 86% of the second channel air
time.30
In the field of television it is unlikely that the
values of culture could be enhanced or even protected under
the free flow of television programs.
import of Western programs,
"mission impossible".

Under a massive

we reluctantly say it is

It is difficult to escape the global

spread of U.S cultural styles through television programs.

Total Program Outlet
(100% = 48,689 minutes
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countries
Figure

4.

Imported programs as a percentage of
estimated total Arabic region television
broadcast
time.

SOURCE:
International Flow of Television Programs, Reports
and Papers on Mass Communication, No.100, UNESCO, Paris, 1985.
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Table

1.

Percentage of imported
in 1973 and 1983.

Country and
Broadcasting Institution

television

Percentage of
Imported Programs
1 973

Algeria
Egypt
Kuwait
Lebanon
Saudi Arabia/Aramco TV
Syria
Tunisia
People's Republic of Yemen

Table

2.

—

41
56
40
100
—
—

57

Prices for United States
in some Arab states
(in

Country
Egypt
Iraq
Kuwait
Lebanon
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Algeria

programs

Half-Hour Episode
400 - 600
350 - 500
450 - 500
175 - 200
650 - 800
70 - 275
90 -100

1 983

55
35
—

—

—

33
55
47

television films
U.S.
dollars).

Feature Film
1,750 - 2,500
1,200 - 2,000
1,750 - 2,000
800 - 900
3,000 - 3,200
150 - 1,250
no sales

SOURCE:
Stephen S. Wildman and Stephen E. Siwek, "Interna¬
tional Trade in Films and Television Programs", Ballinger
Publishing Company, Cambridge, MA, 1988.
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Table

3.

Percentage
1983,
and
states.

Country

Algeria
Egypt
Kuwait
Lebanon
Saudi Arabia/
Riyadh TV
Saudi Arabia/
Aramco TV
Syria
Tunisia
People's Rep.
of Yemen

of
in

Imported %
1973

-

41
56
40
31
100
-

-

57

imported TV programs in 1973,
prime time 1983,
in some Arab

Imported %
1983

Imported %
1983
Prime Time

55
45

55
41

-

-

33
55
47

-

-

35
35

SOURCE:
Stephen S. Wildman and Stephen E. Siwek, "Interna¬
tional Trade in Films and Television Programs", Ballinger
Publishing Company, Cambridge, MA, 1988.
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and it is extremely difficult for a society other than the
U.S society to practice a free flow of media and enjoy a
national culture at the same time.
Arab television can be characterized as a ersatz and
non-authentic television.

Its programs do not reflect the

indigenous national culture and most of its broadcast
programs are irrelevant to the society's issues despite the
fact that Arab societies are full of political,
and social problems.

economic,

Actually television programs affairs

in the Arab States in one path and society and cultural
affairs are in another path.

Cairo University conducted

research on the link between television programs and
society's issues in Egypt from the period of 1981 to 1983

.

The finding of the study was that 87% of the broadcast
programs have nothing to do with the society's issues and
the rest

(13%)

have touched on some of the issues.31

In

Tunisia,

study found that programs directed to the women in

the peasant area are programs of Western musicians such as
Bach and Beethoven and about Western intellectuals such as
Sartre and Hagel.32
Since most of the broadcast programs are Westernimported,

Arab television has played a primary role in

reflecting and promoting Western culture much more than it
did in promoting the indigenous national culture.
A.

M,

Muhammad

ascribed the source of social change in the Arab world

to the new technology such as telephone,

radio,

television,
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and video; meanwhile he refutes the allegation that the
direction of this social change is the progressive
appropriate direction due to lack of proof.

Besides,

the

control of this direction is external and attached to those
who own this technology.33

Thus,

it cannot be taken for

granted that the social change that television might cause
will be positive change.

In 1964,

Shramm noted that "There

is little doubt that modern communication can be influential
in a developing culture."34
went by,

from experience,

as the years

Shramm's statement is very true.

Actually,

with regard to the issue of television and

its Western impact on the indigenous Arab culture,
indictments can be made of television,
precise,

of governments,

this medium.

many

or to be more

who are responsible for running

It is no longer a secret that Arab television

is a mini-copy of Western television and that there is very
little uniquely Arab in Arab television.

There is still no

independent theory or philosophy of Arab television.

Arab

governments failed to create and present a unique new model
which would incorporate into television the authentic Arab
culture and reflect Arab life style.
in the Arab Gulf states,

AL-Usmani noted that

it is difficult to identify a

coherent television philosophy that strongly reflects the
ideological and national
particular,

identity.

Television,

in

is a new phenomenon that originated in the West

and became available as a technology before its
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practitioners

fully realized the technological potential.35

"Mohammad Sanousi,

[former]

Assistant under secretary for

Television Affairs

in Kuwait,

has expressed his doubts that

any Gulf state has a recognizable philosophy about how
television can be used...-I don't really believe that we
know what television is...or how it can be used effectively.
So

far we only have certain ideas.*"36
If one excludes

from the daily television schedule the

opening recitation of the holy Quran,
talk shows,
an Arab

it

Arabic news,

is very hard to believe

state.

Abdul—Samad M.

it

and a

few

is television of

comments on the concentration

of American movies on the Egyptian television as reflecting
a picture where
the U.S

some one might think that Egypt

states.37

Little attention has been given to

television by governments who
utilization of television
indigenous arts,

failed or ignored the

in a matters of culture,

authentic customs and traditions,

national

thought and

national

history and civilization,

This

state

is one of

intellectual,

local

and

religious rituals,
and national development.

of affairs might be attributed to the

misconception and approach with which most Arab governments
most

often viewed the television medium.
In reviewing the development of Arab cultural history,

one

observes that people were committed and attached to

their culture before the emergence of television much more
before the

emergence of television.

People started to

135
change their life style after the Western
the Arab world after the Second World War

wave that swept
('50s and

-60s).

Television -and other media-were the main factors relied
upon by Westerners

in transmitting their life style pattern

to the Arab states.
clear cut line

The emergence of television drew a

in terms of cultural continuity.

Meanwhile,

one observes that the rural areas and the remote areas
the

from

cities which have not been influenced yet by the medium

of television are more authentic
style,

in their culture and life

since television centralized mostly around the

cities and the

suburbs.

However,

the attraction of

television within the cities and suburbs created demographic
problem that encouraged rural peasant to migrate to the
cities.
For the

first time

in history Arab culture was

penetrated by Western culture.

Throughout history,

Arab

culture was

impenetratable despite numerous Westerners'

endeavors.

With the

it

invention of the power of television,

seems that Western culture could for the

first time

easily penetrate the Arab culture.
A common observation regarding the modification of
Arab culture

is the deteriorization of the Arabic language.

Through out history,
strength as

as

its

one of the ancient Semitic languages.

Historically,
language

the Arabic language maintained

Arabs always have taken pride

one

in their

of the world's richest languages.

The most
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significant turning point for Arabic language was the
emergence of Islam in the Arab land and the revelation in
Arabic of the holy Quran to the Arabian prophet -Muhammad”.
That event was considered a great honor to the Arabic
language in which Arab people have always taken pride.
matter of fact,
strengthened,

the two main factors that enriched,

and

maintained the Arabic language through

history is the Quran and the Hadith,
prophet".

As a

-the sayings of the

Arabic became essential not only for Arabs but

for non-Arab Muslims as well,

since it was the language of

the Quran and the language of the prophet.
Through the years,

during the spread of Islam and

despite the interaction with other remote cultures,
maintained its strength.

Because of its power,

Arabic

the Arabic

language was not influenced by other languages but other
languages such as Persian,

Turkish,

Indian,

other parts of the world such as Africa,
Europe,

were influenced by Arabic.

and those in

Asia,

and even

It was not until the

Seventeenth Century that the Arabic language began to
witness some recession when the Westerners,
Portuguese,

Dutch,

of the Arab world.

and British,

especially

began to dominate some parts

With the fall of the Turkish Ottoman

Empire followed by the fall of the Arab world to Western
colonialism,

the situation deteriorated even further.

With the recession of Arabic language in different
parts of the Islamic world such as East and West Africa,
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South East and central Asia,

and Turkey,

oral interpersonal

Arabic even in the original Arab land began to be affected
by other languages,
fact,

especially by English and French.

during the colonial era,

In

one of the aims of the

colonials was to weaken the formal classic Arabic through
encouraging local dialects.

Nevertheless,

and despite the

relatively successful attempts of the colonialists, Arabic
still maintained its strength.
Nevertheless,

damage to the Arabic language continues

with the emergence of the modern mass media technology and
its fast spread through the Arab states with,

the help of

the uninterrupted flow of imported Western software.
Western television programs in all its variety and Western
pop music have played a major role in advancing the notion
of the supremacy of the English language.

In fact,

the

global Western media has succeeded in promoting the English
language to the point where it is now recognized as the
international

language despite the fact that those whose

mother tongue is English constitute no more than 10% of the
world's population.
For centuries,
mother tongue.

the Arabs used to take pride in their

It is no longer so.

With the Westernization

wave that swept the Arab world since the fifties,

there was

a tendency among governments and some categories of people
(especially the Westernizers and those who were educated in
Western countries or by Western educators)

to undervalue
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Arabic and look at it as if it is a thing of the past and no
longer a valid language to be associated with modern
civilization science and modernization.

Meanwhile,

English

was viewed as the language of science and modern
civilization.

At the present time,

science in higher

education institutions in the Arab states has to be taught
in English,

or in French in some Arab states.

Unfortunately,

Arabic was not given the attention it

deserved by Arab media in general and television in
particular.
language,
Arabic,

While it used and promoted the English

Arab television did not promot formal classic

instead,

it promoted and encouraged what is so~

called the "simple media language Arabic" based on local
dialects.

In 1971,

Algeria changed programming language

from French to Arabic.

However,

they as well as Tunisia and

Morocco still depend heavily on French programs

,

Other Arab

states depend largely on American programs.
The members of Arab Commission to Study Media Issues
in the Arab World have expressed their regret for the fact
that some Arab media policies neglected the Arabic language
and for the lack of cohesive national strategy to serve the
Arabic language through the media.

They especially

regretted that common dialects with their lower levels
constitute a large portion of theater,radio,
programs.38
Education,

A study conducted by
Culture,

(ALECSO)

and television

Arab League for

and Science Organization,

concluded that
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among the Arab states language unity is demonstrated by the
use of only 7% of the total language expression,

and among

93% dialects and slang dominate media language.39

in the

final report of their meeting in Riyadh,

Ministers of

Education and Information in the Gulf states affirmed the
necessity of reinforcing the Arabic language in education
and the media since it is the language of the Quran,
since the

and

Arabic language is of ultimate value.

Another aspect of changing the social life style was
through the social movement,

Arab women,

for example.

For

the first time in the Arab woman's history she followed
Western woman.

Shramm has often noted that change will not

take place smoothly unless people want to change,
requires both information and persuasion.

and that

That's exactly

what happened in the Arab world and to woman in particular.
Unfortunately,

Arab people in general and Arab women in

particular were ready for change when the Westernization
wave swept the Arab world after World War II which had been
preceded by years of Western colonialism.

People were

persuaded to change after they were brain-washed for years
with the notion of following the Westernization path to
modernization.
Arab Women were vulnerable to the current of Western
women's liberation movements in Europe and U.S.

Hence,

a

group of women began to express publicly their rebellion
against Arab and Islamic values and began to call for the
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same changes that Western women were requesting,
Western woman their ideal.

Noticeably,

making

women began to

imitate Western women with respect to the notion of "modern
women".
styles,

Arab women began to dress in clothing of western
imitating Western women's appearance.

In this regard,
programs,

television through the imported

played a outstanding role in promoting the

glamourous image of Western women and in reinforcing the
notion of the supremacy of modern Western women's life
style.

Meanwhile,

the image and historical role of the Arab

woman was undermined and ignored.

Studies in this field,

especially those which were conducted under the auspices of
Arab League for Education,
(ALECSO),

Culture,

and Science Organization

concluded that Arab media has distorted the image

of Arab women.

She was always presented and visualized in a

negative manner.
In the field of advertisement,

Arab women have been

misused by the advertisement agencies,
promoting products such as perfumes,
automobiles,

and furniture.

especially in

cosmetics,

fashions,

It was influenced to a great

extent by the Western style of production which uses women
to present images of the contemporary woman.
of Arab woman does not exist in Arab reality.

This paradigm
Also,

studies

proved that Arab media in general is not giving attention to
major women's issues in the Arab world or in the world in
general.40
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The current of the international

flow of television

programs was so strong that it swept all barriers in its
way,

and all kinds of victims started to fall prey to this

current.
difficult,

Schiller predicted a long time ago that "it is
in fact,

to escape the global spread of U.S

cultural styles featured in the mass media of films,
programs,

pop records,

and slick magazines.

TV

Their influence

prompts sentiments such as that expressed by the prime
minister of Guyana,'A nation whose mass media are dominated
from the outside is not a nation.'41

Anthony Smith ruled

out the enjoyment of national culture under the roof of free
flow of media:

"It is extremely difficult for a society to

practice a free flow of media and enjoy a national culture
at the same time — unless it happens to be the United
States of America"42
Repelling this influx of Western programs seems
impossible and relying on them seems indispensable.
the Arab States succeeded in doing so;

None of

neither Egypt,

the

major producer and distribution center for the Arab world,
which is considered the Hollywood of the Middle East,

nor

Saudi Arabia which is considered the most traditional and
strict state in the Arab world.

Despite Egypt's production,

it imports more than 41% of its programs,
UNESCO statistics.43

Between 1970 and 1978,

5732.17 hours of foreign programs,
rejected

according to
Egypt imported

1126.78 of which were

(therefore not broadcast).44

Late statistics

142
showed that Egypt import annually 1800 hours from the
300 hours from France,
countries/5

u.S,

and 400 hours from different European

Despite these impressive figures,

religious

programs do not exceed 1% of the total broadcast time.
After Sadat's open policy to the West in 1977,

even more

Western material was poured into Egypt.
In fact,

even during the reign of President Nasir,

was known for his policy of animosity toward the West,
could not escape this peril.

On the contrary,

who

Egypt

he encouraged

the importation of Western programs.
President Nassir, in the common pattern of the "father
of the new nation" set his personal stamp on radio and
television in Egypt.
This was a political, Arab
nationalist stamp but Nassir also encouraged imports of
some Anglo-American material at Nassir's personal
directive. During much of the 1960s an entire
television channel was aimed at expatriates resident in
Egypt and was filled with mainly Anglo-American
programming/6
The flood of Western programs,
inconsistent alien ideas and values,

along with their
into the Arab states

has aroused and provoked many categories of people within
the Arab world;
organizations,

the conservatives,
scholars,

religious leaders and

academic professionals,

governmental and professional organizations,

all calling to

counter this current for the sake of the Arab and Islamic
nation.

Accordingly,

many conferences and seminars were

held to tackle this issue.
Intellectual

In conferences such as "The

Invasion and Anti-Islamic Attitudes",

"Civilizational Challenges and Cultural Invasion",

"Islamic
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Media and Human Relations",
Broadcasters r

and ^What Educators Warn-

fr-™

the participants are in consensus that the

current situation is a deliberate conspiracy and attack
against the Arab and Islamic nation,

aiming to transmit anti

-Islamic values and destroy the morals of the Islamic
civilization.

it was considered a new invasion attempt by

the West with new technique after all their past attempts
had failed,

a new aspect of the old conflict between Islamic

and West civilizations.

The conferences have warned of the

wicked consequences of the present situation if it continues
and demanded that governments take prompt and serious
actions to counter this destructive current.
In their final report of their seminar,
Want From Broadcasters,

What Educators

the Ministers of Education and

Information set a strategy for countering intellectual and
cultural
remedy,

invasion based on two major fronts:
prevention,

Prevention and

would be effected through the cautious

selection of the broadcast programs and rejecting all that
opposes Islam's principles.

Remedy would be acheived by

countering the anti-Islamic attitude through educational
curricula and media programs by means of criticism,

which

would attempt to prove their invalidity and threat through
logic,

dialogue,

and persuasion.

The fourth conference of Arab Ministers of culture
which was held in Algeria in May 1983 under the auspices of
(ALECSO)

Arab League of Education,

culture,

and Science
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Organization discussed one issue "Arab cultural security and
cultural

industries".

m the end of the conference,

following recommendation was issued:

the

The conference asserts

that cultural security is attached to the Arab states'
capability to manufacture all they need of cultural,
educational,

and entertainment products.

The rising Arab

generations have increasing acceptance on imported cultural
products.

The spread of cultural consumption need entail

the Arab states to be concern of the availability of needed
facilities to establish cultural industries.47
The status of Arab television staggering between
Western and Eastern cultures gave it the character of a
double standard and a schizophrenic identity,
giving a contradictory messages to viewers.
instance,

constantly
Very often,

for

a religious program would be followed by a Western

fashion show or a religious program on the first channel,
while at the same time "Dallas" would be on the second
channel.

Usually,

the daily television schedule begins with

a recitation from the Holy Quran and ends late at night with
a Western cowboy movie.

Very often viewers can not relate

the television messages to their real life surroundings,
feel they are alien in their own society,
inner disruption,

anxiety,

which might cause

and confusion for some,

especially children and teenagers.
messages clash with Arab society,
messages.

and

Frequently many of these
family,

An Egyptian psychiatrist,

and school

in his commentary on
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youth's feelings of alienation,

depression,

and anxiety,

says youth feels helpless and hopeless because they cannot
be rescued from their feelings of loneliness.
has eliminated any hope for them,
television,

and movies;

psychiatrist,

The society

through its radio,

I have believed eventually,

as a

that schizophrenia does not affect individuals

only but it can affect societies as well.4®
States people read in the newspapers,

in the Arab

hear from radio,

see in television all that our enemies want us to read,

and
hear

and see.49
The flood of imported programs along with its alien
values have created a bicultural society which caused an on¬
going conflict between the traditionalists and the
modernizers.

For so many years governments,

officials as

well as many people,

were confused between the two different

irrelevant concepts,

modernization and Westernization.

It

appeared to them that the two notions overlapped.
Therefore,

they always tend to associate modernization with

Westernization believing that Westernization is the only
path for modernization.
Despite the failure and invalidity of this theory,
however,

some television officials still insist on

Westernization of television programs.

In fact,

at one time

this misconception used to be the trend of economists and
sociologists:
Economists and researchers thought in the 1950s and
1960s that imported radio, television, cinema, and
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foreign-owned press were all part of the crocess of
capitalZaoods W4Ch °onsfsted in the transference of
oapital goods and other industries.
Today it is more
!?e^d_that machinery of

information,

if

it

is

countr^Tn
°u*slde' merely confirms the receiving
country in the state of perhaps more hopeless
dependence than before.5^
F
Even Sociologist Daniel

Lerner,

Who studied the effect

of Western mass media on some of the Middle East societies
in the early

'50s and afterward,

of The Traditional
Even though

Society:

wrote a book on The Passing

Modernizing The Middle Fast.

in one segment of his book he discriminated

between Europeanization and modernization,

he could not

discriminate between modernization and Westernization or
between Europeanization and Westernization.
in early years
media

in the

on Arab people's

'50s the

It seems that

influence of Western mass

life style was not yet clear.

Europeanization some years ago penetrated the upper
levels of Middle East society, and affected mainly
leisure-class fashions.
Modernization today reaches a
far wider population and touches public as well as
private aspiration. Central to this change, says
Lerner, 'is the shift in modes of communication ideas
and attitudes- for spreading among a large public vivid
images of its own New Ways is what modernization
distinctly does.' Euopeanization used the class media;
modernization, the mass media.
The mass media,he says,
are what chiefly make the difference between the effect
of these two social movements.51
Now at the present time after decades of Lerner's
perspective
served the

of

"modernization",

it becomes clear that

same end as Europeanization and there

is a

difference between Europeanization and Westernization.
fact,

"Modernization"

"Europeanization".

it

In

became much worse than

If Europeanization had Westernized only
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the upper class of the society at the time,

"Modernization"

has Westernized the whole society and shifted the Arab
culture
ideas

from oral

culture to modes of communicating Western

and attitudes.
Schiller ridicules the allegation that refusing

Western media means refusing modernity "Some claim that an
expression of support

for cultural

integrity is equally a

traditionalism and reinforces the most
conservative and repressive elements
societies.

According to the most

American communication scholars,
the

in

(mostly)

poor

influential group of
the Western mass media are

instrument of modernity and social change;

and resisting

them signifies an opposition to modernization and an
endorsement of orthodoxy,
Actually,
cultural

the situation
policy

illiteracy,

and backwardness.

is reversed.

The objective of

is not merely to exclude material:it

assist the process of shaping consciousness.
essence

it

is

opposed to established,

is to

In its very

traditional

authority.52
The problem
countries

in the Arab states,

in general,

as

in the developing

is that of understanding technology

and how to combine both the modern

imported Western

technology and maintainance of the heritage at the same
time.

Actually,

that was not as easy task as

to determine what and how much to take
what to reject,

it might appear

from the West and

how to draw the line between what should be
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changed and what should be preserved.

These were very

confusing but crucial decisions for the Arab states to make.
It seems that because of the desire for quick modernization
and the starvation for technology,
able to draw that clear-cut line,

the Arab states were not
which led them to import

from the West both the good and the bad.

Katz and Wedell

have pointed out that -The quest for speedy modernization
does not allow new nations to create their own symbols of
the media

it is far easier to buy the symbols of

modernization wholesale."53

Hamdy Kandil,

an Arab media

expert and director of the Free Flow of Information at
UNESCO,

comments on the problem of technology in developing

countries "Technology is ahead of us.

It controls us and to

this day we do not benefit from it the way we should."54
Ibrahim Alusef,

the Director of AGJPPI

Joint Programs Production Institute)

(Arabian Gulf States

comments on the

phenomenon of television as a technology in the Gulf region:
I think we are running behind television instead of the
opposite process occurring.
Technology is changing too
fast and every day our responsibility to utilize it
become more demanding.
This is in contrast to our
content, which still lags behind and does not reflect
the many fields that developed rapidly in the last
twenty years.55
Analyses attribute the causes of the Iranian
revolution to the wave of Westernization that the late Shah
of Iran was trying to impose over the indigenous Islamic
culture during his unsuccessful attempts to modernize Iran
against the will of his people,

causing a contradictory
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dual-cultural society rejected by the masses of people.

The

discrepancy between the indigenous and the alien Western
values was actually the spark that erupted the revolution.
Noticeably,

after the revolution,

all aspects of

Westernization that were imposed by the old regime had
disappeared from the country.
It is obvious that Arab television operate separately
and apart from other institutions in the society.

in fact,

television frequently clashes with other institutions'
goals.

Due to the absence of planning and cooperation

between television and other institutions of society,
television was constantly accused of destroying what school
and family constructed,
and school roles,
efforts.

and instead of reinforcing family

television functioned to weaken these

What is being taught by school and family can be

easily erased by television programs.

Thus,

one can observe

easily the irresponsible role of television and the
disparity between television and other educational
institutions in the Arab society.
While there are exceptions in the Arab Middle East,
broadcast officials do not seem to have a policy or
goals for radio and television that are tied to the
goals of the country and the appropriate central
planning organization.
This is particularly true with
respect to programming policy for both news and
entertainment.
There is a surprising lack of
communication and cooperation between ministries of
information and education.56
The Ministers of Education and Information in the Gulf
states along with other Arab media experts and specialists

150
met in Riyadh in 1984

in a conference called "What Edueai-nr-g

Want From Broadcasters",

The participants agreed on the huge

gap between the two sides and they confirmed their belief in
the destructive role of media,
social

fields.

In the final report and the recommendations

conference,
coordination,

in the areas of education and

the participants called for more

cooperation,

and homogenization between

educational and media institutions.
Arab States Broadcasting Union
conference in Kuwait in 1975,

(ASBU)

organized a

"Arab Regional Conference for

Educational Broadcasting." to study the problems facing
utilization of television in education;

on top of these

problems comes the unclear relation between educational and
media institutions.57
States,

Despite its young age in the Arab

television had joined and has somewhat replaced the

role of family and school.

It has started to compete with

them in inculcating new values and tendencies in children.
The phenomenon of television's impact on changing
values

in people's social life is actually not confined to

Arab societies.

Rather it is global phenomenon,

original Western countries,

which experienced this problem

long before Arab societies did,

although it was much more

severe and shocking to Arab societies.
Yurikouf,

Soviet sociologist,

noted that in the twentieth century,

television,

even in the

because of

a unique spiritual relation has appeared.

Before the emergence of television this spiritual relation
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was between man and another man; but now this relation
exists between the humankind and the machine.
of some benefit of this on one hand,
peril on the other.
master of the family.

But despite

there is also unusual

A new member has appeared as the new
Yurikouf comments on the phenomenon

of gathering around television and he observes that a new
phenomenon has appeared:

receiving guests and continuing to

watch television at the same time,

as if people do not come

to visit their friends but to visit their television.

They

are connected spiritually to the television screen and to
the dining table through their abdomen,
is nothing to connect them together.

but actually there

Thus,

unites people superficially as viewers only,

television
but from

psychological point of view it separates people,
disconnecting their relationships.

Mostly the television is

the speaker and people are the listeners,

and they do not

socialize with people but with television.58
Canadian K.Taggart observed that those hours the
family used to spend together in sharing ideas and opinions
had dispelled because it became the peak hours for watching
television.

For people to gather only in the same place is

not enough to bring them close socially without interacting.
More important than that is that the traditional values that
the family instills in the children started to

disappear

and were replaced by television values derived from cowboy
movies and violence and crime serials made by television on
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a daily basis.59

Psychologist White believes that the

viewing process of television increases the negative
tendency in the individual,

since the viewer stay still,

accepting all that is presented to him without taking any
positive action.60
Needless to say,

probably the innocent victims of

television are the children.

German Martin Keihacker

affirms that today's children are not only spectators but
also partners in the events and in the acting.

They live

the event and participate in it and are influenced by the
experiment,

an actual living influence.61 Studies have shown

that pre-school children spent hundreds of hours watching
television before they reach school age.

They learn

television's values long before they learn school's values
and before they learn how to read and write.

Unmistakably,

violence and crime programs are more pyschologically
effective on children's and teenagers'
Arab states had to ban the show,
Man",

personality.

Some

"The Six Million Dollar

after several accidents involving children were

reported.

Some children attempted to imitate the fictional

power of the show's main character.
Nevertheless,

while it is not the purpose of this

study to focus on individual and social problems caused by
television,

many studies have shown that numerous

individual,

educational,

social,

and pyschological problems

are linked to television programs and viewing patterns.

153
Within the last several years,

as a result of the

unchanged policy of television programming and after peopleespecially parents- have experienced negative results from
their children's behavior,
television experts,
columnist,

many calls came from Arab

educators,

scholars,

religious groups,

and parents charging that television is a

corrupting influence and demanding true nationalization of
television and Islamization of its programs.
Noticebly,

in the last several years,

people

accordingly tended to form negative impressions of
television and began to deal with television more seriously
than before.

Some people changed their viewing pattern,

others their general outlook on television.

and

Therefore,

according to their new comprehension of the situation they
started to react to these changes,

especially within the

educated class and the conservative class.

Many people

started to restrict -viewing hours - after it had been
unrestricted on the fraudulent ground that television is an
innocent entertainment medium,- especially for children.
Now—their viewing is also often attended by one or both of
the parents.

Others,

moreover,

ban television from the

household on the ground that television is nothing but a
corrupting device and that their family and children are
better off without it.
This recalls the history of television in Saudi
Arabia,

when some religious groups opposed the establishment
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of radio and television in the country because it was
considered a corruptive device coining from the West to
corrupt the people.

At that time their allegation were

lampooned and ridiculed and they were called ignorant and
backward by the majority of the people at the time who
claimed themselves modernizers.
about thirty years,
true,

Interestingly,

and after

their expectations turned out to be

as indicated by research and studies of Arab media

experts and by the educated class.
misunderstanding,
corrupting medium,

To clear up any

the accusation that television is a
actually is not directed to television as

a technological device but rather to the type of programs
broadcast and the way it has been used.

Entertainment

One of the clear features of Arab television is that
it

depends extensively on imported Western programs for its

daily broadcast schedule,
unusual.

and this by itself is not

If we think about it,

Arab states do not only

import television programs but they import from the Western
countries almost every-thing for daily life needs.
prominent feature

But the

characterizing these imported programs is

that Arab television is entertainment- oriented.
The Arab States import a massive volume of foreign
Western programs especially in the field of entertainment.
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Ready-made Western entertainment programs occupy the largest
portion of
50%)

air time,

of air time.

filling from 40% to 60%

in some Arab states,

reaches as high as 80% of air time.

(an average of

the percentage

Ironically,

meanwhile

the Arab states import 50% of their programs from Western
countries,

the average of programs importation among the

Arab states is approximately 13% of the total air time.
Indeed,

this is a dilemma in the Arab States,

and in this

issue lies the ugly face of Arab television broadcasts,
imports of poisonous programs that are really far from its
needs or actually not needed at all.
In the Arab states,

television has always been looked

at either as a political tool or a pastime medium,

rarely

looked at and often ignored as an educational or a
developmental tool.
mind

In fact,

it was imprinted on people's

that television is primarily for entertainment

purposes.

Douglas Boyd comments on this point

To a great extent programming is basically
entertainment oriented on Arab television station and
it is not unfair to say that both radio and television
in the Arab World are believed by consumers to be
primarily for entertainment.
The director of Egyptian
television observed... that a television set is usually
bought with the intention of entertainment.
Nobody
thinks of television as a mean of education when they
go to buy a television set.62
Nevertheless,

the problem does not stop at this limit.

The danger of this type of programs goes beyond the fact
that these programs are merely imported as entertainment to
the fact as disclosed by facts and figures that the content
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of this type of ready-made programs
both to the national

irrelevant

culture needs and to the national

development process.
tragedy and

is entirely

That

in itself is a national cultural

is considered as committing vicious crime to the

dignity of the national culture.

Wilbur Shramm comments on

the problem of the use of television and entertainment
programs

in the Third World countries:

Every new country is under some pressure to install
television.
It is a badge of prestige.
It is an
invitation to entertainment...but the essential
question, as for radio and film, is where television
belongs in national development.
What the people are
usually asking for, when they clamor for television, is
the succession of entertainment programs which have
made the medium so popular in many countries that are
further advanced economically.
These are the
"Westerns," the crime mysteries, the advanced programs,
the comedies, variety shows, and sporting events.
It
is hard to argue that these have much to do with
economic development.63

It
officials

is

quite evident that television management and

in the Arab states realize the

of these entertainment programs,
importing them deliberately.
television acts
matter as
market.

and yet they

insist on

It seems that Arab states'

like private commercial television in this

if they are
That

irrelevant content

in competition with the commercial

is the simple and easy method to attract

viewers by offering pure commercial entertainment programs.
The director of programming

in the state of Qatar television

admitted that
We know that many of our imported programs which are
supposed to be entertainment deal with various
problems, most of which lack relevance to our own
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situation.
But people like them, and if we cannot
provide such material for them, they will find
alternatives somewhere.64
The threat of this type of
programs

imported entertainment

is not only that they convey different

ideas and

values but also because the content of these type of
programs

is

in contradiction to the society's

indigenous

cultural values.
While

some warn of the threat of these alien values on

the cultural

continuity of the society,

others see nothing

wrong with having these alien values of other cultures,
proclaiming that this
that

is the nature of modernization and

is how societies and culture change.

and becoming
process

influenced by each other

for modernization,

...

Interacting with
is a natural

by changing values,

norms,

ideas,

and attitudes,

and radio and television are nothing but

media

interaction.

for this

Modernization is inseparable from traditionalism and it
is nothing but transformation of tradition.
Indigenous
culture is changed or changed by its contact and
interaction with other cultures.
The new society is
born on the old, and not superimposed on it.
Recognizing the great impact of media, the point is
that not all effects of alien ideas are generally
negative, and what is considered negative for some
might be considered positive for others.
However,

the above argument is not the point here.

They are totally two separate
topic

issues.

The point

is not meant to be a diatribe against

or against different customs and values.
against the nature of humankind.

In fact,

in this

foreign cultures

To do so,

would be

efforts should be
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encouraged to

interact with other world cultures

accelerate the process of modernization,

in order to

learning,

and human

and cultural understanding among humankind and to share
intellectuall

ideas.

That

question which remains
contribution

is a very natural process,

the

is has this type of program made any

in this regard,

and was

it

for the sake of the

world's cultural process?
It

is already been noted that the so-called the

positive cultural

intention is

of these programs.

far from the original purpose

The homogenization of the world cultures

is considered a serious threat which would abolish and
eliminate the

fascination of life on earth by imposing a

worldwide uni

culture on the original

goals.

The truth

is that life

diversity of customs,
clothes.
and

"Made

is

one to achieve certain

fascinating because of

traditions,

languages,

in America" messages,

food,

imagery,

its

and

life-styles,

information techniques are being internationally

circulated and,

equally

The massive
commercial

important,

globally imitated".66

importation influx of these Western

entertainment television programs actually were

the chief carriers of Western values and life-style which,
as

a

consequence,

great degree,
life-style.

caused the people of the Arab states to a

consciously or unconsciously to

change their

Varis and Nordenstreng study reported that

during the early

1970s the U.S exported approximately

150,000 hours of programming each year.

This was more than
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three times the total programing exports of the next three
leading exporting nations combined(U.K,
W.Germany).67

In 1974,

U.S exported

hours of television programs.

nowadays to the

and

100,000 to 200,000

One-third of which was

exported to Far and Near East.68
attributed the

France,

The editor of the Boston

forsaking of Islam's ethics by Muslims

influence of the Western life-style.

Needless to say, there have always been Moslems who
have ignored these details of behavior, just as there
are today.
But they nevertheless constitute a
reference point that Moslems can and do turn to,
particularly in a period when the behavior patterns of
many people are rapidly changing under the influence of
Western lifestyle. 9
Unfortunately,
people

the prevailing misconception among

and officials

in the Arab States

imported programs may be enjoyed as
for pastime,
cultural

innocent entertainment

and there are no specific

ideas behind

that entertainment

it.

is not

of the biggest deception

is that these

intellectual or

Schiller believes that "The notion
instructive must be classed as one
in history."70

chronicler of American broadcasting,

Erik Barnouw,

puts

it this way:

To me, entertainment is a poisonous concept.
The idea
of entertainment is that it has nothing to do with the
seriousness of the world, but that it fills up an idle
hour.
Actually, there is an ideology implicit in every
kind of fictional story.
Fiction may be far more
important than non-fiction in forming people's
opinions.71
Perhaps not too many people realize that alien values
come more
programs.

strongly and effectively through entertainment
What people do not take seriously

is actually
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what effective them more.
programs

lies within

The magic

impact of entertainment

its unconscious and

intangible

penetration that not too many people realize,
too many people take entertainment seriously,

and since not
the

fact

is

what people do not take seriously is what effect them more.
Role- playing

is an effective method

in learning.

In

fact the notion of entertainment depend extensively upon the
factor of

role-playing as an essential

influence viewers psychologically,
allegation that entertainment

indirect way to

thus ruling out the

is neutral,

Recognition of the promise of the media in connection
with the problem of cultural identity leads to the
realization that entertainment is not neutral, but an
active force in the communication of values.72
Actually,

entertainment

transmitting Western
music,

Dr.

is a useful medium in

ideologies even in the pattern of

Joseph Klapper of the Columbia Broadcasting

System explained to the congressional Committee on Foreign
Affairs:
The broadcasting of popular music is not
likely to
have any immediate effect on the audience's political
attitude, but this kind of communication nevertheless
provides a sort of entryway of Western ideas and
Western concepts, even though these concepts may not be
explicitly and completely stated at any one particular
moment

in the communication.73

Governments and television officials believe that they
are
fine
sex
goes

on the
as

safe

side and these Western entertainment are

long as they edited out the violence and excessive

scenes.

But actually the

far beyond the

influence of these programs

limit of violence and excessive sex
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scenes.

These Western entertainment programs,truly,

were

the vital carrier in transmitting and imposing the concept
of "supremacy" of Western people and of Western culture over
any other cultures including the Arab culture.

Western

people were always viewed through these images as the best
and smartest people.

Unlike other people,

their mentality

appeared to excel that of other people and the Western
culture was always viewed as the best culture on earth in
contrasts to other cultures.
In fact,

masses of Arab viewers are so attached to

these programs that it sometimes reaches the level of
addiction and brain washing.

The Arab Center of Audience

and Viewers Research -a branch of ASBU- conducted a research
study in five Arab states to test the viewing pattern of the
dramatic entertainment shows.

The finding of the study

suggested that the average number of Arab viewers who watch
these serials is 80.78%,
78.92%,

Morocco 72.05%,

as follows

:

Iraq 88%,

Jordan 89.33%,

Sudan

and Kuwait 96.44%.74

The addiction to watching these shows affects very
impressivly the mentality of Arab viewers,

since they

consider what they see in these programs to be their
ultimate goal.

Through these programs,

Western lifestyle in all

they visualize the

its aspects as their supreme

lifetime aspiration and the only desirable path for
civilization and modernization;

at the same time it makes

them resent and want to undermine their own culture.
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Also these programs were an excellent method to
promote Western goods and were probably more effective than
standard direct advertising methods.

in persuading people

that it would be better to live like Western,
Western style house, Western furniture,
appliances,
products,

to drive Western cars,

to have a

to use Western home

to consume Western

to have the Western look,

to wear Western clothes,

even Western style hair cut,

and even to have the same

mentality of Western people.

According to the French

Match,

magazine,

the marketing

strategy of the

Americanization television programs,
marketing of Coke.
for instance,

.Paris

resembles the world

When the producer company of "DALLAS"

negotiated and signed contract with

international television to sell the show,

the method and

procedures were the same OPEC undertaking its marketing
negotiation.75
Hollywood television actors and actresses are very
popular among the masses in all their categories
teenagers,

and women).

People,

unfortunately,

often to regard them as their best role model,
pervasively as do the people in the West.

(children,

tend very
probably as

Ironically,

one

might find people who know more about these actors and
actresses than he or she knows about their own national
heroes.
Despite the American and worldwide popularity of the
American show,

"DALLAS",

Hassan Al-Tilili,

an Arab media
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specialist in his work Our Ailing

describes the impact

this serial had on people's thought in different partes of
the Arab world and the Middle East:

In Lebanon,

tragedies of the atrocious civil war,
watched it twice a week since 1978.
was also broadcast twice a week,

despite the

the people in Beirut
In Morocco,

the show

despite the constant

criti.ci.sm from the opposition pressing to boycott the show
due to its explicit undermining of virtue,
conduct.

However,

values and

the television continued to broadcast

the show because of its popularity among the people;

it was

their favorite topic of discussion.
In Algeria,

and despite its state's socialist system,

the national newspaper waged a campaign against the show,
considering that it

praises for American capitalism.

a short suspension of the show,

After

the Algerian television had

to continue broadcasting it because of viewer pressure.
show had left its fingerprints on the Algerian society,

The
and

in many cases people began deal with each other according to
the show's values and notions which people started to take
as a point of reference.
In Tunisia,

the Electric and Gas company conducted a

research study which showed that the consumption of water,
electricity,
time.

and gas dropped by 20% during the show's air

In Egypt,

the people were frustrated and depressed

because television ceased to broadcast the show during the
national period of mourning after Sadat's assassination.

In
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the Arab Gulf states,

viewers started to buy the video tapes

of the show in order not to waste time.76
Because of the liberal approach in editing employed by
Bahrain television,

in contrast with other Arab television,

especially in the Gulf region,
watch "Dallas".

some viewers tune in to it to

"The tolerance characteristic of Bahrain

television has attracted many viewers,

especially youths who

prefer to watch Dallas unedited than to see an episode
that has been severely cut.

Officials at Bahrain television

feels that because of tough competition from the video
market.,|77
A Turkish professor

,Awzkok,

in Turkey after J.R was shot.

portrayed the situation

"Who shot J.R" was similar to

the public build-up and high alert during war time.

It was

the main event for people all over Turkey in schools,
courts,

hospitals,

Turkish towns,

and cafes.

The mayor of one of the

after he found out who shot J.R,

had to

announce the answer in public to the townspeople through the
loud speaker.

Despite the strict censorship on television

programs since the army came to power,
not edit the show.

Moreover,

however,

they could

the Generals gave orders to

broadcast the show as it is.78
Altilili,

however,

attributes the success of "Dallas"

among Arab viewers primarily to the cultural vacuum that
Arab viewers are living in,

since television is considered

almost the only way that Arab viewers can release their
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tensions.

Those in authority in the Arab world still look

at culture in a negative way and they still consider that
culture is not an affective element in economic activities
or in the developmental operations.

Therefore,

Arab

television viewers find themselves in a position where they
have to be consumers of foreign production without bothering
to distinguish between the good and the bad,
local production is missing.
available,

Even when local production is

it is usually less than expected.

given this situation,

as long as

No wonder,

that Dallas has a prestige over other

programs.79
However,

entertainment programs might be a smart move

on the part of governments to distract people's attention
from problems and crises their country is facing.

Gehan

Rachty believes that the concentration of entertainment by
government is intentional:
There is an increasing emphasis in the Arab states'
television system on entertainment, especially serials,
long feature films, and variety shows.
These program
categories account for 53.8% of television time in Abu
Dahbi, 44% in Saudi Arabia, 56% in Qatar, 60.5% in
Kuwait and 60% in Egypt, and an average of 55% of
television time in all Arab states.
The purpose is to
attract the audience and give them what they want,
since television is considered mainly a medium for
entertainment, especially in states where there is no
other public entertainment.
Television entertainment
is consciously used in many cases to divert people's
attention from social, economic or political
problems.80
Also during the British occupation of South Yemen,
British introduced television to the people in 1964 to
divert their attention from the revolutionary liberation

the
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movement's activities and from North Yemen's spreading the
spirit of struggle against the British occupation.81
The criticism of the epidemic of entertainment
programs is not confined only to imported programs; the same
criticism applies also to the locally-produced entertainment
and drama.

The frequent criticism directed to this type of

program is that they do not deal with important issues but
often create an alien world that has nothing to do with real
life.

However,

even these local entertainments have a

Western style of production and content.

The mentality of

Arab television was influenced pretty much by the mentality
of Western television.

As viewers are looking at Western

actors and actresses as their best role model,

television

officials are also looking at Western television as their
best model.

The result was an imitation of Western style

programs and techniques.
television,

Being a mini-copy of Western

cause it to lose essential factors of creativity

and authenticity.

Arab television was not only brain-washed

in terms of production techniques but even in theories of
content;
Television in the Arab Middle East has a predominantly
Western style...creativity in the television medium is
moreover tied to electronic requirements and
technological innovations...virtually all television
station in the Arab world were purchased from and
installed by West European and American equipment
manufactured. Furthermore, various programs sponsored
by both western and Middle Eastern governments as well
as private foundations, have taken experts to the Arab
countries to advise, or sent Middle-East nationals to
the United States, Great Britain, France,
t
x
Germany to train in television production. The natural
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result of all this is a western-type television program
in Ardbic•
To the extent that Arab television give its attention
to entertainment programs,

they gave much less to

educational and religious programs although statistics
showed that illiteracy in the Arab world reaches more than
50% of the total population.

This percentage reaches 80% in

the rural areas which constitute 60.7% of the total
inhibited area.

Despite the lengthy daily schedule of

broadcasting hours of Egyptian television,

for instance,

the

percentage of religious programs of the total broadcast time
does not exceed 1%.83
In 1982 Arab television produced a total of 30,000
television hours;

the Egyptian television produced 25% and

the remaining was produced by eight other Arab countries.
More important is the type of these programs produced,

as

follows:84
1- Entertainment programs:

16395 hours.

2- News programs

:

5078

hours.

3- Educational programs

:

3499

hours.

4- Religious programs

:

2136

hours.

The Arab Commission to study media issues in the Arab
world,

in its report,"Arab Media:

New Arab Information Order,"

Present and Future,

Toward

focused on the content of

broadcast programs in Arab television,

arguing that the

content of programs in Arab television is still (juestionable
and that the notions of entertaining,

educating,

and
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informing are meaningless as long as they are isolated from
the political and social climate.
warning,

Entertainment has become

educating has become propaganda,

has become a hiding of truth.

and information

It has been shown that

television has been used in an improper manner,

which does

not consider the viewer's interests nor ambitions.

The

argument comes to the surface when considering the
seriousness of these functions of television
educate,

and inform)

(to entertain,

in a situation where Arab televisions

import 40%-60% of its programs,

some of them accepted to

allow the advertisement and promotion of goods and
commodities inconsistent with the existing circumstances.85
Late statistics indicate that six Arab states broadcast
annually a total of 850 hours of commercial advertisement,
but there is no indication that assures the compatibility of
these goods and products with the economical planning of
these states.86

The Foreign Channel

In almost every Arab state there are two television
channels,
program,

the first channel or what might be called the main
and the second channel or what might be called the

foreign program.

The main channel used to be the only

channel on Arab television for quite long time.
seventies and early eighties,

During the

as a result of the development

Egypt
Iraq
Kuwait
Lebanon
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia/
Aramco TV
People's Rep. Yemen

kst~b

Key:

News and
current

Figure

5.

Documentaries
Fiction,
and
entertainment
educational
and
children

Sports

Distribution of type of
materials in some Arab

Others

TV program
states.

SOURCE:
Television Traffic, A One-way Street?-Survey and
Analysis of the International Flow of Television Program
Materials, UNESCO, No. 70, Paris, 1974.

Table

4.

Program structure of some Arab
countries
according to
categories.

(The share of imported programs within each category is shown in parenthesis)
Program
Categories

Informational
Educational

Algeria
%

16

(-)

20

(9)

28

(17)

5

(25)

7

(-)

15

(-)

3

(37)

1

(-)

(17)

5

(-)

5

(40)

1

(-)

(-)

2

(-)

5

(47)

1

(12)

(-)

Children's

9

(-)

Unclassified

Total
Import

minutes
%

10
7

37

(12)

9

(96)

5

(50)

14

(75)

9

(77)

11

(66)

48

(80)

48

(60)

38

(55)

51

(74)

48

(73)

(-)

5

(39)

2

(-)

-

-

(-)

4

(-)

-

-

5

Advertisements

Total %

Democratic
Yemen
%

Tunis
%

(31)

1

Entertainment

Syria
%

22

Cultural

Religious

Egypt
%

-

3

1 00

1 00

1 00

1 00

1 00

7,669

20,292

7,443

6,322

6,963

(55)

(35)

(33)

(55)

(47)

SOURCE:
International Flow of Television Programs, Reports
and Papers on Mass Communication^ No.100, UNESCO, Paris, 1985.
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and increase of broadcast hours,

some Arab television

systems started to broadcast another channel,

which became

known among the people as the foreign channel or the English
channel.

Ironically,

some Arab governments insist on

it the educational channel.

Soon the epidemic of

adding the foreign channel affected many other Arab
television systems.

Establishing another channel,

however,

should not be judged as a big step in television
development.

What counts is not the number of channels nor

the number of broadcast hours,

but what the content of the

broadcast programs on this channel.
Before establishing the foreign channel,

the main

channel used to be a mix of Arabic and foreign programs,
since the number of Arabic programs were not sufficient to
fill out the transmission time.

It was expected that

foreign programs would fill the foreign channel since Arabic
programs can barely fill the main channel.

Thus,

most of

the broadcast time was filled with imported foreign
programs.

In Saudi Arabia,

for example,

the percentage of

foreign programs on this channel reaches 86%;
87.4%,

and in Qatar,

in Kuwait,

78%.87

Establishing the foreign channel to serve foreign
communities was the purported justification for allowing
more foreign programs to penetrate Arab culture.

Actually

the foreign channel worsened the question of importing
Western programs,

which did not do any good for the native
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cultural development.

While the problem already existed

before the establishment of the foreign channel,

the

complexity of the issue has increased with its emergence.
Although Arab television management justified these
channels as needed to serve non-Arab communities in the Arab
states,

undoubtedly,

this kind of justification is illogical

and cannot be taken at face value. Unmistakably,

the

establishment of this channel can not be explained in any
way as arising from the governments'
communities.
community,

concern for foreign

While this channel may be serving the foreign

it is at the same time causing severe damage to

the indigenous society which still does not have its own
genuine channel and was already suffering from the foreign
programs on the main channel.

Besides that,

the Arab native

majority should be given priority service by the
establishment of a full,
Moreover,

authentic Arabic culture channel.

it is not true that the foreign channel

attracts non-Arab viewers only.

It also attracts Arab

viewers of the first channel who have a desire to watch
foreign programs.

As a matter of fact,

the foreign channel

seems to attract more Arab viewers than the first channel
does.

It is a prefered by many people,

and Arab community

watches this channel more than does the non-Arab community.
Probably no governments in the world other than the
Arab governments offer a whole independent channel by itself
to serve foreign minority communities at the state's
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expense.

In addition to that,

not accomplishment through

serving

foreign communities

importing western programs.

is

Most

of the programs broadcast on this channel are globally
Western,
with

pure

entertainment shows which have nothing to do

"serving"

the foreign communities.

The truth

is that establishing

foreign channels

is a

delibrate move by Arab governments to allow more foreign
entertainment programs

into the Arab states to entertain

people and offer them what they want which serve as a
distraction tool
engaged

to people.

Arab television systems are

in competition with each other.

They are in a race

among themselves with respect to availability of channels
and transmission hours.
was

Establishing the

a deliberate move by governments,

foreign channel

not to serve the non-

Arab community but to show off what might be considered as a
technological
with

development which could be accomplished only

foreign programs.

channels'

They tend to take pride

in their

availability they offer and the length of their

daily broadcast hours

length to dominstrate the television

facilities they offer regardless of the broadcast content.
Thus,
feel

those Arab states with one television channel tend to
that they are at a

lesser advantage and less

than those who have more than one channel.
is no need

for this kind of channel;

existed on the

one problem.

first channel.

fortunate

Actually,

there

the trouble already

Two problems have replaced
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News

Arab television not only

imports entertainment

programs

from Western countries,

for news

importation as well.

they also depend on them

As regular television

programs are filled with imported Western programs,
editions are

filled with Western news.

news

As viewers become

attached culturally to the West through entertainment
programs,

they become attached politically to the West

through the news.
Facts and figures

indicate that the world's

information and news are controlled and dominated by a
Western countries.

They come from four sources

Agence France Press,
the world

(London,

AP,

and UPI)

Paris,

indicate that developing countries
of

their news

which

is

(Reuter,

and from three cities

and New York).

few

in

Figures also

import approximately 80%

from Western countries,

although 20%

to 30%

news related to the developing countries.

of

However,

an argument can still be made about the type of negative and
distorted

implied even in this 20 to 30%.

Arab media

in general and Arab television in

particular are no exceptions

in this regard.

Western newscast out-number any
In

1981,

Imported

local or national Arab news.

the average Western news constituted a total of

40%

in the newscast

in the Arab states while Arab national news

constituted

and the

30%

local news

10%.88

However,

these

175
figures vary from one Arab state to another.
Ironically,

Arab states do not import news of Western

countries but do import news of other Arab states from
Western sources.

Despite the close geographical distance

among Arab states,

news has to go to Europe first and then

distributed to the Arab states.

During the civil war in

Lebanon and the Israeli invasion,

most Arab television

obtained their news from Western agencies.
during the riots in Algeria,

In 1988 and

Arab television got the news

from France Press news agency,

among others.

If we review the content of these imported news
programs,

we will end up with the same result as effected by

imported Western programs,

the meaninglessness of these

programs and irrelevancy to people's and society's needs.
Western news is covered in greater detail than events and
major news are covered in other Arab states.

Probably Arab

viewers know more about what is happening in Western
countries than what is happening in their own home land.
All studies conducted in the field of the flow of news among
Arab states,
level,

either on international level or Arab world

indicate the paucity of this flow.

Despite all that

been said about the unity of the Arab states and the common
elements they share,
have established,

and the existing organizations they

the news flow activity among them range

between 10% and 30% of the total flow.

89

Arab television present Western news in considerable
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detail.

The President of the United states,

the White house staff,

State Department,

officials of

and Pentagon appear

almost daily on Arab television with their daily statements
and press conferences.

Even in such events as sports and

news of the weather is covered.

Anthony Smith observed that

Third World media pays as much attention to the private
lives of American celebrities,
Francisco earthquake,
American students,

to the dangers of another San

to the problems of drug-taking among

to the health of the American president,

as they do to the comparable personalities and issues of
their own societies.90
The British royal wedding in 1981 received a
tremendous coverage,
paid in the West.
States,

giving it as much attention as it was

The health of the President of the United

the first lady activities,

trapped in a well pipe in Texas,
of

fighting during his show,

Baby Jessica who was

the Geraldo Rivera incident

the two whales who got trapped

in an icy area and the effort to rescue them for days,

all

are examples of incidents receiving the attention of Arab
television newscast.

Conclusion

The disfunctioning of Arab television has continued and
spread to the Arab culture.

The impact of imported western

television programs on aspects of Arab heritage and Arab
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people is very obvious.

The chapter has demonstrated that

television in the Arab states is far from playing a
constructive role in terms of Arab cultural continuity.
Arab television is playing neither a neutral role nor even a
marginal role toward preserving Arab heritage.
Unfortunately,

Arab television has become a negative

and destructive weapon against Arab culture through its
irresponsible broadcasting of alien content of programs
which contradict and are incompatible with the basic Arabic
values.

Therefore,

Arab television is accountable for its

harmful role and holds a great share of responsibility for
the damage that pervaded the Arab culture.
Chapter V narrows down the situation,

turning the

study's attention from the Arab world in general to the
state of Kuwait as a case study for the research,
the issue in more depth.

studying

More of the effect of imported

western television programs on the Arab culture will be
demonstrated in the following chapter.

The chapter will

take a close-up look at the model of Kuwait television.
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Chapter V

THE CASE STUDY:

THE STATE OF KUWAIT

Introduction

This chapter

is the heart and the core of this study.

It narrows down the
the

issue from the Arab states

in general to

state of Kuwait specifically as the case study of this

research.

In this chapter,

Kuwait television will be

studied as a model of Arab television in terms of the
relationship between television and Arab culture.

In this

chapter,

the case study will be discussed in depth through

critical

analysis

in order to arrive at the final results

and conclusion of the research.
Many topics and

issues are covered

in this chapter.

In addition to providing a brief history of Kuwait and the
structure

of the

state,

this chapter reviews

analysis the development of broadcasting
special

strategies

of broadcasting,

characteristics
content,

in Kuwait with

emphasis on the television medium.

Kuwait television tackles some

of

in critical

The review of

issues such as policies and

censorship,

broadcast programs.

types and
In terms of program

the chapter will examine the content of the

imported western programs,
and the role of the

especially entertainment programs

foreign channel.
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Most

important,

this
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chapter will touch on the

issue of cultural domination and

illustrates how the Arab culture

in Kuwait was damaged

through broadcasting alien imported western programs.

Location and Tonography

Kuwait

is

located between

latitudes 28,45 and

30,05 to

the north of the Equator and between longitudes 46,30 and
48,30

to the east of Greenwich.

The state of Kuwait

occupies the north- east corner of the Arabian Peninsula and
the north-western corner of the Arabian
is bounded

in the east by the Arabian

south and west by Saudi Arabia,
Iraq.

Due to this

location,

(Persian)

(Persian)

Gulf.

Gulf,

It

in the

and in the north and west by

Kuwait

is the veritable gateway

to the north eastern section of the Arab Peninsula.
The total
kilometers,

area of the state of Kuwait

mostly flat desert,

square miles

is

The Neutral

in the

zone

Zone

years

and

been under a

most of these Islands are

(5,700 sq km)
in 1966;

was partitioned

revenue from oil

is shared between both states.

also another Neutral

zone has

or approximately 7,780

however,

between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia
production

square

Kuwait also owns six Islands which add some

sq miles to the area;

uninhabited.

17,818

(nearly the same size of the state of

Massachusetts).
3 00

is

Zone between Kuwait and Iraq.

There
This

long political and border dispute

still has not been solved.

Kuwait has one of

for
the
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few finest natural harbors
of

the Gulf.

(Kuwait Bay)

The weather of the state

desert climate geographical region.
hot

in the summer,

110°

ranges

to 66°F,

and 120°F

The temperature

is very

,in the shade,

In winter,

it

with occasional winter rains that

bring some grass and small
spring.

is typical of the

the average summer day temperature

ranging between
from 46°

in the north portion

flowers to the desert

Dust and sandstorms are frequent

in early

in the summer and

humidity aggravates the severe summer heat making air
conditioning

indispensable.

Background History

Although the history of modern Kuwait as an
city

started

tribes
known

inhabited

in the early eighteenth century when some

from central Arabia
later as

goes back much

"Kuwait",

(Najd)

immigrated to what became

its history as uninhabited

further than that.

It

land

is known that people,

particularly seamen from other nations,

had reached

its

shores many years ago.
Archaeological
Kuwait Bay,

findings at Failaka

island,

south of

indicated that pre-historic settlements of the

early Bronze Age existed there some 4,000 or 5,000 years
ago.

The

(Ikaros),

island became
as

in later times a Greek settlement

is evidenced by the ancient remains of a stone

temple built about

334

B.C.

at the time of Alexander the
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Great by his army,

a bust of whom was found and the

discovery of a hoard of coins from Hellenistic times.
For centuries,

Kuwait land has been an important trading

rout due to its strategic location on the northern Gulf.
Through this strategic route of water,

goods have passed

from China and India to Kuwait and Shatt Al-Arab,
overland to Arabia,
to Europe.

However,

Syria,

Iraq,

continuing

the Mediterranean and then

no such evidence indicated any kind of

habitation on the mainland of Kuwait in the very early
times.1

In 632 A.D,

famous leader,

the Muslims under the command of the

Khalid ibn al Walid defeated the Persians

under the famous Persian leader,

Hormus,

in the battle of

"That Alsalasil" or the "Battle of the Chains",

which took

place on Kuwait land in "Kadhma".
In the sixteenth century,

the European influence

started to penetrate the Gulf area when,

following the

exploration of Bartholomenw Diaz and Vasco de Gama,
Portuguese ships reached these waters.
lasted unchallenged for entire
powerful naval

fleet,

century.

Their presence
Because of their

the Portuguese influence was strong

and obvious and they established a chain of forts along the
coast from Oman in the South of the Gulf to the north of the
Gulf in Kuwaiti island,
"Grane"

then known to the Europeans as

(the little horn),

meaning high hill.

It was

located opposite Kuwait Bay and served as the center for
their naval

fleets which dominated and secured the region
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mainly for maritime route trade purpose.

The Gulf maritime

route and Grane Island were familiar to the Dutch,

French,

and British marines as well who sailed these seas in the
seventeenth century to challenge the Portuguese during the
struggle for dominating maritime trade routes.

Eventually,

the British emerged as the prevailed power.
It believed that the present town of Kuwait was
founded in the beginning of the eighteenth century when in
1710 a terrible and continuous drought hit the interior of
Arabia,

driving

some families of the Anazah tribe to

immigrate from central Arabia
difficult place.

(Najd)

in search of a less

After searching in several places,

they

found the conditions to be even worse than where they came
from,

till they reached to the shore of the Gulf where they

settled eventually near the harbor or bay where a fort or
"Kut"

stood.

The name Kuwait is derived from the Arabic

diminutive word of "kut" meaning small fort.
It seems that from the early settlers'

time,

people of Kuwait decided to appoint a "shaik",
rule them.

In 1716,

the

or chief,

to

the chiefs of the most important three

tribes entered into alliance.

The conditions of the

alliance provided that Sabah bin Jabar bin Salman bin Ahmed
will have the leadership in the affairs of government,
consultation with the other chiefs;

in

Khalifah bin Mohammed,

would have the leadership of the financial affairs in
commerce;

and Jabar bin Rahmat,

chief of the Jalahmah, would

188
control the affairs of work on the sea.
be equally divided among them.2

In 1766,

All profits were to
the whole of

Khalifah followed by the majority of al-Jalahmah left Kuwait
to settle in Bahrain.
al~Jalahma,

With the migration of al-Khalifah and

there was no serious challenge left in Kuwait to

Sabah authority.3

A member of Al-Sabah family ruled Kuwait

ever since through selection among the family and the AlSabah family has been the ruling dynasty of Kuwait since
that time.

Unfortunately,

many people and writers tend to

associate and recognize Kuwait with the oil era.

The post¬

oil era has been much covered; many have written on that
subject,

which was given too much attention.

However,

less

attention has been given to the history of pre-oil era.
Kuwait had a long glorious heritage of maritime
history.

Those Kuwaiti men and women who lived in the pre¬

oil era and bore much hardships associated with surviving
mother nature sacrificed much and committed their lives to
their land,

indeed should be given full credit for their

great achievements in establishing and maintaining the
modern Kuwait.

They all proved they were sea and state

craftsmen.
Despite the nomadic origin of the Kuwaiti people,
quickly adapted to the sea life environment.
oil era,

they

Prior to the

the Kuwaitis always looked to the sea as a source

of livelihood.

Soon,

such as pearl diving,

they took from the sea occupations
fishing,

and maritime commerce and
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turned the small town into the maritime trading center of
the northern Gulf.
Palgrave,

British traveler-author,

William G.

who made a trip to Kuwait and the region in 1862,

delineated the skills of Kuwait's seamen as follows:
Among all the seamen who ply the Persian Gulf, the
marines of Kuwait hold the first rank in daring, in
skill, and in solid trustworthiness of character.
Fifty years since their harbour with its little town
was a mere nothing ; now it is one of the most active
and the most important port of the northerly Gulf.4
The pearl diving industry played a major role in the
state economy and some of the finest pearls in the world
came from the Arabian Gulf.

At one time,

the estimated

number of pearl harvesting boats in the Gulf were 5000,
which 700 came from Kuwait.5

By 1912,

of

a fleet of 812 ships

employing 30,000 sailors and divers was engaged in these
maritime activities.

During the summer months,

nearly one-

third of the entire population would be at sea for the pearl
diving season.6
The long and hard sea life had shaped the Kuwaiti
people to be one of the best talented and skilled vessels
craftsmen in the world.
that sail

They succeeded in building vessels

in the oceans and cross seas with no navigational

aids except the qualifications and skills of the men.
In 1944,

Lieutenant-Colonel Harold R.

P.

Dickson,

the

former British political agent in Kuwait made this note:
Kuwait to-day is still a most interesting and old-world
spot for any one who wishes to study the various types
of sailing-craft in the Persian Gulf...Many a sailor of
the Royal Navy or other visitor has taken away with him
as a souvenir a perfect *odel of [sailing -boats], or
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one of the types of pearling boat.
About nine years
ago, an admiral took home one of these perfect models
and presented it to the Science Museum, South
Kensington.7
Not too many years ago,

a Kuwaiti ship craftsman built

a classical Kuwaiti style yacht

(boom)

for the ruler of

Qatar; John Daniels portrays the amazement of British naval
architect when he saw this art masterpiece of Kuwait
craftsmen;
A senior British naval architect, greatly impressed by
this particular craft, asked if he could see the plan.
His embarrassment must have been greater when he
learned that the craft had been made entirely from the
creative genius of Kuwaiti craftsmen with their
specialised skills and that no plans are ever used! the
builders merely got down on the keel and proceeded with
the job with no more ado.8
In 1776,

Kuwait served as a starting point of a desert

trade and mail route to Aleppo and the Mediterranean to
replace Basra which was captured by the Persian during the
war between Turkey and Persia.
nineteenth century,

Before the turning of the

the British East India company moved its

trade headquarter for the northern Gulf from Basra to Kuwait
to avoid the threat to its trade route.

Years later,

Kuwait

was the intended termination point of Berlin-Baghdad
railway.

William Palgrave depicts the condition of Kuwait

during his visit in 1862:
The import duties are low, the climate is healthy, the
inhabitants friendly, and these circumstances, joined
to a tolerable roadstead and a better anchorage than
most in the neighborhood, draw to Kuwait hundreds of
small craft which else would enter the ports of Aboo
Shahr or Basra....In its mercantile and political
aspect this town forms a sea outlet, the only one for
jabal Shammar, and in this respect like Trieste for
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Austria.9
It is worthy to note that Kuwait history as a land has
always been part of Arabian history.
the Arabian Peninsula in the 7th C. ,

When Islam emerged in
the whole Arabian

Peninsula converted to the new religion and Kuwait as
uninhabited land at the time became part of the Islamic
caliphate ever since.
18th C. ,

When Kuwait was established in the

it was already under the Islamic Ottoman caliphate

and flew the Islamic Ottoman flag.
International powers dominated the Gulf region since
the 16th C.,

the British eventually emerging as the

uncontested power over that of the Dutch or the Portuguese
who used to be the only power operating in the Gulf prior to
the arrival of the British.

With the emergence of Kuwait as

a new trading center in the northern Gulf,

the British

started to manoeuver around this new strategic center.

The

British relationship with Kuwait started when they
transferred the British East India company of the southern
terminal of

its overland mail route through Aleppo from

Basra to Kuwait.

Meanwhile,

the British interest in Kuwait

did not stop there.

Kuwait Under Britain

In the struggle for power in the region between the
Ottomans and the British,

with a significant British
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connection a bloody coup took place in Kuwait and Shaik
Mubarak came to power in 1869.
reign,

The legitimacy of Mubarak's

who ruled Kuwait until 1915,

is still questionable.

The rules that were made by Kuwaiti people since the
establishment of Kuwait town in early 18th C.

concluded that

the seat of power should shift through selection.
agreed upon as a common sense rule.

This was

This procedure was

carried out peacefully and smoothly through the years until
Mubarak's reign,

when he broke these rules.

Mubarak was known to be so fond of the throne that he
would do whatever it took even if he had to kill his two
brothers.

The British took advantage of Mubarak's fondness

for the throne and backed him in the coup with many
promises.

According to an official memorandum by the legal

adviser to the British Embassy in Istanbul,

prior to the

coup Mubarak spent one month in Bushire with the British
Resident in the Gulf,

F.A.Wilson,

a point not denied by

Wilson.10
In May 17,

1896,

Mubarak carried out his coup and

seized power from the ruler,
Muhammad,
Jarrah,

Shaik

by murdering him along with another brother,

Shaik

in a vicious and atrocious slaying while they were

sleeping.

Unlike other rulers of Sabah family who came to

power through selection,
Kuwait,

his elder brother,

Mubarak proclaimed himself ruler of

breaking the rules of succession by selection,

which

made the people of Kuwait regard him as an illegitimate
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ruler.

The Ottomans,

however,

interfere in the event,

to avoid bloodshed,

did not

regarding it as an internal matter

of Kuwait.
Although Kuwait had always been proud of being part of
the Islamic Ottoman Caliph territory and raising the Islamic
Ottoman flag,

Kuwait enjoyed full autonomy and the Ottomans

actually never interfered in Kuwait's internal affairs.
However,

that was not the case after Mubarak came to power.

During Mubarak's reign,
colony.

Kuwait became an official British

It was clearly evident that the British,

conjunction with Shaik Mubarak,

in

had planned and determined

the future of Kuwait long before Mubarak's coup.
Through the years,
selfishness,

Mubarak gained a reputation for

ruthlessness,

exclusive privleges.

tyranny,

and sought to have many

These attitudes put him on many

occasions in confrontation with the people of Kuwait.

It is

not true that Mubarak was a "great man," despite the
description in British-written history books and other
foreign sources.
historian,

A prominent and authentic Kuwaiti

Abdul-Aziz Al-Rushaid,

described Mubarak's

character and assessing Mubarak's reign:
Mubarak was a tyrant, stubborn and unjust.
He was an
absolute ruler who loved the accumulation of wealth and
was always seeking ways to increase his wealth.
He
assessed high fines against law-breakers; continuously
invented taxes...and made himself partner in all
building and property.
He received one-third of what
was sold or rented, even if this was repeated a number
of times a day.11
Meanwhile another

Kuwaiti historian,

Al-Shamlan,

delineated
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Kuwait as a just and peaceful society,

and the

characteristics of rulers before Mubarak:
[They] were not privileged from most of the Kuwaiti
population in any way.
They were similar to the shaik
of the tribe.
There was no distinction between the
shaik and members of his tribe.
The power of the ruler
was limited, and there were some Kuwaiti leaders who
had more authority than the ruler himself.12
Beside his fondness for ruling,

Mubarak was also well-known

for his anti-Islamic rule attitudes and pro-British.

All

Kuwait rulers before Mubarak held the title of Qaimqam
"District Governor"

from the Islamic Caliphate.

offered this title in January 1897,

When he was

he refused to accept it

and sought British assistance instead.

Mubarak was known

for his lavish and extravagant life and during his reign
some immoral conduct that opposed Islam's teachings appeared
in Kuwait.

Years later it provoked the followers of the

famous Islamic movement

(Wahabbis)

suppress these evil acts.

to attack Kuwait to

Right after he came to power,

Mubarak sought British assistance against the Islamic
caliphate;

they were more than happy to accept Mubarak's

offer.
On January 23,

1899,

Mubarak signed a secret agreement

with the British incorporating humiliating stipulations.
Mubarak agreed not to cede territory to,
relations with another power,
Under this treaty,

or to direct

without Britain's consent.

Mubarak agreed that Kuwait's foreign

relations were to be handled through the British Foreign
Office.

Mubarak bound himself,

his heirs and his successors

195
not to receive the Agent or Representative of any power
or government at Koweit [sic], or at any other place
within the limits of his territory, without the
previous sanction of the British Government; and
further binds himself, his heirs and successors not to
cede, sell, mortgage, or give for occupation or for any
other purpose any portion of his territory to the
government or subjects of any other power without the
previous consent of Her Majesty's Government for these
purposes.
This engagement also to extend to any
portion of the territory of the said Shaik Mubarak,
which may now be in the possession of the subjects of
any other Government.13
The agreement affixed no obligation upon Britain despite
Mubarak's insistence upon British protection.
British Political Resident in the Gulf,
Malcolm John Meade,

I.S.C.,

Later,

the

Lieutenant Colonel

paid a visit to Kuwait and

assured Mubarak in a letter of the good offices of the
British Government to him,

his heirs,

and successors as long

as Mubarak scrupulously and faithfully observed the
conditions of the said bond.
Mubarak Rs.

15,000

(1,000 £)

The letter also agreed to pay
and added "A most important

condition of the execution of this agreement is that it is
to be kept absolutely secret,

and not divulged or made

public in any way without the previous consent of the
British Government."14

Mubarak's two brothers,

witnessed the agreement,

who

refused to sign the agreement

unless Britain assured protection of the family palm tree
groves in Fao from the Ottomans.

As a guarantee of their

silence on the secret agreement,

the British agreed to do

so.15
and

This treaty was humiliating to the dignity of Kuwait
all Kuwaiti people,

making many Kuwaiti people believe
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that Kuwait was sold to the British.
all these negatives,

Ironically,

despite

the British called Mubarak "Mubarak the

Great".
In
the

1899,

the Ottoman Caliph supported a proposal that

Islamic Ottoman caliphate should give the Germans

consent to build the

famed Berlin— Baghdad railway and to

extend and terminate

it

in Kuwait;

block the extension of the project,

the British

depriving Kuwait of a

vital means of contact with the external world.
early

intervened to

This was an

indication of Britain's tight grip on Kuwait and

domination of Kuwait decision-making.
In

1904,

in Kuwait.
the de

the British Political Agency was established

Since then,

the British Political Agent became

facto ruler of Kuwait.

Among

its other functions,

the Agency was given the right to establish and conduct its
own jurisdiction

law court

The Agency was the only
until

for non-Muslims

in the state.

foreign government post in Kuwait

an American Consulate was opened shortly after World

War II.
of the

During the First World War,
Islamic Ottoman caliphate,

Mubarak that his palm tree groves
permanently exempted
his protection

British

the British promised
in Fao would be

if they occupied Basra,

taking

it

from the

in exchange for his assistance

forces region.

called all Muslims

fall

from taxation and they would guarantee

Islamic rule of the Ottoman
to the

which caused the

When the Ottoman Caliph

for Jihad against the British,

it was
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expected that Mubarak would not respond to the Caliph's
call.

However,

many of the tribes

in neighboring Iraq

responded to the Caliph's call and rebelled against
Mubarak's ally,
his

Shaik Khazal of al—Muhammarah,

support of the British.

because of

Shaik Mubarak attempted to

rescue his ally by mobilizing Kuwaiti

forces and forcing

Kuwait people to quell the tribes who responded for the
Jihad.

The Kuwaitis surprisingly stood against Mubarak and

refused to

fight their own Muslim brothers

the British.
mind.

As a result,

Mubarak was

for the sake of

forced to change his

Al-Rushaid comments that Mubarak "was disturbed by

the degree of enthusiasm for the rebellion common among
Kuwaitis,
his

something he had not seen the equivalant of all

life".16

Caliphate,

In

1914,

after the

fall

Mubarak and the British

of the Islamic Ottoman

formally agreed that

Kuwait would come under the British colonial
that time,
suddenly
In

Britain had

in January,
1922,

full

control

system.

of Kuwait.

Since

Mubarak died

1915.

following a short conflict with Saudi Arabia,

Britain once again betrayed Kuwait at the Uqair conference,
gl^ Percy Cox,

then the British High Commissioner

and Major J.C.More,
the time,

the British Political Agent

in Iraq,

in Kuwait at

drew boundaries giving two-thirds of Kuwait

territories to Ibn Saud.

When he heard the news,

Kuwait's

Shaik Ahmed Al-Jabir resented the unjust agreement and
that he was deceived.

felt

Even though he signed the agreement,
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Ahmed was constantly considering how to regain
Kuwait's

lost territory.

"To the day of his death he

believed that he had been unjustly treated."17
In January 1961,

the government announced that Kuwait

was now responsible for
till June

19,

1961,

ruler of Kuwait,
Luce,

its foreign relations.

It was not

when letters were exchanged between the

Shaik Abdullah Al-Salim,

and Sir William

then the British Political Resident in the Gulf,

the British Government recognized Kuwait's
sovereignty.18
a treaty of
Untied

The

that

independence and

1899 protectorate treaty was replaced by

friendship and consultation.

States have established embassies,

Britain and the
replacing the

Political Agency and the former American Consulate.

Post-Oil Era

The pearling
in the

state's economy and Kuwait was one of the chief pearl

centers

in the Gulf and the region.

depression

in the

cultured pearl
the

But the economic

1930s and the advent and growth of

industry

led by Japan,

brought depression to

industry as well to the state and threatened people's

life

source.

another.
time,
oil

industry at one time played a major role

But God never closes a door without opening

An unexpected miracle was on the horizon.

the mid-30s,

in the

area;

early signs

At that

indicated great potential of

then the discoveries were confirmed.

Oil
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was first discovered in 1938,

stopped for several years due

to the onset of the Second World War,

and resumed in 1946.

As a consequences of the new discoveries,

the pearling

and fishing industries suffered a drastic declined and
people of Kuwait could no longer look at the sea as a source
of life.

Instead,

this time they turned to the forsaken,

abandoned desert land as a new source of life.
Unfortunately,

the discoveries of the "black gold"

lured the

people and made them forget somewhat their pride in their
past.

The shipbuilding industry likewise fall sharply.

Compared to 812 ships operating in 1912,
five boats operating in 1956.

there were only

The last Kuwaiti deep sea

dhow was purchased by the Office of Education in 1954 for
preservation as an historical memorial.

Such tragedy to the

glorious industry of maritime heritage!
In some ways "black gold" has usurped much of the
romanticism, the quaintness and the attractiveness of
the old Kuwait.
Nevertheless, even in recent years, we
have been reminded of the remarkable achievements of
the former era....one could not escape from a vivid
sense of character, an inseparable link of the
romanticism of the past as one toured the Kuwait
waterfront of yesterday and saw the various craft
silhouetted against the setting sun.19
Needless to say,

the discovery of oil did not only

shock the economic system but caused an upheaval to the
whole structure of the entire society,
expectations,

changed all

and created new stages of life.

In fact,

the

oil boom in the region drew a very thick clear-cut line not
only in Kuwait's history but in the history of the Arabian
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Peninsula.

As a matter of fact,

oil was considered the

major variable that shifted the primitive town to a modern
state.

When the oil tap was turned on,

Al—Sabah,

Shaik Ahmed Jabir

in his address to his people referred to Kuwait

for the first time as a state,
Harold R.P.

Dickson,

not as a shaikhdom.20

former British Political Agent,

who lived in Kuwait both before and after the oil era and
then wrote many history books of Kuwait,

expressed his

admiration toward the will of the people of Kuwait and the
challenge they met in living in the harsh environment.
Sun and sand are formidable enemies in an almost
waterless country where the rainfall is less than five
inches a year, and where day shade temperature rise to
110, 120, and even 128 F. These difficult conditions
under which men had to work and live, particularly
during the early eages, make the success which has been
achieved all the more remarkable.21
One of the state's first planning advisors,

Dr George

Saba Shiber described the sudden disparity between the pre
and post oil eras:
new Kuwait.

"Yesterday there was old Kuwait; today,

Yesterday and today are literally a stone's

throw away in space and fifteen years apart in time.

The

story of pre-oil and post-oil Kuwait is extraordinary and
unique.".22

British author John Daniels, who lived and

studied Kuwait's society in its first stages of the post oil
era,

describes the thriving rapid progress in the state as

unparalleled in the Middle East,

if not in the world.23
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Resources

In general,

Kuwait lacks natural resources

particularly sources of drinking water,

and depends

thoroughly upon desalination technigues to provide water and
drinking water.

Kuwait has the largest water distillation

plant in the world.

Water has been always Kuwait's main

problem in the either pre or post oil era.

In fact,

drinking water was a big business before oil was discovered;
usually imported from the Shatt Al-Arab river in neighboring
Iraq or obtained from springs under the sea by divers who
would trap it in jugs and bring it to the surface.

Some

ground water has been found but most of it is brackish
water.

Interestingly,

the highest budget item in the state

is not the defense or the educational budget as one might
expect,

but it is the budget of water and electricity.

Despite the heavy cost to the government of this burden on
the budget,

both water and electricity are subsidized by the

government and people are charged below cost prices.
Kuwait,

In

producing a barrel of distilled water costs more

than producing a barrel of crude oil.
The lack of water combined with the poor quality of
soil and the harsh weather makes agriculture almost
impossible.
area.

Arable land represents only 1% of the total

In recent years,

the government has been concerned

with issues of natural resources such as agriculture,
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and animal husbandry.

The government set

strategies to increase production of fishing,
products,

plantation,

green land,

arable land in the state,

animal

arable and potential

and green houses.

However,

it was

clear that these ambitions would not succeed or survive
without government support.
to allocate lands,

loans,

Therefore,

the government began

and providing facilities to those

who are interested in investing in the land.

Nevertheless,

this industry has not be able to attract many Kuwaities due
to the more lucrative opportunities in the oil and
commercial sectors.

Moreover,

government strategy.

this is a long-range

The result in the best cases,

is not

expected to reach commercial level and still far away of
reaching local self-sufficiency level.
Kuwait's oil resources,
government oil companies,
the state.

owned and controlled by three

is the vital natural source for

More than 90% of the state's revenue is from oil

and oil products.

Kuwait's oil reserves,

68.53 billion barrels,

approximately

is estimated to last for another 188

years if the oil production remains with the average of one
million barrel a day,
of the largest oil

as it presently is.24

fields in the world,

Kuwait has one

"Burgan" oil field.

The International Bank Mission which visited Kuwait in 1961
indicated in their report that the oil resources of
Kuwait,

about one-fifth of the world's total,

give the

shaikhdom a much larger role in the economic affairs of
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the Middle East than its modest geographical dimensions and
population might indicate.
government,

Due to the wealth of the

Kuwait provides its citizens with one of the

most comprehensive welfare systems in the world.

The per

capita GNP in Kuwait is among the highest in the world for
an average of $13,500.
for about $29,

While a barrel of Kuwait oil sells

a U.S Department of Energy official has

estimated its cost of production to be 25 cents.25

This

compares to 6 to 8 cents in 1961.

Population

The story of population in Kuwait after oil was
discovered is a unique one.
under way in the early 50s,

Due to the oil boom that got
and due to the government needs

for labor and skills not available in Kuwait at the time to
carry out the government jobs and services,
the mecca for immigrants.

Kuwait became

Due to the huge state's budget

and the government announcement of the first development
plan and the massive governmental projects and the rapid
expansion of civil services,
influx of

Kuwait was swelled by the

immigrants from both Arab and non-Arab expatriate;

skilled and unskilled.

Ragael El Mallak noted that "With the

possible exception of America at the turn of this century,
no other country has witnessed such a mass movement of
people,

proportionately,

as has Kuwait.".

Fakhri Shehab
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described the immigration in Kuwait in early 1950's:

"A

uniquely attractive market for labor was created and a flood
of skilled and unskilled workers flocked from the four
corners of the globe,

but mostly from neighboring

countries. "27
Although the government for the time being has set
very tough restrictions on entrance visas to the country,
the immigration to the country was unrestricted and
unsupervised until 1954.

It was not until 1955 when the

Office of the Social Affairs drew the government attention's
to the fact that only 13% of the labor force was made of
Kuwaiti nationals.28

In spite of government restrictions on

entry visa to the country and work permits,

it is still

having some difficulties in controlling immigrants and
reducing their number.
immigrants,

It seems that the need for the

especially the skilled,

is indispensable to

carry out the massive expansion in government civil jobs and
services.
In 1900,
in 1937

Kuwait population was estimated at 10,000 and

it was 75,000.

it reached 150,000,

In 1950,

after oil was discovered,

then 160,000 by 1952.

In 1957,

the

first Kuwaiti census indicated that Kuwait population was
206,473,

of whom 45% were Kuwaitis.

in the years 1961,

1965,

1970,

1975,

The censuses following
1980,

and 1985 have

consistently indicated that the non-Kuwaitits out-number the
Kuwaitis.

In 1975,

Kuwait's population was 994,837; the
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Kuwaitis constituted 47.5% of the total poulation.
Kuwait population was 1,355,827,
Kuwaiti.

In 1980,

of which 58.6% were non-

The estimated population of Kuwait according to

the 1985 census was 1,697,301,
were Kuwaiti citizens.

of whom approximately 40.1%

The population at mid-1988 was

estimated at 1,958,000.29
Kuwait's population have increased very rapidly over
the years after the discovery of oil.
period from 1957 to 1965,
Between 1957 and 1975,

Within the eight year

the population increasd 128 %.

Kuwait population increased 557%,

annual average increase of 24%.

Between 1957 and 1980,

an
the

population increased by 656%.

The annual population growth

between 1957 and 1961 was 12%,

probably the highest in the

world.

Both Kuwaiti and non-Kuwaiti populations have grown

rapidly.

Kuwait population has one of the highest growth

rates in the World
years,

(about 4.5% from 1975 to 1980).

Over the

the growth rate among Kuwaitis increased dramatically

despite their decline in number against the non-Kuwaitis.
In 1980,

for instance,

as in 1957,
period.

there were about five times as many

an increase of 494% over a twenty-three year

Meanwhile,

the growth among the non-Kuwaitis for

the same period was even greater,

854%.30

The average rate

of growth of the non-Kuwaiti population has been decreasing
very noticeably,
1985.

from 10.3% in 1975-1980 to 5.6% in 1980-

It is estimated to have been 1.9%

with Kuwaiti population growing by 3.9%.

in recent years,
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Of these figures,

about 80% of the immigrants are

males.

The non-Kuwaiti population,

nature,

has an unusually high proportion of young and

middle-aged adult males

because of its immigrant

(61.8% in 1985), many in

construction and service jobs.

The foreign population

consists primarily of workers,

sometimes accompanied by

their families,

who are in Kuwait to take advantage of the

relatively high wages and the shortage of labor in all areas
of employment.

Jobs held by immigrants range from manual

labor to important government and managerial positions.
Palestinians and Jordanians constitute about 22% of the
total population;
Iranians,

Egyptian,

Pakistanians,

4%;

other Arabs about 15%;

and Indians about 10%;

remaining 2% come from Europe,

the U.S and the Far East.

The population is relatively young:
years old,

and highly urbanized,

living in the urban areas.

and the

58.3% are under 25

with 91% of the population

The population density is 80.2

per sq km.31
The definition of citizenship in Kuwait is a very
strict one,
world.

Article 1 of the citizenship law of 1959

Decree #15,
1969,

and probably is among the most strict in the

issued December 5,

1959)

(Amiri

amended 1960,

1965,

and

officially defined the Kuwaiti nationals as those

people and their descendents who were present in Kuwait
prior to 1920 and maintained residence there to 1959.
Kuwaiti law allows granting of citizenship to non-Kuwaitis
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if they meet certain requirements.
instance,

residency

in Kuwait

for a minimum of

knowledge of the Arabic language,
needed by the country,
Kuwait.
born
and

By

1975,

in Kuwait,

for

15 years,

a

possession of a skill

and a legal

29.9%

source of

income

in

of the non-Kuwaiti population were

16.4% had been in Kuwait for 10 to 14 years,

12.7% had been

they were

It requires,

still

in Kuwait

for 15 or more years,

considered non-Kuwaiti.32

Until

number of those who could be naturalized was
fifty persons annually.33

However,

1980,

the

limited to

Those who are granted Kuwaiti

citizenship have the same rights and obligations as other
citizens except

for some political

Despite this citizenship law,
naturalization
political

for a

rights

(66.9%),

for the purpose of political
Till

there

permanently reside
nationality.

1979

there were

Most of these bedouins were

Iraqi desert

However,

the government granted

large number of Bedouins with

demographic reasons.
naturalized.

rights.

is

(21.6%),
still

full

and

132,490 persons
from Saudi desert

and Syrian desert

(2.9%).34

a large population who

in Kuwait but still do not hold a Kuwaiti

Most of these people are tribesmen who used to

travel

constantly

in northern and inner Arabia searching

better

life or better jobs.

As a desert tradition,

for

those

tribesmen had not recognized the concept of boundnes and
many of them would spread over today's states.
it was

rather difficult

Therefore,

for some of these tnbsmen to
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determine

their

identity within

Immigrant population has
government.
or

Since most

subsidized,

citizens,
services

the

it

spends

these

to

movement

most

materials

of
to

government

the
the

never

residents.

on

crimes,
are

these

government urges

Despite

the

population

after

rate

the

among

Kuwaiti

has
much

not

the

been

oil

the

among

attention

to

the

In

out by

the

the
of

illegal

immigrants.
as

to

The

permenant

are viewed

as

jobs.
leave

the

among the

there was

the

always

also

temporary
Very
the

Kuwaitis;

of

citizen
a

rapid growth

outnumbered the

government

recent

issue

for

expire.

government's

solved.

the

smuggling

doing temporary

boom,

years

that

immigrants more

immigrants

immigrants which
For

from these

security point

these migrants

contracts

increase

reached

of

free

than

influenced

and

rapid birth growth

people.

population
never

purpose

their

the

are

difficult

From the

carried

for the

movements within groups

immigrants

often

when

also

robberies,

considered

the

on

for years have

for

country

It was

state

immigrants

services

in Kuwait.

Usually

problem

Also this means

the political

state

a

borders.

in the

are more

these

employees
the

services

citizens.

control

been

are benefiting more

citizens.

on

geographical

always

there

immigrants which

political
view,

the

spends more

government
of

since

the

immigrants

than

government
than

and

of

a

encouraged

nevertheless,

it

aspiration

and the problem

years,

government gave

the

the massive

expatriation

in
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the

state since

foreigners out-numbered the native citizens,

considered by the state to be a threat to the

internal

security.

in the

The government called for a balance

population structure between native and migrant people.
Right before the onset of

Iran-Iraq war and during the

increasing Iraqi-Iranian hostility,

the government waged a

massive deportation campaign and termination of contracts
for

security reasons.

after

a

total

of

In the

last three months of

series of bombing and explosions

1980,

and

in the state a

18,000 repatriates were deported.35

Political Background

Kuwait became
threatened
claims to
League
1963,

independent of Britain

immediately,

within hours,

sovereignty of

British and Arab

forces were sent to maintain Kuwait

Qassim regime,
substantial
million KD
Official

and after

financial
($84

and was

by neighboring Iraq

its territory.

after the military coup

in 1961,

independence.

in Iraq that overthrew the

international pressure and a

inducement payment from Kuwait of

million),

In

Iraq dropped its claim.

30

36

Iraqi policy recognizes the state of Kuwait without

accepting the

legitimacy of

its border.

A border dispute

over what appeared to be the oil rich-border zone still
unresolved,

flared

in

1967,

leftist regime came to power

1973,

and 1990.

in Iraq

in 1958,

Since the
Iraq has been
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the major threat of destabilizing the security of Kuwait and
the Arab world because of its territorial and oil ambitions.
The last threat was the barbaric Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in
August 1990.

The Iraqi Invasion

During the course of the final stage of writing this
thesis Iraq invaded Kuwait because of territorial and oil
field ambitions.

The invasion which shocked the world

occurred after the secular leftist government of Iraq
promised Kuwait's government,

and many other Arab states and

western countries that it would not invade Kuwait;

it

alleged that it would peacefully settle the border and
disputes about oil fields with Kuwait.
On August 2,
attack,

1990,

in a deceptive and unprovoked

the dictator of Iraq,

army to occupy Kuwait.

Saddam Hussein,

ordered his

The Iraqi army took Kuwait by

surprise and swiftly invaded and occupied the whole country.
The Emir of Kuwait and his government officials,
the prime target of the invasion,

who were

successfully fled the

country and sought refuge in Saudi Arabia to lead the
resistance.

Within a very short period of time,

they asked

the U.S to intercede militarily in their behalf.
Despite a worldwide condemnation of the invasion and
extensive international diplomatic pressure on Iraq to
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withdraw from Kuwait,

Iraq refused.

The U.N Security

Council unanimously issued a resolution condemning Iraq's
aggression,

imposing economic sanctions against Iraq.

Despite Iraqi denial of any territorial ambition in Kuwait,
and an Iraqi promise to withdraw,

two days later Iraq

announced its "annexation" of Kuwait.

The U.N again

unanimously voted that the annexation was null and void.
Furthermore,

Iraqi troops moved southward and

threatened to invade neighboring Saudi Arabia and amassed
troops along its border.
other countries,

The U.S,

together with some 2 5

including many Arab countries,

responded to

a request from the Saudi government to send troops to defend
Saudi Arabia as well as put pressure on Iraq to withdraw
from Kuwait.

The Arab emergency summit in Cairo,

also

condemned the Iraqi invasion and demanded immediate
withdrawal of Iraqi troops.

The summit announced that many

Arab states would send troops to the Kuwaiti-Saudi border
and join a massive international military buildup of forces
to repel any Iraqi aggression.

It has become very obvious

that Saddam Hussein's aggression against Kuwait was not
merely a dispute over part of Kuwait's territory but a
conspiracy which had been planned for years.

The plan to

occupy Kuwait and Saudi Arabia was developed in conjunction
with King Hussein of Jordan.
Within a few days the whole world stood against Saddam
Hussein,

and Iraq became isolated from the rest of the
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world.

Saddam Hussein responded to his isolation by taking

thousands of foreigners in Iraq and Kuwait as hostages
including women and children to use them as a human shield
any international attack on Iraq.
denounced by the international community.
the invasion,

This move was
Within two months

the U.N Security Council issued nine major

resolutions against Iraq.
Meanwhile,
Kuwait,

Sheik Jabir Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah,

the Emir of

and the Kuwaiti governmental authorities who sought

refuge in Saudi Arabia vowed to fight for the liberation of
Kuwait until all the Iraqi invaders were withdrawn.

The

Kuwaiti people have shown extraordinary solidarity and unity
behind their leadership in resisting the Iraqi Army.
after the invasion,

Right

eye witnesses and international

organizations reported

massive destruction and wholesale

looting of the country of both public and private
possessions.

The Iraqi military personnel began torturing

and executing thousands of Kuwaiti civilians,
women and children.

including

As these lines are written,

the

situation is still tense and unclear and the fighting is
still going on between Kuwaiti resistance and Iraqi troops.

Thp. Political System

Kuwait is a traditional hereditary constitutional
monarchy with a ruler

(Emir) .

Succession of the Emir is
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restricted to the heirs of the seventh ruler of Kuwait,
Mubarak Al-Sabah,

chosen alternately as a tradition from one

of the two branches of Al-Sabah family, Jabir and Salim
named for the two sons of Mubarak AL—Sabah.
Kuwait's constitution,

According to

the Emir chooses his successor and

must obtain the approval of the Kuwaiti National Assembly.
The constitution provides for a tripartite
governmental structure.

The Emir is the head of the state

and is the highest authority.

He is assisted by an 18

member cabinet which he appoints,
The National Assembly

headed by the premier.

(parliament) ,

elected to four-year terms,

formed by 50 members

has legislative functions.

A

judiciary authority constitutes the third branch of
government in which the Emir acts the High court of Appeal.
Although the political authority revolves around the
royal family of Al-Sabah,
in the society,

there are other prominent groups

such as merchants and principal tribal

groups which share the power with the royal family.
Political parties are not allowed in Kuwait; however,
are several

there

informal groups and organizations operating

unofficially.
Unlike other Arab states,
Western-style democracy.
1963,

Kuwait enjoys a relatively

Two years after independence, in

election for a 50- member National Assembly took place

for the first time on a very limited franchise.

Candidates

for the National Assembly are elected by a very narrow
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electoral base.

In 1985,

the electorate only 57,000.

Suffrage has been restricted to first class citizen male
adults who prove that their families were resident in Kuwait
in 1920 or before.
The National Assembly has always been a vocal forum
for criticism of government domestic,
international
established,

issues and policies.

regional and

Since it was

the National Assembly had been influenced by

different ideologies,

from

Nasserists and leftist groups in

the sixties until mid-seventies,
groups in the eighties.
in the Assembly

to the rightist and Muslim

Despite the limited seats they won

(four seats),

the Islamic groups were viewed

as the only active and prominent opposition group.
Nonetheless,

on two occasions,

the Emir had to

interfere and dissolve the National Assembly by Emiri
decree.

The first occasion was in 1976,

after overt

criticism of neighboring countries caused the Emir to view
the Assembly as a disruptive influence.

In August 29,

197 6,

he dissolved it and suspended some articles of the
constitution including the free press article,

a decree

which lasted for five years

the

In February 1980,

government appointed a committee to review the constitution
and report in six months.
February 1981,

After its reconstitution in

Arab leftist and Nasserist groups were

defeated and victory went to right,
groups.

independent,

and Islamic

The Assembly became increasingly effective and had
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almost constant clashes with government,
economic issues.

especially over

After the 1985 election and despite a

significant number of prominent candidates;

independent

members of the de facto opposition described as nationalists
and Islamic groups were elected.
Even though the opposition stopped far short of making
any revolutionary demands,

it consistently embarrassed the

government over its economic policy.

A member of the ruling

family was forced to resign his position as a Minister of
Justice in May 1985 after a hearing before an Assembly
commission proved his lack of integrity.

Another member of

the ruling family —the Oil Minister— and three other
Ministers— persistently came under fire,

the two Ministers

actually tendering their resignations without having them
accepted,

a unique state of affairs by the autocratic

standards of the region.
external pressures,

Eventually,

and apparently due to

the Emir stepped in to dissolve the

Assembly for a second time in June 1986,
external threats to the state's security.

citing internal and
The Emir once

again suspended some articles of the constitution,
the free press article,
over the press.
took effect,

including

and imposed a pre-censorship law

But since the cease-fire in the Gulf War

there has been increasing domestic pressure for

new elections and reconstitution of the National Assembly.
However,

the government seems to be unwilling and

unenthusiastic about restoring democracy in its original
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style unless major changes occurred.
1990,

after public pressure,

Nevertheless,

in May

the Emir announced the he would

accept the restoration of democracy through the "National
Council",

composed of 75,

members in which he has the right

to appoint 25 members; the other 50 members are elected
secretly.

Historical Background of Broadcasting in Kuwait

Introduction

There are two major factors which played a vital role
in establishment and emergence of broadcasting in Kuwait:1external factors and 2-internal factors.
1- External factors:
the British,

influence of the Europeans,

especially

during their domination of the country and the

region in general,

the impact of broadcasting systems from

other Arab states especially Egypt and Iraq.
2- Internal factors:

the discovery of oil which led to the

wealth of the state as an economic power and the achievement
of

independence and formation of a formal state with a

modern political system.
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Radio

It was during the Second World War that the British
installed a small low-power radio station in a small room in
the security force building to broadcast two hours daily in
Arabic for purely political purposes; to counter the
powerful Nazi station in Basra in neighboring Iraq,
propagandize for the Allies'

and to

policies during the war.

At

that time was part of British strategy to establish many
radio stations in different parts of the Arab world to
counter Nazi stations.
Officially,

Kuwait's radio,

founded in 1951 with one

and 1/2 kilowatt transmitter operated by two employees for
two hours daily,

covered Kuwait's city only.

In 1953,

the

number of employees increased to five and the transmission
hours increased to three hours and half, which lasted for
five years.

In 1959,

four rooms in an old army built on the

land of the army workshop were turned into a temporary
studio and eight rooms became officies.

Until 1959,

a one-

kilowatt short wave transmitter handled the broadcasts.

The

next year a five—kilowatt medium—wave transmitter started
operating;

within months a five-kilowatt short wave

transmitter was added to the strength,

while before the end

of 1960 both the new transmitter had been increased to tenkilowatt each.

Summer,

1960,

saw the six evening hours of

daily air time increased to ten and half hours;

three and
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half in the morning and seven in the evening and news
bulletins were broadcast for the first time.37
Unlike some other Arab states,

radio in Kuwait was

from the beginning a governmental station long before
independence.

After independence in 1961,

because of the

wealth of government and the image of the modern state,
Kuwait's radio expanded considerably and powerfully
especially after the emergence of radio as a political
weapon.
In the 1950s and 1960s,

during the cold war among some

Arab states or what had been known as the Air Waves War
among Egypt,

Iraq,

Jordan,

and Saudi Arabia,

Kuwait was

attacked through the air waves by some leftist and
revolutionary regimes such as Iraq,

Syria,

and Egypt,

especially during the 1956 tri-attack on Egypt. These
developments alarmed the Arab states against Britain,
putting Kuwait official policy in a crucial position,
Kuwait is a good ally to the British.

since

The government found

that many people were listening to and influenced by these
stations causing the government to accelerate the expansion
of its radio service to attract the people to listen instead
to their national government voice.
The emergence of radio in Kuwait can not be separated
in any way from politics.

The relationship between radio

and politics in Kuwait is very obvious both prior and after
independence.

Abdul Aziz Jafar,

Assistant Under- Secretary
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of Ministry of Information in Kuwait,

who lived through the

long years of experience with Kuwait radio since the early
1960s,

stated that politics was the loudest and most

effective voice in the world and has been the Arab world
from the time that on opene one's eyes on life.
world was engaged in the World War,

When the

the Arab world was

engaged in two parallel wars; the war of liberation from
colonialism and the war of reformation of the state
structure and political system.
size,

was not in isolation;

Kuwait,

despite its small

actually Kuwait's maritime

history and constant travelling among different coasts of
Persia,

India,

and Africa in addition to its location on the

Eastern Arabian Peninsula and its location in the vicinity
of Iraq,

made politics an integral part of the Kuwaiti

existence.38

In early 1960s,

to the police force,

when radio was still annexed

the political department of the radio

was annexed directly to the office of the ruler.39
In 1956,

when Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal,

Britain initiated the Suez conference in London in
condemnation of Egypt's action which eventually led to the
Anglo-French air attack on Egypt on October 31 1956.

The

Suez Canal crisis set the Cairo radio to spreading antiWestern views,

especially against the British and provoked

Arab Nationalism feeling which sparked an increasing antiBritish sentiment in the Arab world in support of Egypt.
Kuwait was under air wave

attack by Cairo radio "Voice of
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the Arabs," which put the Kuwait government

in a crucial

situation since Kuwait was still under British Protectorate
and the British Political Agency still existed in Kuwait as
a

representative of the British government.

as positive response to Cairo's radio,

As a result and

Kuwait's government

was under popular pressure to end British domination of the
country.

In

1958,

the Voice of the Arabs recorded:

AL Sha'ab [name of newspaper, means, the people] of
Kuwait has demanded the abolition of the Political
Agent's court in Kuwait, as the British are acting as
Rulers and this is a transgression against the dignity
of Kuwaitis.40
Before all these powerful and severe air waves
attacks,

Kuwait's radio was unable sufficiently to counter

or even match Cairo's radio attacks.
ship,Cleopatra,
activity.

picketed

reaction

an Arab

in New York as a result of Zionist

The Arab ship picket

spontaneous

In 1960,

incident brought

from Kuwaiti dockors

they would blacklist all American ships,

forth a

indicating that
and that no further

United States tankers would be loaded at the two Kuwait's
oil

ports of Mina al-Ahmadi and Mina Abdulla.

This message

evidently pleased the Egyptian radio station "Voice of the
Arabs".

The

station's announcer gave this dramatic

commentary:
Today and for ever we have a date with glory.
Today, our workers, from Casablanca to Ahmadi and Basra
will wage their triumphant battles.
We shall assert our Arabism to the World.
We shall prove to the World that we are united -from
Morocco to Kuwait and Iraq^
We shall redeem Palestine.
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Despite these air waves tensions,

the Egyptian's

hostility actually was not considered a serious direct
Kuwait's security or intended to overthrow the
ruling government.
coup took place

Nonetheless,

in 1958,

a military bloody

in neighboring Iraq and the pro-British

government was overthrown to be replaced by hard-line
military communist government.

The new government began

gradually to antagonize relations with Kuwait,
the British presence.
direct threat came
declaration of

In 1961,

from Iraq.

independence

new agreement with her,
Kassem,

a serious and

Right after Kuwait's

from Britain and signing of a

the dictator of Iraq,

claimed the territory of Kuwait,

from years
Iraq's

however,

criticizing

Abdul Karim

a claim arising

of build up of borders disputes and antagonism.

radio

launched a propaganda attack against Kuwait:

Everybody knows that Kuwait is a district belonging to
Basra Liwa (Province).
Iraq has helped the inhabitants
of Kuwait to expel the ghost of British imperialism.
Kuwait is an inseparable part of Iraq.
"Kuwait's inhabitants are being ruled by a gang robbing
them of their money and toying with the country's
interests; they have been preventing Iraq's water from
reaching Kuwait.
Our country depends on oil resources
and this gang toys with these resources . . .We shall
appoint Shaik Abdulla [Kuwait's ruler] as District
Commissioner
Kassem,

in Kuwait.42

on different occasions,

Kuwait's territory.

demanded every inch of

"Tomorrow Iraq would inform all nations

of her position with regard to the territory.'1 He rejected
the new Anglo-Kuwaiti agreement and called it an "especially
dangerous blow”

against the

integrity and independence of
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Iraq and the people of Kuwait.
abrogation of the
that nobody

'illegal

1899 agreement',

inside or outside Kuwait,

should rule Kuwait.
intervened

"From the date of the

in her

On June 26

Iraq had decided

of whatever status,

'We would stand up to imperialism if

(Kuwait)
1961,

it

peaceful movement.'"43

Kuwait's radio broadcast a strong and

clear statements explaining

its position of the

issue which

were not empty ones:
The Government of Kuwait declares that Kuwait is an
Arab independent state with complete sovereignty
internationally recognized and that the Government of
Kuwait, backed by all the people of Kuwait, is
determined to defend Kuwait's independence and protect
Kuwait.
The Government of Kuwait, while announcing
this, is fully confident that all friendly and peace
loving states, and especially the Arab states, will
support her in safeguarding her independence. 4
A

few days

6000

later,

at the Kuwaiti government's request,

British troops,

Cairo Radio's
British troops

landed in Kuwait,

"Voice of the Arabs"
on Kuwait's

plotting to occupy Kuwait,
of

some

enough to provoke

against the presence of

land and accusing Britain of
demanding an

immediate withdraw

British troops.
It

is worthy to note that General Qasim was not the

first

Iraqi

leader who attempted to annex Kuwait.

Ghazi

(who ruled Iraq from 1933

absorb Kuwait

into

to 1939)

iraq territory.

King

also attempted to

King Ghazi tried to

arouse the Kuwaitis against their ruler through a private
broadcasting station

in his palace.

In 1938,

the King

summoned the Chief of the staff and ordered to arrange

for
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the army

immediatly to occupy Kuwait,

but the acting Prime

Minister persuaded the King to abandon his scheme.45
Within the trauma of these sizzling political events
jeopardizing
developing

its security,

Kuwait had two major aims

for

its broadcasting system now the power of radio

reaching and shaping people's opinion had became clear:
extend
prove

its voice to other countries as
its existence,

their national
programming
stations.

and to attract

instead of
Therefore,

strategies—

to
to

its people to listen to

radio by offering them alternatives

in radio

listening to other countries'
In 1958,

contract with two experts
two

far as possible,

in

Kuwait government had a

in radio and television to set up

an urgent short-term one,

and another

long-term one to develope and expand radio services.
It

seems that Kuwait has succeeded

two goals.
1951,

Compared to two hours of daily broadcasting

four of them in non-Arabic languages.

1960s were crucial years

for Kuwait's radio.

evident that the Arab air waves
for Kuwait to
power of
day.

in

Kuwait's radio now broadcasts more than 62 hours a day

on eight channels,
The

in achieving these

learn

from.

It

"Cold War" was a big

In 1960,

lesson

the transmitter had a

10 kilowatts and broadcasted for about 17 hours a

Right after

independence,

the government gave

considerable attention to expanding and developing
services,

is

taking advantage of the oil wealth.

number of the employees

increased to 267

its radio

In 1961,

the

and transmission
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was through two powerful transmitters.

One with

100

kilowatts operates on medium wave and another with 50
kilowatt operates on short wave.
tapes

The archives of audio

increased to a total of 2013 hours,

more than 15 hours

in 1958.46

In early 1960's,

the government published a report

stating that the government is boosting
transmitter to 400 kilowatts and
to 250 kilowatts,

compared to not

its medium-wave

its short-wave transmitter

the report continued:

All these equipment is either ordered or already in the
country and it is designed to give a very comprehensive
coverage to the Middle East through an aerial array of
29 beamed aerials covering an aerial "farm" area of
two-and-a-half miles square.
When this project is finished in 1966 the Voice of
Kuwait may be heared as far as the United States of
America.
The final expansion planned at the moment is
for a very high power medium-wave station to be built
within the next two or three years.
It could make
Kuwait the loudest Arab voice over an area covering
Alexandria, Beirut, Northern Iraq, Afghanistan,
Karachi, the Gulf towns and round to Aden, Riyadh and
Mecca.47
In

its early stages,

Egyptian programs.

Many were written and recorded

and Lebanon especially
the

60s Kuwait had

receivers

Kuwait's radio depended on
in Egypt

for the Kuwait radio service,

its own recording studios.

but in

Radio

spread very rapidly among the people and became

very popular.
radio receivers

In early

1960's,

the estimated number of

in Kuwait was 80,000 set.18

Many factors

accelerated the popularity and the availability of radio in
Kuwait;

the opening of Kuwait's market on international

markets after the oil boom,

the wealth of the people who can
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very easily afford to purchase even expensive radio sets,
and needless to say the wide spread interest in politics.
In 1968,

there were an estimated 400,000 radio sets in the

state for an estimated population of 650,000,

probably the

highest rate in the world.49
During the 1970s,

Kuwait's radio continued expanding

and its signals covered most of the Arab world and in the
1980s,

Kuwait's radio programs reached as far as Australia,

New Zealand,

North and South America,

South East Asia.
Kuwait radio,

Far East,

Abdul Aziz Al-Mansour,

and East and

the director of

described the status of Kuwait's radio in the

1980s as passing from amature level to professional level.50
At the present time,

Kuwait's radio broadcasts through eight

programs four of which are non-Arabic.
General program,
Persian,

Second program,

Directed,

These programs are:

Holy Quran,

and F.M program.

European, Urdu,

The total of broadcast

programs is about 23,315 hours a year.
Entertainment programs receive most of the air time in
most radio channels and constitute more than 60% of the
total broadcast time,

while cultural programs are allocated

the least number of hours.

Like most other Arab states,

Kuwait's radio offers FM service which is filled with
Western pop songs and music such as American,
French,

and Spanish.

British,

Most of the audience for this station

are teenagers and Europeans, however,

It is not clear yet

what is the real purpose of this station.
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Despite the incredible development in Kuwait radio in
the last thirty years and despite the success of the
government to attract the people to listen to the national
radio,

external programs,

still have some popularity among

the people and are considered credible sources of
information.

Audiences usually tune in to these stations

during political crises and crucial political events as a
way of seeking truth in contrast to evasive official stories
of government.
(RMC)

Some of these external stations include

Radio Mont Carlo,

BBC,

VOA,

and RM.

Television

Just as in radio,

Kuwait's television was developed

and expanded very rapidly beyond all expectations in a
relatively in very short period of time.
air waves "cold war"

Due to the Arab

in mid-1950's and 1960's and the

Kuwait-Iraq crises in 1961,

Kuwait's government had a

substantial desire to develop radio and television services
as well.

Nonetheless,

due to the relative complexity of the

nature of television compared to radio,

television

development in Kuwait was less rapid than radio.
of this,

In spite

television development in Kuwait is impressive and

extraordinary.
Arab states,

If television service is a reality in the

it is no doubt a reality in Kuwait.

It seems

that the early political events made the Kuwaiti officials
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realize the significance of this medium and its development,
since early stages,
policy,

as a means of expressing Kuwait's

getting its message cross,

and defending its

opinion.
Indeed,

the government succeeded in making television

a distinctive phenomenon and in attracting people and
families around the television set and building credibility
of the national television.
economic,

political,

Moreover,

The nature of

and social environment of Kuwait have

played key roles in spreading the phenomenon of television.
The high income of the government and the people as a result
of the massive oil revenue,

the political events that

surround Arab states in general and Kuwait in specific as a
post-independence era,
social

and the image of forming new modern

life as a post-oil era equipped with television set

which served as a technological aspect and entertainment
medium at the same time were all factors behind the rapid
spread of television in Kuwait.
Early statistics in 1968

indicate that there were

about 80,000 television sets in use in the state for an
estimated population of 650,000.51

The United Nations late

statistics of 1980 give impressive figures,

indicating that

Kuwait has the highest ratio of television set per capita in
the Arab states,

490.91 sets for each 1000 capita,

second in the world after the U.S.,
1000 capita.52

and the

631.99 set for every

A study conducted by Kuwait Ministry of
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Information in 1985 suggested that more than 80% of the
families living in Kuwait acguire a television set and many
of them acquire more than one set; more than 99.5% of the
population watch Kuwait's television and 58.8% watch other
neighboring states'

television stations.53

according to 1982 statistics,

the estimated viewers within

the population of the state was 1,300,000,
constitute 96% of the total population.54
estimated,

however,

However,

which a
It has been

that the viewers of Kuwait television in

the region of the Gulf area number 10,000,000.55

The number

of television receiver sets in the state were estimated in
1982

for 400,000 sets and in 1985 for 423,000 sets.

Kuwait

television gained good reputation among other Arab
televisions particularly in the Gulf region.
Gulf Televisions Festivals,

In all past

Kuwait television always

occupies the first position in major categories such as
programs and development.
Since Kuwait Television
the Arabian Peninsula region,

(KTV)

is the first system in

it helped other states and

played a primary role in the development of television
services in the region.

Kuwait's concern for developing its

television service was not limited to its geographical
border but it was extended to other neighboring states in
the Gulf region.

In each stage of development to increase

its transmission power,

Kuwait always take into

consideration the desirability of its signals reaching to

230
neighbouring states so they can make use of the television
service for one reason or another.
In early 1960's,
officially on air,

right after Kuwait television went

Kuwait government announced that it is

building a powerful VHF signal transmitter to cover Basra,
Abadan and southern parts of Iraq.
ministry

"As well as this the

[of Guidence and Information] may build a

transmitter in Bahrain,

and send down complete video-taped

programs for broadcasting;

at the moment reception in

Bahrain is feeble and unreliable."56

In 1974,

Kuwait

financed the construction and furnishing the television
building in Bahrain.57
In 1969,

Kuwait built a television station in Dubai.

This station was operated under the name of Kuwait
Television Service in Dubai.

This station was under the

control of the General Board for the South and the Arabian
Gulf until Decamber 197 2 when it was handled to the
government of Dubai after the formation of the federation of
U.A.E.58

Background of Kuwait Television

Whereas Kuwait's radio was established as a government
property from the beginning,
contrary,

Kuwait's television,

to the

was established as a private commercial station.

The beginning of Kuwait television started when a Kuwaiti
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businessman who happened to be a local RCA television
receivers dealer purchased a
television transmitter
company,
of

RCA,

(525

in 1957.

low-power American standard
lines)

from the American

He started simple daily broadcasting

cartoons and motion pictures to promote television set
that time,

many Kuwaitis already had TV receivers

to receive program signals broadcast from Abbadan in
neighboring Iran from the opposite bank of the Gulf on
American standard signals.
Within a
1961,
the

few years of broadcasting,

and right after independence,

small

station?

a

Kuwait government bought

100 watt transmitter was used to

broadcast experimental programs
1962,

on November 15,

for a year.

17

Kuwait television was annexed officially under the

supervision of the Ministry of Information,
Ministry of
#1

On January,

Information and Guidance,

of the Amiri decree

1962.59

In

1962,

#2

of

1962

formerly

according to Article

issued in January 17,

the government changed the system from the

American standard to the European standard when a European
two-kilowatt transmitter was purchased,
broadcast on channel

8.

Therefore,

and it began to

all American receivers

in Kuwait were adapted to receive the new European channel
of

625

lines.

Kuwait television started with four hours of

daily broadcasting.
A round

1962,

the government announced that a stronger

ten-kilowatts transmitter working on the European channel

10
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was ordered to start working

in 1963.

The government also

announced that this transmitter will
the same programs,

for a while broadcast

and later it will be used to provide a

second channel.60
In

1963,

Kuwait television started broadcasting

The residents of the Eastern province of Saudi
Arabia,

who used to receive American standard signals

Kuwait and ARAMCO
Arabia,

(Arabian-American Oil Company)

had to purchase dual

Kuwait was the

in the Arabian Peninsula to have

broadcasting system.

(

Actually the

in the Arabian Peninsula
and which

its own television

is the American oil

station ARAMCO

in the Arab world

after the American air base station in Libya) .

development
other Arab
system,
1970,

states

too

1964,

television

in

1973,

with

2

for

in 1965,

U.A.E

Oman in 1974,

in 1969,

and Yemen

Qatar in

in 1975).

after the government felt that the Iraqi

from Basra and Iranian television from Abadan

a decision to

the whole

in television

in the region to have their own national

were begining to gain audiences
made

Kuwait

which obviously paved the way

(Saudi Arabia

Bahrain
In

important part

in the area,

first

first television station

is beleived to be the second

television played an

in Saudi

systems receivers to pick up

the new European system in Kuwait.
state

from

in Kuwait,

the govenment

increase the transmission power to cover

state through a transmission station in Al-Rudtain

kilowatts

(video)

and 0.4

kilowatts

(audio).

In
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1966/

Kuwait government signed a contract with the Japanees

company Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Limited to

improve

and develop the state's communication system and to build
the

first earth satellite station in the Arab world,

Al-aish",

which operates via the Indian Ocean's satellite.

The station was
trip of Apollo
moon on July
In

"Umm

inaugurated

in 1969

and broadcasted live the

11 which carried the

first man to walk on the

16,

1969.

1971 a substantial

change

in transmission occurred

with the establishment of a powerful transmission station in
the

island of Failaka,

power of

20 kilowatts

with two transmitters
(video)

and 4

for a total

kilowatts

(audio).

The

purpose of this new station is to cover the eastern province
of the Arabian Peninsula and parts of other Gulf states such
as Abbadan

in Iran and southern Iraq.

transmitters
Iraq

is broadcast specifically to Basra

in order to provide a television presence

that threatened to
On March
transmitting

15,

last channel

reason

invade Kuwait in the
1974,

in southern
in a country

1960s and 1970s.

Kuwait television began

in color on the German system PAL

Alternation Line)
The

One of the

with 625
"6"

(Phase

lines on the channels 5-8-10-6.

was directed especially to Basra.

The

for adopting the German system was partly as an

expression of desire
Arab Gulf

states

for political unity with some other

such as Qatar,

which adopted the same

system.

Bahrain,

U.A.E,

Meanwhile,

and Oman

other Arab Gulf
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states

like Saudi Arabia and Iraq adopted the French system,

SECAM,

as an appreciation for France's moderate policy

in

the Middle East associated with the transaction of French
"mirage" military airplanes and other arms supplies sold to
some Middle East countries.61
In March 27,

1977,

the German company

(Semins)

inaugurated another earth satellite station beamed at the
Atlantic Ocean satellite.

In 1979,

the television moved to

its new and modern French built TV and radio complex.
December 2,

1979,

another channel

On

Kuwait television began broadcasting

designated for foreign programs only and

four hours a day.

In

1981,

for

the Japanees company Nippon

built another satellite earth station beamed also at the
Atlantic Ocean satellite.

In September 28,

1985,

another

earth station was

inaugurated which operate through the

ARABSAT satellite

system.

Broadcasting hours have also
From 24
52

hours

hours weekly
in

1969,

in 1961,

and

it reached 42 hours

58 hours weekly

channel which began broadcasting

a week on both channels.

hours were

increased

350%

in 1975.

1986

in 1964,

The second

for a total of

In 1981,

In 1986,

first channel was 4,488

hours and on the second channel was 2,307
an average of

131

the total broadcast

in contrast to 1961.62

the annual broadcast hours on the

6,795 hours a year,

1961.

for 21 hours a week has

been raised to 45 hours a week in
hours

increased since

for a total

of

130.5 hours per week.
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At the present time,
stations
the

Kuwait television uses

linked to the satellites over the Atlantic Ocean,

Indian Ocean,

and Arabsat.

The Structure of Television System

Television
owned,

five ground

in Kuwait

in Kuwait is a government

controlled,

financed,

institution

and operated by the government.

Kuwait television is part of the Ministry of Information
which

is the one

in charge of operating and supervising the

broadcasting system in the state.
is the Minister of

Information,

Emir- the head of the state-.
sensitive and

The head of this Ministry

who

This position has been very

important to the government since television

came under governmental authority.
occupied by a member of the ruling
television

is appointed by the

The position is always
family.

The director of

(formerly Assistant Deputy under Secretary for

Television Affairs)

is the one who

is directly

in charge of

the television organization and reports to the Minister,
followed by the Programming Department Executive hwo
responsible

is

for the whole planning process and everything

broadcast on television.

The television organization is

composed of six departments as

follows:

A-Programming Department:

is the main and largest

department

This

in the television which

is

in charge of

programming service either planning or production.

Also
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this department is responsible for evaluating and approving
the programs.

There are nine other sub-departments which

come under the administration of this department related to
the work of programming:
programs division,

1-drama programs division,

3-news division,

production services division,
coordination division,

2-sports

4-variety division,

5-

6-second channel division,

8-cultural programs division,

7-

and 9-

production division.

B-Financial Affairs Bureau: Responsible for all financial
work and transactions that are related to television,
a

it has

connection with the main financial Department of the

Ministry.

This Bureau controls four divisions:1-marketing

and bidding,
2-advertisement and commercials,

3-archives,

4-treasurer.

C-Managerial Affairs Bureau: Responsible for all
administrative and organizational work,
formed of four divisions:
services division,

this department is

1-staff affairs division,

2-public

3-secretarial and registration division,

4-and typing division.

D-Films and Cinema Bureau: This Bureau is in charge of
preparing and producing films and footage of films that are
needed by television for its programs,

either documentary or

informative.
E-Censorship Bureaus This bureau is in charge of censoring
all materials reviewing then, for suitable content and
artistic quality.

This bureau determines the compatibility
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of the programs with the overall policy of Kuwaiti
television.

This bureau has two sections,

one for censoring

Arabic materials and the other for censoring foreign
materials.
F-Technical Office:

This office deals with technical

affairs such as making arrangements for receiving and
sending materials through satellite,

receiving and recording

the daily news editions through the Euro-vision and
distributing it,
systems.

in turn,

to other Gulf states'

television

Since Kuwait is the Center of News Exchange and

Coordination for the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region,

this

office is in charge of this mission.
As in most other Arab states,
fees;

there are no television

obviously this is the case because the government is

wealthy enough and capable of funding the whole system and
because it wishes to make sure that every thing is under
government control and because it is in the government's
interest that no one else should claim any sharing of this
power.

Centralization is very obvious in television

organization and management.
main reasons;

This can attributed to two

since television is a government property,

then it is very natural to become the voice of government.
Perhaps the other main reason of television centralization
is the nature of centralization of the political structure
of the state, which leads automatically to centralization of
other sub-system institutions in the state.

Ministry of Information
Minister
Minister Deputy
Television

CT>
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Policies and Strategies of Television System

In reviewing the historical background broadcasting of
the Arab world in general and in the Gulf area and Kuwait in
Par"ticular/

we find that the circumstances which surrounded

the emergence of broadcasting have pretty much shaped the
policies and strategies of broadcasting in Kuwait and other
Arab states.

Not only that,

but they have also shaped the

function and

structure of television broadcasting.

television in Kuwait is a governmental property,

Since

it is very

natural that television operate and function within the
framework of the state policy.
The planning process for programming in Kuwait
television goes through two main steps:

first,

it sets up

the general annual programming and proposes the budget for
it,

and second,

seasons
,

divides the annual programming to four

(each season is 3 months).

To carry out these steps

the management requests all programming departments and

sections to submit their plan for programming over the next
four seasons along with estimated budget and technical
needs.
study,

The programming department through its committees
review,

and evaluate all bidings of Arabic and

foreign materials from local,

regional,

and international

companies and prepare a report of these materials.

After

preparing a whole cohesive plan based on information from
the different departments,

it submits to the Director of
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television for approval.

The Director of television in turn

submits the plan to the supreme commission of radio and
television programs which is headed by the Under-Secretary
of the Ministry of Information and membership of Assistants
Under Secretary,

Directors of radio,

and engineering departments.

television,

technical,

The commission then submits

the whole plan to the Minister for final approval.
Kuwait television usually begins its daily programs in
the evening at five clock in the winter and six clock in the
summer during the weekdays.
broadcasting in Kuwait.
cases on the weekends,

There is no day television

However,
holidays,

there are exceptional
national days,

and special

occasions when television broadcasts morning programs.
Since early 1974,

Kuwait television began broadcasting daily

morning programs for only four hours during the three month
school summer vacation period.

There have been suggestions

to have regular daily morning broadcasting all year long,
even when schools are in session.
Kuwait television broadcasts on two channels,

the

first channel and the second channel:
The First Channel (KTV1):
predominant one.
November 15,1961.

This is the main channel and the

Kuwait's oldest channel,

It started broadcasting four hours a day,

increased to 6 hours a day in November,
in November,

1969,

operational since

1964,

to 7.5 hours

and to 9.2 hours in November 1975.

This

station used to broadcast both Arabic and English programs
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(with Arabic captioning)

until the establishment of the

second channel in December,

1979.

Most of the foreign

programs were then shifted to that channel.

Currently,

most

of the programs in the first channel are in Arabic and
foreign programs constitute about 15% of its air time.
broadcasts longer than the second channel,
special occasions such as weekends,

It

especially on

holidays,

and special

events.

The Second Channel
December,

1979,

(KTV2): This channel was established in

with 4 hours of broadcast a day,

in the following years to nearly 6 hours a day.
purpose of this channel,

officially,

Arab community in the state.

increasing
The main

is to serve the non-

All the programs in this

channel are in the English language.

More than 80% of the

programs broadcast over this channel are imported;
are drama and entertainment programs.

about 55%

This channel also

broadcast many of educational and cultural materials,
accounting for 35% of the channel's air time.

Censorship

Censorship on broadcast programs in general can be
described as moderate,

but conservative especially of

excessive sex scenes, violence,

and anti-governments

materials particularly any which criticize heads of states.
Since the emergence of television in Kuwait,

censorship has
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changed its trend; during the 1960's until mid-1970's
censorship was liberal.

Noticeably,

in late 1970's,

censorship took a conservative trend.

Since

1979,

censorship toward moral issues became very strict,
concentrating and focussing more than before on religious
programs.

This trend can be ascribed to the timing of many

political events of the time in the Islamic World,
the Iranian revolution,

such as

the takeover of the Holy Grand

Mosque in Mecca by a religious group,
invasion of Muslim Afghanistan,

the communist Soviet

and the signing of Camp

David treaty between Egypt and Israel.
In searching for written rules that KTV might apply in
its censorship procedures,
such rules.

However,

the writer could not find any

he was told by television officials

that any such written restrictions or guidelines do not
exist and most of these rules are unwritten ones.
cases,

In many

it depends pretty much on the common sense of the

censor person or the committee.
Al-Usmani,

who studied Kuwait television,

noted that there

are three main requirements for program acceptance in Kuwait
TV;

a program must not violate the religious beliefs of the

state,
values,

it must not violate the state's traditions or social
and it must be compatible with the government's

overall broadcasting policy;

"These conditions are obviously

vague to the point where one has difficulty understanding if
they are really applied.63
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Nonetheless,

Kuwait television,

for instance, would

tolerate such scenes as love scenes or dancing.

Kuwait TV

would not mind showing drinking alcohol or showing drunk
persons on the ground that these problems are common
problems even in the Gulf region and cannot be ignored;

"We

cannot put our head in the sand and pretend everything is
okey" argues Salim Al-Fahad,

the former director of Kuwait

television and programming department.64
department has two committees,

The censorship

one to censor Arabic programs

and the other to censor foreign programs.

Advertising

Even though Kuwait television is state television and
not commercial television,

the government had allowed

commercial advertisement in this medium for a limited period
of time during the day.

Government policy toward commercial

advertisement had been also changed through the development
of Kuwait television.

Generally speaking,

there has been a

great deal of reluctance to allow commercial advertising on
Arab television.

This reluctance reflects the governments'

desire to remain the sole supporter of the service so it can
maintain full control over it.

Also,

part of this

reluctance arises from the belief that introducing
commercial advertising to state television is incompatible
with the dignity of a medium which is ultimately the voice
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of the government.
Although Kuwait television began in 1961,
advertisement was not allowed till October 1969,
years after starting transmission.

In fact,

about eight

Kuwait had

preceded many other Arab states who had restrictions and
were forbidding commercial advertisements in government
television in their first stages.
In 1969,

the administration of Kuwait television

formed a committee the study the possibility of allowing
commercial advertising in television without destabilizing
the objectives or the principles of television as a
governmental medium and at the same time to serves as
additional

income source to the government.

The committee

after studying many commercial advertising laws in some Arab
and foreign countries,

and after studying the international

treaties that deals with commercial advertising specially in
television,

elicited the law of commercial advertising in

Kuwait television.65
From the beginning,

advertisement became very popular

due to the nature of the free economic system of Kuwait,
nature of Kuwait's consumer society,
people,

the

the high income of the

and low state customs tax on imported merchandise.

In the fiscal years 1970-1971 and 1971-1972,

the commercials

income were 59.5% and 78.2% consecutively from the total
television programs budget.

In 1972-1973,

the commercials

income covered the whole programs budget with slight surplus
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and with later years there were great surplus.
1976,

the income increased 217.9%

In 1975-

than the previous years.

This increase can be attributed to the timing of the
beginning of the color transmission.

In 1978-1979,

there

were 199.5% increase in contrast with the previous years
1977-1978.

In the fiscal year 1980-1981,

the commercial

income was more than ten times as it was in the fiscal year
of 1970-1971.66
The time designated for commercial advertisement in
Kuwait's television is very limited since television is not
a private commercial institution and since advertisement is
not considered the major source of television income.
Commercials are usually broadcasted at specific time between
programs and not within programs; programs cannot be
interrupted for commercials as the case in some western
countries.
In 1980,

Kuwait television determined the air time for

advertisement with a maximum of 2 0-2 5 minutes a day,

an

equal of 4.1% of the broadcast time on the first channel and
3.1% of the air time on both channels.
advertisement in the years 1972,
5.7%,

and 3.9% consecutively.67

statistics,
channels;
hours)

3%

1973,

However,
and 1974 was 4.6%,

According to 1987

advertisement constitute 5% of air time on both
(132 hours)

on the first channel and 2%

on the second channel.

(50

68

Perhaps the noticeable criticism of most of these
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broadcast commercials

is that they promote Western products

most of which were designed and produced especially
Western environment.

for

Most of these commercials contain

materials which are not compatible with the norms and values
of the

indigenous culture of the state.

a government property,

Since television is

the revenue of advertisement does not

go to the television treasury but to the state's treasury.

Types

and Characteristics of Broadcast Programs

It was mentioned earlier that broadcasting
emerged during World War II to propagandize
and counter the Nazi
broadcasting
surrounding

stations

in the region.

in Kuwait

for the Allies
Then,

in Kuwait emerged within a political atmosphere
it and it was

propaganda tool.

introduced by the British as a

Althgouh the original

cause disappeared

other analogous variables emerged maintained this original
function.

Hence,

it was natural that it continued,

especially after the emergence of a series of complicated
developments
general

in political events

in the Arab world

in

and the Gulf region in particular.

Government Politics

Since the
situation

end of the World War,

in the Arab world was at

the political

its peak of political
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seething,

ideological

political

independence.

broadcasting

and the struggle

As a result,

the

for

function of

in the Arab states was devoted to purely

political purposes.
political

struggle,

Therefore,

broadcasting

we can conclude that

is actually considered the

foundation

of Arab media.
In late

1950's and during the

1960's,

Kuwait

in turn

was vulnerable to air waves attack from radical Arab states
especially Egypt,
Iraq

in

Iraq and Syria.

Since the bloody coup

1958 when the military came to power,

Iraq relation crisis was aggravated;

in

the Kuwait-

the Iraqi broadcast

system began attacking Kuwait and since then Iraq threatened
to

invade Kuwait several times.

itself pushed

Kuwait reluctantly

into a war of the air waves.

became more concerned when

it

found

The government

found out that people

in

Kuwait began buying television sets to receive signals
neighboring countries.

from

These external threats began to

jeopardize the national unity of the state and the
government decided to make more contact with
through a national

its people

television medium and sought to use the

television medium as a means to unify the people of the
state under their national government policy.
In early

1970's,

with the expansion of Kuwait

television transmission,
(channel

6)

presence of

Kuwait set a separate transmitter

beamed at southern Iraq
statehood and

(Basra)

independence.

to provide a

Due to Kuwait's
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crucial geographical size and location,

which makes her more

vulnerable during critical political times,

Kuwait also had

to beam its television signals to other two countries as
well

Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Douglas Boyd attributes

Kuwait's powerful transmission as overcoming the
psychological disadvantage of a smallness by having a
powerful radio and television service.69
Since early 1970's,

the Gulf region and Kuwait in

particular witnessed a few political movements as a result
of immigration of a large group of Nasserites,
Palestinians,

mainly

who held positions in Kuwait Ministry of

Information and other Kuwaiti press.

Previously,

Iran

claimed the territory of Bahrain and occupied some Arabian
islands in the Gulf that belong to U.A.E.

Kuwait,

became cautious about foreign intervention.

in turn,

Meanwhile,

the

nationalism movement was sweeping the region all along the
Gulf shore.
television,

Salim Al-Fahad,

former director of Kuwait

said since the 1970's "Nationalism has been an

essential element in the policy of the Kuwait television.
Nationalism as a policy for Kuwait television has
become a
by.

more and more essential element as the years go

In the late 1970's and early 1980's,

Kuwait witnessed

profound and complex political developments.
Kuwait's history,

Throughout

nothing has been more threatening to its

national security than the Iran-Iraq war.
Kuwait witnessed a series of explosions,

Since 1980,
assassinations and
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assassination attempts as a result of increasing Iran-Iraq
hostility.

After the breakout of the Iran-Iraq war,

Kuwait

came under constant severe attack from Iranian media.

These

air wave attacks reached their peak with the assassination
attempt of the Emir in May 1985 and several missile attacks
on Kuwait's territory in the following years.
television in turn,

Kuwait

through all these years of events,

emphases nationalism more than usual on many different
occasions.
Television in Kuwait is the official voice of the
government and always been used as an integral part of the
government,

working within the framework of the state policy

presenting and supporting the official state's policy and
the political system.
official reports and

It presents only one point of view of
reflects very much official political

content in its programs, which serve in general as
propaganda for the head and seniors of the state,
policy,

and other Arab states'

programs-

state's

heads and officials.

News

content are loaded with government reports and

there is special focus on government seniors'
activities schedule.

daily

Often these activities are presented

in a meaningless and dull manner such as official meetings,
airport receptions,

royal motorcades,

and state's banquet

dinners.
Kuwait television also present a
foreign imported news.

In fact,

large portion of

the imported foreign news
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are the prevailed and they overshadow both local and
national Arab news.

According to a study conducted by Arab

Center of Audience and Viewers Research in 1982 concluded
that international news in Kuwait television form 32.7%
while Arab news forms 25% and local news 9.1%.71

In another

study of news in Kuwait television concluded that in 1982
news was 15.7% of the total air time in which 60.7% were
imported from Arab and non-Arab countries,

in 1983,

news

formed 9.9% of the air time in which the imported formed
33.3%,

and in 1984,

total air time,

the news air time was 10.65% of the

imported news constituted 56.1%.72

President of the U.S,
administration,

The

members of his cabinet and

officials and staff from the White House and

State Department,

members of the Senate and the House

appears almost daily on Kuwait television news.

Another

study also showed that the News viewing pattern among
Kuwaitis toward Kuwait television news is very high and it
reached as high as 85.7% in contrast to 71.5% in Egypt,
93.3%

in Jordan,

75%

in Sudan,

85.7% in Qatar,

and 61.2% in

North Yemen.73
Kuwait television receives its daily imported news
bulletins through Eurovision and Visinews.
communication facilities in Kuwait,

Because of the

and its long experience

in dealing with internatinal and European news agencies,
Kuwait became the Center of News
Peninsula region.

Exchange for the Gulf and
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Compared to other Arab states,
relative

freedom and democracy.

opinion and

Kuwait enjoys a

Freedom of

freedom of the press are guaranteed by the

constitution according to the articles
to the will

individual

#36 and

#37,

subject

of the Emir:

Freedom of opinion is guaranteed to everyone, and each
has the right to express himself through speech,
writing or other means within the limits of the law.
The press is free within the limits of the law, and*it
should not be suppressed except in accordance with the
dictates of law.
Freedom of expression

in Kuwait is a right but not through

the broadcasting system.
officials and

Government and government

institutions are usually the ones who have the

privilege of access to television.
government
unlikely

and

Public criticism of

its policy through television is highly

if not

forbidden.

However,

criticism of television

programming might be acceptable.

Muhammad Al-Sanousi,

former Assistant Under Secretary

for television affairs

Kuwait,

has pointed out that

usually taken
comes

"Criticism of the press

into consideration when it

the
in

is

is objective and

from a knowledgeable person who knows what he

is

talking about."74
Unfortunately,

Kuwait's democratic life was not

reflected on Kuwait's television,
news

of

its political

democratic political
democratic experience

governance.

which did not present any
Despite the relatively

system in Kuwait,

the unique Kuwait

in the region and the Arab world,

active National Assembly sessions,

the

and vital discussions and
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debates among its members over significant national issues,
Kuwait television ignored totally this aspect of Kuwait's
life.

It never covered any of these events.

of the National Assembly,

The chairman

“ranked the second most important

official in the state" and other members of the Assembly,
were never shown on television and had no opportunity to
make any statements to the viewers.
Therefore,

the television system in Kuwait can be

characterized as a one-way medium and a one-way flow of
information.

Being a one-voice medium is against the nature

of television as a medium of communication.

With the

absence of participation in planning and programs'

content,

many messages have been ignored and bounced by both ends,
which has led to miscommunication between the sender and the
receiver.

Ithiel de Sola Polo describes a broadcasting

system supported by the government as follows:
Run the risk of becoming boring and reflective of the
tastes and views of civil services.
There are no
incentives to attract audience, since the revenue does
not decline if the audience fall off, and the only
people who must be satisfied are those who hold the
purse-strings.75
The absence of democracy in the structure of television has
led to the absence of cooperation and coordination with
other developmental organizations,
non-governmental sector.

especially those in the

Consequently,

the message does not

stimulate much interest at the receiving end due to the lack
of dynamism in the transmitted message.
situation like this,

Usually in a

a thin connection at least is required
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to work as a channel for

9etting the message across.

Entertainment.

Like any other television in the Arab states and
developing countries,

needless to say,

entertainment

programs dominates air time in Kuwait television.

in 1975,

a study conducted by the UNESCO suggested that light
entertainment constitutes the major programs in both
Kuwait's broadcasting systems,

radio and television.

The

study reported that Kuwait radio broadcast over 129 hours a
week,

of which 97 hours are light entertainment,

for a special audience,
cultural programs,
television,

13 hours for news,

14 hours

4 hours for

and 1.5 hours for education.

In terms of

the same study concluded that Kuwait television

broadcast programs for a total of 38 hours a week.
entertainment occupies 25 hours,
for special audience 4 hours,

news 8.5 hours,

Light

programs

cultural and educational

programs 1 hour.76
Light entertainment still forms the majority of
Kuwait's television programs,
programs.

In spite of the development of Kuwait television

since 1975,
aspect.

outnumbering any other

there was no development in this particular

As a matter of fact,

entertainment program time

increases every time the state increases the transmission
hours.

In reviewing the development of transmission hours
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in Kuwait television, we observe that with each expansion in
transmission hours,
hours as well,

there is expansion in entertainment

with establishment of the Second Channel,

the Foreign Channel,

air time of entertainment programs

became even more prominent since the purpose of this
channel,

purely devoted to Western programs,

is to serve the

non-Arab community in the state and the availability of
these programs in English language.
Kuwait television broadcast approximately a total
6,795 hours a year on both channels,
statistics.

The

according to

of

1986

first channel broadcast 4,488 hours and the

second channel broadcast 2,307

hours.

it was already

mentioned that the predominant broadcast programs are
entertainment.

One must examine and diagnose the type of

the broadcast programs on this two channels
able to assess the role and the
the content of programs
Between

1976

and

in order to be

function of television since

is what really counts.
1980,

Kuwait television purchased

7154.4

hours of

foreign programs

year.

However,

drama programs constituted 69%

hours.

Meanwhile,

purchased

programs
by
and

(1976-1980)

510 hours a year.

-serials- constituted 61%

feature

films,

cartoons.77

1430.9

a

of these

the Arabic programs Kuwait television had

for the same period

for an average of

for an average of

drama,

Table

#

Arabic soap operas
of these hours,

varieties,
5

were 2550 hours

and Table

plays,
#

followed

children programs

6 elaborate the total
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broadcast hours according to classification of the types of
foreign programs

for the years

1985 and

In analyzing the two Tables,
observations of

1986.

we can make very clear

features that characterize the types of

programs on Kuwait television:
1- Drama programs
films)

(includes shows,

serials,

and

are the dominant programs on both channels.

consume

27%

and

on the second channel.

36%

of the total broadcast time on the

2- Entertainment or recreational programs
music and songs,
are

plays,

first channel

(includes

music shows and songs programs,

second on the list,

broadcast time on the

constituting 20.5%

first channel

They

light

and sports)

of the total

and 27%

on the second

channel.
3-

Special Group programs

children,

family,

(includes women's,

education,

army and police)

third place and they constitute
time on the
4- News

first channel

and information

and commentaries)
first channel

and the

form about

Athan

on the second channel.

includes news,

political programs,

fourth place with

(include poems,

14%

on the

talk shows,

seminars,

and physical education programs)

of air time on both channels.

6- Religious programs
Quran,

in the

fifth on the second channel with 8%.

global music,
10%

come

14.4% of the total broadcast

and 12%

occupies the

5- Cultural programs
contests,

(

youth,

"call

(includes recitation of the holy

for daily prayer",

live broadcast of
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weekly Friday prayer,

and religious talk shows)

form the

least number of programs within the total broadcast time,
coming at the end of the list.
Noticeably,

drama programs do not count as

entertainment programs according to Kuwait television
officials definition which include shows,
films.

serials,

and

If we combine both drama and recreational as

entertainment,

they would form a total of 47.5% on the first

channel and a total of 63% on the second channel.
Nonetheless,

the argument in this matter does not terminate

at the fact that these programs are merely entertainment
programs,

but it gets more serious when it goes beyond that

to the fact that most of these entertainment programs are
imported from Western countries.
In reviewing and analyzing the content of these
•

the problem consequently,

becomes more profound.

There is a danger of finding that the content of these
imported entertainment is irrelevant to the values of the
culture of the state.

In most cases the content of these

programs is not only does not help in the process of
development in the state,

but also cause sever damage to

aspects of culture and play a negative role in the
development of the culture.
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Table

5.

TV

transmi

1985.

SOURCE:
Office,

ssion

hours

by

type

of

program,

"Annual Statistical Abstract," Central Statistical
Ministry of Planning, Edition XXIII, Kuwait, 1986.
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Table

6.

TVg transmission

Programs

hours

Hours of Second
Channel

Percent

Hours

by

type

of

program

Hours of First
Channel

Percent

Hours

Informative

8

184

14

633

Recreational

27

618

20.5

922

Cultural

10

230

9.3

416

Drama

36

826

27

1,212

5

114

11.8

526

1 2

285

14.4

647

2

50

3

132

1 00.0

2,307

100.0

3,902

Religious
Group programs*
Commercials
Total

'Includes children, household, and safety programs

SOURCE:
Office,

"Annual Statistical Abstract," Central Statistical
Ministry of Planning, Edition XXIII, Kuwait, 1987.
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Table

7.

Classification
percentage of
standard
(the

of program categories and
broadcast time as a fixed
main channel) .

Types of Programs
(A)

Cultural and Special Programs

1. Cultural, Scientific, Art, Literature
2. Religious
3. Children

(B)

Percentage

10
10
10

Information Programs:

1. News and Political

10

2. Information about State Activities

10

(C) Entertainment

20

(D) Sports

10

(E) Drama

15

SOURCE:
Kuwait Television in Twenty Years,
Information, Kuwait, 1982.

Ministry of
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Table

8.

Classification
percentage of
channel).

Types of Programs

of program Categories and
broadcast time
(the second

Percentage

Drama

50

Cultural

34

News

10

Entertainment

3

Sports

3

SOURCE:
Kuwait Television in Twenty Years,
Information, Kuwait, 1982.

Ministry of

261
Western Proaramc

Historically,

Western programs

are not a new phenomenon.

in Kuwait television

They can be traced back to the

period when television was first established in Kuwait.
its early stages,

In

Kuwait television was more heavily

dependent on Western programs.
dependency still prevails,

Ironically enough,

despite the increase

this

in local

production and may be even more extensive than before.
Furthermore,

the new development of

increasing transmission

hours and establishing the second channel mainly for foreign
viewers has created an even greater demand for Western
programs.

With the establishment of the second channel,

problem of

imported

the

foreign programs has become more

aggravated.

The Second Channel:

The

idea of establishing this channel

goes back to early sixties before
air

in December 2,

intentional,

1978.

it actually went on the

This time of delay was

according to a government report,

designed to

give the project enough time to be more mature and developed
through

studies aimed at determining its objectives,

content,

and type of viewers.

determined
channel

However,

it was clearly

from the beginning that the purpose of this new

is to serve the non-Arab community in the state.

Prior to making the
officials

final decision,

the television

conducted a pilot study to seek different opinions
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and views of knowledgeable people and those who have
experience

in the

field,

consulting with them to elicit

suggestions which might be helpful

in the planning process-

especially the type of programs to be broadcast.
Eventually,

the prevailing thought among the officials

regarding the type of programs was that they should
concetrated on dramatic and cultural types of programs.78
In

its

programs

first stage,

the channel used to broadcast mixed

of Arabic and English.

After a short time

a

decision was made to devote the channel to English programs
and shift most of the
channel

to this channel.

channel
Arabic

foreign material

are

subtitles.

all the programs

in

They accounted an average of about 80%
the other 20%

locally produced,

countries.

first

in English or other foreign languages with

the channel's air time:
but are

Currently,

from the

or produced

are still

of

in English

in other Arab

These programs are confined to programs not

available through ready-made
and reports,

importation,

religious programs,

reports.

Although this channel

community

in the

state,

such as

and special

local news

occasions

is aimed at the non-Arab

nonetheless

it has very wide

popularity among Arab viewers.
The U.S
other sources
China,

is the major supplier for this channel but
include Britain,

New Zealand,

are purchased

Italy,

Australia,

Germany,

for this channel

France,

and Russia.

Japan,
Programs

either through local

or
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international agents or through a direct contact with the
companies.
A heavy schedule of
comedy,

and

form 50%

feature

foreign shows,

Officials commenting on this

taste

in addition of the wide

range of availability of this kind programs which
internationally.

However,

for evaluation and selection,

content,

for one

Other
music,

light

songs,

programs

either

high prices,

for technical,

or boy cut rules.

foreign entertainment programs such as

and dancing shows and concerts and other

variety of programs are also shown
Officials

films every year

many of them cannot be

reason or another;

rights reserved,

is mostly

officials said,

television receive and review hundreds of

broadcast

They

in Kuwait television to the desire to satisfy a

large portion of viewers'

produced

drama,

films are shown on this channel.

of the channel time.

phenomenon

serials,

in this channel.

say that despite the popularity of this kind of
and the great demand of viewers to increase this

type of

shows,

demands

since most of these shows contain scenes and actions

do not

but the television cannot obey this kind of

fit with the norms and values of Kuwait's society.

These programs

form 3%

of the channel

air time.

Foreign sports are also shown in this channel
British and Italian soccer games,
Tennis tournament and matches,
programs

U.S NBA,

such as

international

and other world sports

such as the Olympics games.

These programs

form 3%
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of the air time.
channel,

Many cultural programs are offered in this

apparently because of the availability of this kind

of programs in English.
The availability of educational and cultural programs
that this channel offer is probably the only advantage of
this channel over the first channel.

A large group of

viewers described as the educated class recognize this
channel through this type of programs.

A large variety of

educational programs such as Geography,

animals'

world's cultures,

documentary,

travelling,

life,

science and

invention discoveries are shown in this channel as well.
They quite occupy a large air time of 35%.

Even though all

these programs are with Arabic captioning or commentaries,
noticeably,

local programming almost does not exist.

News bulletins in English was the first thing was in
mind when this channel was first established.

This channel

offer two daily English evening and late night news
bulletins,

political programs,

commentaries,

especial reports,

and other informative reports.

The news and

informative programs constitutes in this channel 10% of air
time.
In Kuwait,

the average ratio of imported programs of

the total broadcast time is 50%;

on the Second Program

Channel -which is the foreign channel- the percentage of the
foreign imported programs has reached 81.8%,
for the years 1979,

1980,

79%,

and 1981 respectively.

and 79%
Between
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1976-1980 Kuwait television purchased a total of 7154.4
hours of

foreign programs;

of this 69% were considered

entertainment programs.
In
hours

1987,

Kuwait television

foreign programs and,

hours.

imported more than 3011

in 1988,

imported more than 3120

Douglas Boyd observed that officials at Kuwait

television are not concerned about the cultural
imported programs because they believe that
viewer to make a choice between what
services.

They

it

in

is up to the

is offered on the two

indicate that even if western entertainment

programs were not offered on Kuwait television,
available

affect of

local

cinemas or on videotape

they are

for home video

systems.
In this matter,
the type

of these

however,

it

is

important to examine

imported programs where we

find that

entertainment programs constituted more than 60%
total

imported programs.

of the
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Table

9.

Imported television hours
and their classification according to types
of programs
in Kuwait
in
1987.

Types of Programs

Number of Hours

Drama - shows - serials

1,030

Cultural and scientific

710

Children

420

Light entertainment

110

Sport

100

Religious

40
Total: 2,410

Table

10.

Number
Kuwait

of
in

Source of Films
American and British

featured films broadcast
in
1987
(average of 2 hours each) .

Number of Films
246

Indian

10

French

35

Italian

10
Total: 301
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Table

11.

Imported television
in
1988.

Types of Program

broadcast

in

Kuwait

Number of Hours

Drama - shows - serials

1,080

Cultural and scientific

710

Children

520

Light entertainment

120

Sports

100

Religious

40
Total imported hours: 2,570

ble

12 .

Number
Kuwait

of
in

Source of Films
American and British

featured films broadcast in
1988
(average of 2 hours
eac

Number of Films
240

Indian

25

French

5

Italian

5
Total: 275
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Television and cmt1]re in

Television service is a reality in Kuwait and it
considered one of the tools that has a broad effect on
Kuwait's society,

as it does everywhere.

Television viewing

patterns are very common and popular among Kuwaiti people.
People in Kuwait are well known for their fondness of
acquiring and watching television.

As Zahra Freeth noted,

the Kuwaitis are confirmed TV addicts.79
British author,

Violet Dickson, wife of the former

Political Agent,

who witnessed the development of

Kuwait in the 1960's and the emergence of television in its
early days,

describes the situation in Kuwait in the early

days of television and the great desire of Kuwaiti people to
have a television set even among women in the desert.
recalls a story when two bedouin women,

She

black draped figures

wearing veils wearing over their face-masks who made a
surprise visit to her asking her help to acquire television
set.
After sitting and chatting for some time, I ask Sarah,
the young girl, what is on her mind:
She replies, 'you are my mother and I am Sarah, your
daughter;
I have come to ask you to give me a television set.
Everybody has one except me, and a small one is quite
cheap-only sixty dinars (60 £)
'My dear little girl, I cannot give you this. Even my
own daughter has not got one, neither have I.
Perhaps one of the ladies at the palace will give you
one.
'No; as you are my mother, surely you can do this for
your daughter?
'I will bring you a nice piece of silk to make into
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adress for the Id.' [holiday]
No, I don't want that- only a television.'
She is very disappointed at my firm refuel
get up and glide out, for
™o
'
clippers under full sail.

au'tj

Uki

«-w

*

?wo

I°sawdthat1?h^r however- as 1
passing their house,
I saw that there was a television aerial on it: so
perhaps she got one after all.
In 1982,

a study was conducted on a random sample of

families in Kuwait which represent and cover all areas in
the whole state.

The study indicated that 96.8% of all

families in the state are television viewers.

The same

study also indicated that the average family in Kuwait ——
both Kuwaiti and non-Kuwaiti— acquire 1.6
sets.

color television

The average Kuwaiti family has 2.2 3 sets as opposed to

1.17 sets for each non-Kuwaiti family in the state.
study also indicated that the spread of videos’
confirms the television viewing pattern.

The

popularity

The study showed

that 58.11% of the total families in Kuwait acquire a VCR
set,

the average share of each family of VCR is

Kuwaiti

family is

Nonetheless,

.97 and

.52

.70,

the

for non-Kuwaiti family.81

the nature and features that

characterized the Kuwaiti society traditions were the chief
factor that helped in many ways the acceleration of the
spread of television in Kuwait.

Beside the easy approach of

television as a major entertainment medium,

the nature of

the Arab Kuwaiti culture as a family oriented culture
encouraged a family gathering around the television when
they gathered daily.

Also the traditions and customs of
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Kuwaiti society of evening group gathering out doors or in
public places have created a group viewing pattern.

One of

the interesting and unique group viewing pattern in Kuwait
is to place television in public places such as coffee shops
or restaurants in local quarters, which imply an invitation
for others or passers by to come and join the group.

A

British visitor found that what most particularly interested
her in Kuwait was to see that at a refreshment kiosk on the
sea-^ron^'

television set was placed on the ground,

and

men bought their drinks and sat on the ground to watch it;82
this scene in particular reflects the tradition of the
ultimate enjoyment of Arab culture,
say,

sitting.

Needless to

the high average income of the people and the unusual

hunger for acquiring technology mediums,

make the desire to

obtain a television sets striking to the observer.
reviewing the history of Kuwait,

in

it is evident that Kuwait

society had been enjoying cultural continuity and a selfsufficient cultural environment.

The society and the people

of Kuwait were secure in terms of culture until oil was
discovered in the late 1930’s compined with British presence
over years of domination.

The British have a great influnce

on Kuwait's social life and the legal system as well.
It was already mentioned earlier that the discovery of
oil

in the region and in Kuwait has changed all expectations

and drawn a thick and clear-cut line in the history of
Kuwait.

Not only that,

it caused a severs shock to the
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customs and traditions of the society and people.
S.

Jaqueline

Ismael ascribes the social change in Kuwait to the

physical modernization of Kuwait,
utilities,

transportation,

the dependence of

and communications

infrastructures upon technologies produced in the central
capitalist nations,
living.83

and the increase in the standard of

Although this trend was to be expected to be as a

result of the advent and wealth of oil revenue,

but it seems

that there was no way to evade these social changes even
though there was some control aimed at minimizing the degree
of this damage.
Harold R.P.

Dickson,

former British Political Agent in

Kuwait and one of the prominent figures of the story of oil
in Kuwait in the early days,
Jabir,

had warned the ShaiK Ahmed Al-

Shaik of Kuwait at the time,

of the probable social

outcome of the oil discovery on Kuwait society,

but the

Shaik had no other choice except to sign the oil concession
agreement.
Not long before oil concession was signed, Shaik Ahmed
confided to Colonel Dickson his feeling about the
advent of wealth. 'You must realise,' the Political
Agent told him, 'that this probably means that Kuwait
will become very wealthy; a large number of outsiders
will have to come to your country to work the oil; it
will bring both good and bad... it will mean the
building of a power station for lighting and air
conditioning, modern building materials for houses.
Think very carefully about these things.' Shaik Ahmed
did not reply at once. But a few days later he told
Dickson: 'I must do this for my people, even if it will
bring undesirable things to my country. We are poor,
pearling is not what it used to be, so I must sign.'
...he accepted the need to develop the country's oil
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fol!ow?e«4 regrettedCthatd that ?hange would inevitably
very^austerity^

l?**?

lead"ahiP which^r^oSfof'th.

surge of techL!^ 2^2=2^^^ 4°* in 3
In early 1950-s,
began to become true.

Harold Dickson's earlier expectations
He observed some of the early signs

of the social changes in Kuwait society as a result of oil
wealth.

The changes were due to the impact of the West.

Dickson sums up the early Western impact in Kuwait in two
major factors:

motor-car and radio.

Dickson explains how

these two major factors made some changes in people's
behaviors in the early days:
Probably no single factor has done so much to alter the
thinking of the desert Arab as the motor car.. .more
insidious is the effect of the motor-car on the ladies
of the town...women hear more and see more, and it is
likely that the motor-car will be an important factor
in the eventual removal of the veil, through this is
very, very far distant where tribal Arabia is
concerned. . .the radio brings them into a world of
music, people, places and happenings of which their
mothers did not even guess the existence...these same
women have growing interest in cosmetics, perfumes,
powders and soaps.85
Dickson also noted that radio was so popular in Kuwait
and that people like to be informed regarding world affairs,
that they would tune to Arabic-speaking programs from
London,

Ankara,

and Moscow as well as to other Arab states'

radios such as those of Beirut,

Jordan,

and Baghdad.

Radio

became so popular among the Kuwaitis that since early years
it was in every home,

even of the humblest villagers,

as

part of the government's strategy of entrance into the
modern world.86

Dickson estimated the number of radio sets
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available in Kuwait alone at that time as some eight
thousand receiving sets87,

a very high figure in contrast to

the small population at the time.
After the emergence of television,

it was very evident

that the people of Kuwait also had great desire to acquire
television sets.

Very soon the popularity of television

spread very rapidly among the people,

high classes and lower

classes alike.
During the reign of Shaik Abdulla Al-Salim
1965) ,

Kuwait was in the first stage of opening to the West.

Nevertheless,

Shaik Abdulla was very keen to introduce

Western media to Kuwait society.
rule,

(1950-

At the beginning of his

he resisted the introduction of films to the Kuwait

public as a whole to avoid any political or social
instability which might result.

However,

after waiting for

few years and giving the intensive educational drive a
chance to develop more and more,
radio medium in 1951,
films.

and after introducing

he reconsidered his attitude towards

With the spread of education and radio communication,

Shaik Abdulla acceded to public opinion and allowed the
establishment of Kuwait National Cinema Company,

founded in

1953.88
British author John Daniels,

who lived in Kuwait

during that period and witnessed the introduction of Western
mediums of radio,

cinema,

and television in Kuwait,

attributes the Shaik of Kuwait's cautious resistance to the
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introduction of

films to his understandable reluctance to

permit his people to run before they were able to walk.

The

Shaik of Kuwait knew that films would inevitably sink
Western

ideas deep into the Kuwaiti mind.

If the best of

the Western world were to be absorbed and the worst
rejected,

the Amir was acutely aware of the need

for an

extensive education and development program in order that a
progressive new world could be
It was
factors

introduced to the people.89

clear that during

such as the

1950's and a result of many

long period of time of Western

colonialism which resulted dependence after independence and
the Westernization wave that swept the Arab world after the
second World War,
parts

people

in the Arab world,

civilization.
modernization.

in Kuwait,
were

like those

in other

fascinated by western

It was viewed as the only path for
Therefore,

and

and according to this approach,
everything western

for a certain period of time
people began to shift to

in order to be called modern,

underestimating their

indigenous values and customs which

were viewed as things of the backward past.
Kuwaitis attitude toward
1950's was
compete
gowns as

reflected

foreigners

in their dress;

in the early

Kuwaitis

felt that to

in the modern world they must abandon their national
impractical

and get

into shirts and trousers.

Even

Kuwaitis of the merchant class were experimenting with suits
of European style.90

In early

1960's,

the Ministery of
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Guidence and Information published a report in which proudly
described the

influence of western culture over Kuwait's

radio listeners as

follow:

Kuwaitis enjoy

'listeners choice’

programs as much as

^*1" ^

qetsearmanv°as
£ans'
The
radi°
Nation
gets
as many as five hundred letters
a week
with
^hits^"

f°r tunes'

including Western

'pops'

and

Another weekly music programme tells about the lives of
the classical European composers and presents their
works on records.9r
However,

in the

patterns have emerged

1960's,

Daniels noted,

many new

in Kuwait society mainly as a result

of contact with the outside Western world in the U.S and
Europe.
driver

When he asked a low income local

Bedouin taxi

if he ever took his wife to the cinema,

immediately
home.".92

"No need to do that.

he answered

She can watch television at

John Daniels describes some changes that occurred

in the situation of Kuwaiti women in the late 1960's,
contrast with her

former status

in

few years earlier:

In any event, Kuwaiti women of today have made their
presence felt and nowadays a European visitor meeting a
sophisticated businessman may be introduced at a social
gathering to the wife of his contact.
Formerly this
would never happened.
. . .where the former Kuwait wife at home wore a plain,
simple dress with long sleeves, the young wives of
today dress in the latest Western fashion.
Furthermore
the veil, which was traditionally worn whenever the
women left the house, has been discarded by the younger
generation.
True, some of the older women still wear
it, but it seems clear that the veil will probably
become almost extinct in a few years from now.
Although Kuwaiti women's dress was always receptive to
external
of

influence

in

fabric or detail

of cut,

the wearing

European styles did not become widespread until the

late
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1950-s and early 1960-s right after the emergence of cinema,
films,

television,

and the

flood of Western magazines and

printed media which were the chief carrier introducing
Western culture and lifestyle to the people.

The newly

introduced lifestyle attracted the younger generation and it
spread more rapidly among young women lured by the notion of
joining the
"At

"liberated generation."

first,

girls would compromise with family concern

f?ra.fepUt^tl0n and modestY and would cover their new
clothes with the, Abbaya, when out of doors.
Family
photographs of the 1960's, however, show groups of
girls cheerfully posing in the then current European
fashions of short skirts, stiletto-heeled shoes and
bouffant hairstyles."94
One of the outrageous
Kuwait,

incidents that took place

which proves the western influence on Kuwaiti

people's mentality
particular,

in general

happened

movements

and Kuwaiti women in

in the early 1960s when a group of

young Kuwaiti women under the
in Europe and U.S,

influence of women liberation
publicly expressed their

rebellion against the traditional

Islamic of purdah "abayah"

and demanded western style women's

freedom,

western women as their best role model.
group of young women on several
purdah

in

regarding

Furthermore,

these

occasions burnt the Islamic

in public.
When

formal

and women wore the
according to

education began in Kuwait,
Islamic purdah

Islam's teachings.

westernized Kuwaiti women

"abayah"
However,

Kuwaiti girls

to school
this group of

burnt the Islamic purdah

in
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school yard and demanded permission to come to school with
western clothes.95
active,

The social movement in Kuwait was very

especially in the 1960s.

-As television arrived,

they were eager to discover how much they could be part of
this new medium."96

Their active role was very evident

their early appearance and participation in
television which caused them to be viewed by women in the
region as liberal women.
Women's group are still very active in Kuwait and play
an important role in influencing programming input.

Their

representatives hold semi-annual meetings with the
television Director to discuss the portrayal of women in
television and other related issues.

In 1975,

for instance,

they opposed a Kuwaiti series portraying a Kuwaiti female
teacher as careless and more concerned with her appearance
than her teaching.97
British author,

Zahra Freeth, who lived in Kuwait

before the oil era and who made a visit to Kuwait in the
early 1970's after about twenty years of absence,

expressed

her ultimate astonishment of the cultural shock that
occurred to her old town.

Freeth noted that no country

could have moved further or changed faster than Kuwait and
that changes which in Europe took place gradually over
centuries,

in Kuwait have taken only twenty-five years.

She

observed how the Kuwaitis became Westernized and no longer
care for their old customs and "with their new affluence,
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the Kuwaitis have not only destroyed their old town,

they

ba^e discarded a whole culture."^®
In contrast to the Kuwaitis extreme adherence and
commitment to their religion before the oil era,

she was

surprised by the lack of enthusiasm among the new generation
of Kuwaitis toward Islam's basic principles and teachings.
Freeth explain more:
While we were out on the mole the sun dipped below the
canefro!l0^ZOn' and at °nCe the muezzins began their
cail from the mosques of our quarter. My son stood to
listen to the call for prayer, and I could see that he
was watching the busy stream of cars on the highway
the pedestrians who walked on the sea-front. It
seemed they paid no heed to the cry from the minarets.
Isn't everybody supposed to stop whatever they are
doing and make the sunset prayer when the muezzin
calls? he asked. We explained that in a perfect world
that is would happen; this was what used to happen in
the unsophisticated town of my youth."
Moreover,

Freeth expressed wonder at how the

traditions of old Kuwait were wiped out so thoroughly and
replaced by everything Western,
morality,

values,

including Food,

clothes,

and people's attitudes.

It is only twenty years since the first really modern
shops began to appear in Kuwait, and now the main
streets are lined with stores which in equipment and
stock are totally European. To me, the interest of such
shops lay in the way they reflected the changing
consumer tastes in Kuwait. Fifteen years before I had
not seen European-type restaurants, dry cleaners and
laundries, hairdressing salons, shops full of prams and
modern infants' clothes, and women's dress shops. Now
they are all here. The dress shops even have model
female figures in the window to display their goods some thing so contrary to the traditional Muslim ban on
representation of the human form that I found it hard
to believe that such things were now accepted without a
second glance.100
Freeth recalls women's status when she left Kuwait in
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the 1950's.

She noted that at one time it was hard to

imagine that one day the Kuwaiti woman would break out of
her purdah.

Women,

she added,

who wandered unveiled about

the streets and spoke boldly to strange men,
prostitutes,

were

and there was no middle ground; nor could a

woman appear unveiled among her husband's friends.

For a

woman to be eyed openly by others in the street was in
itself a defilement,

and no man then would have wanted a

bride who had been thus sullied.
under western influence,

Twenty years later and

she noted,

Kuwaiti girls move about

the streets freely in European dress with mini-skirts and
the men allow their young wives to meet their own male
acquaintances.

Freeth portrays some of the practices of

western life style in one of Kuwait high class houses to
show how far some Kuwaitis gone in westernization;
These modern families live in luxuriously furnished
houses in the best suburban areas, and entertain in the
European way. In most of these houses the cocktail bar
is the most prominent feature of the sitting room and
there is a lavish supply of drink. The wife welcomes
the guests at the door and moves freely among
them...often at parties there will be dancing to the
record- player, and some of the Kuwaiti girls, with
their husband's consent, will go so far as to partner
other male guests.101
The costumes worn in Kuwait nowadays are clear
examples of social change in the society as e result of the
impact of the Western culture.

The change of costumes was

not confined to women but to men as well.
the past,

In contrast to

where every one wore the traditional local Arab

dress which had steadily evolved to suit climatic and
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cultural conditions,

present practices are more varied.

Western-style suits and clothing are worn not only by
Westerners working in Kuwait,

but also by Kuwaitis and Arabs

in professional and service jobs.

Working clothes of jeans

and T-shirts are favored by the various nationalities
involved in technical and construction work.102
Furthermore,

the Kuwaitis not only changed their

customary clothing to a European style but they also changed
their homes.

After demolishing the old traditional houses

in the old part of the city,

the Kuwaitis,

unfortunately,

did not live in a newly developed version of the traditional
home but rather moved out into the suburbs in European style
houses that do not harmonize with the natural climate of the
Kuwaiti environment.

Dr,

George Saba Shiber,

one of the old

and first planning consultants to the Kuwait Municipality in
early 1960's,

wrote a book on Kuwait urbanization in which

he expressed his regret for the missed opportunities.

Dr.

Shiber expressed his admiration and amazement at the old
Arab Kuwaiti forms of architecture and how they had evolved
to suit the climate of the east.

In contrast,

he found that

the new buildings lack any feeling of continuity with older
traditions,

and were often designed without the slightest

thought for the climate conditions of Kuwait.103
About old Kuwait,

Dr Shiber writes:

Its buildings were a closely-net labyrinth that
repelled heat and sandstorm to the maximum, having
thick walls, narrow apertures, and properly located
slits for ventilation, [about the new buildings]
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discover^of^il"^110"5 °f Dinars sPent since the
functionali^S
"V* the'iaw^of^
functionalism and organic design.104

In 1954,

Harold R.P.

Dickson commented on the early

effect of western modern technology on Kuwait's Islamic
culture.
science,

Dickson wrote "Materialism,

has weakened Islam...material prosperity, which of

itself is neither good or bad,
how it is used,
Islam.

popularized by modern

but,

like fire,

depends on

has tended to weaken rather than strengthen

In 1972,

his daughter,

western look of Kuwait.

Zahra commented on the new

She wrote,

"The new Kuwait has the

best and the worst of the western civilization that it so
assiduously set out to emulate.

What of its Arab identity?

What has remained to act as a visual and spiritual link with
the past? Not much."106

Conclusion

This chapter took a close-up look at the issue in the
state of Kuwait,

as a model of Arab states.

It is very

evident that the imported television programs has left its
deep negative cultural effect on the indigenous culture of
Kuwait.
Many factors combined can be counted as responsible
for this phenomenon,

including the financial capability of

the government to purchase packages of western programs even
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for high prices because of the wealth of the government • s
revenue,

and the availability and the widespread use of

television sets among Kuwaiti people because of their high
average income.
viewers'

Largely this negative effect is caused by

wide exposure to western programs,

special channel for foreign programs,

the designated

and the fact that it

is an entertainment-oriented medium.
Yet,

there is still insistence on the part of the

government on importing these programs.

The chapter has

also demonstrated that Kuwait television like in any other
Arab television systems is not playing a primary role in
preserving and protecting the Arab national culture.
Chapter VI will describes and analyzes the successful
experiment of the Arabian Gulf States Joint Programs
Production Institution

(AGJPPI).

The chapter will look for

the secrets of success of this pioneer experiment which
considered the first successful and professional Arab
educational television production.

The AGJPPI can be used

as an excellent small-scale model for a national Pan-Arab or
regional television production industry.
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Chapter VI

THE EXPERIMENT OF THE ARABIAN GULF STATES JOINT PROGRAMS
PRODUCTION INSTITUTE

(AGJPPI)

Introduction

After the successful
children's program,

launch of the popular Arabic

Iftah Ya Simsim,

the American program,

Sesame Street,

the Arabic version of
as the first

professional Arab educational television production,

Hamdy

Kandil wrote:
This may be the first time in the Arab world that such
sums have been allocated to an educational and cultural
programs; for the usual practice has been to lavish
funds on entertainment and drama programs and their
producers while educational and cultural programs, and
perhaps serious programs in general, have occupied
second place in the concerns of administrators and
financiers.1
Indeed,

the experiment of the AGJPPI,

of productions
breakthrough

is a pioneer work and considered a

in Arab television production,

paradigm for any Arab television work.
experiment

with its high standard

and set the

This unique

is actually the beginning of authentic Arab

television history and offers a new generation of Arab
programs

and set the

industry.

It

Al-mal

it,

put

Arab world,

foundation for the Arab television

is the kind of production house,
that every state

wishes to have.2
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in the region,

as Hamza Bait
if not

in the
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Although the AGJPPI is a regional institute and not a
Pan Arab institute,

it is probably the only Arab institute

in the whole Arab world that produces television programs on
behalf of all Arab states.

The AGJPPI is a good example of

regional cooperation among Arab Gulf states which might be
applied in other different parts of the Arab world.
Therefore,

it is worthwhile to take a look in more detail at

this pioneer experiment.

Background of the AGJPPI

In 1976,
Gulf states
Arabia,

the Ministers of Information in seven Arabian

(Bahrain,

and U.A.E.)

Iraq,

Oman,

Kuwait,

Qatar,

held their first conference in Riyadh to

discuss some media problems facing their states,
the television production problem.
conference,

Saudi

including

At the end of that

the Ministers agreed on the establishment of an

institution which would be in charge primarily of producing
television materials for the members'

stations.

The

institution was called the Arabian Gulf States Joint
Production Programs Institute.
The headquarters of the institute is in Kuwait and
enjoys complete independence from governmental authority.
The Board of Directors is composed of the Under Secretaries
of the Ministries of Information of the members states,
who represent them,

and is headed by the Minister of

or
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Information of the headquarter state.

The General Director

of the institute is appointed by the Board of Directors and
reports to the Board.

The structure of the AGJPPI is

composed of four major departments:
Programming,

2- Production,

1- Planning and

3- Public Relations,

and 4-

Administrative and Financial Affairs.
The Institute is not a commercial establishment and
does not seek commercial profits as much as it seeks social
development through television production.

The Institute

sells its production to the member states for at cost and to
other non-member Arab states for low prices.

The Institute

gets all kind of governmental support including the
financial support.

Financing the Institute is achieved

through a contribution quota distributed among the member
states.

The reasons for establishing the AGJPPI,

Al-yuosif,

the Director General of the AGJPPI,

as Ibrahim

indicated

are:3
1-

The need for high standard,

good quality television

programs that have a common subject and appeal to the people
in the region.
2-

The need for cooperation among the Arabian Gulf states

based on what they have in common.
3-

The need to unify efforts and avoid duplication in the

production of these kind of programs to save time and money.
4-

The need to help develop a feeling of closeness among

people of the region.

292
Objectives of the agjppt

According to Article IV of its charter,

the AGJPPl's

purpose is to produce radio and television programs for its
members as well as other Arab and friendly countries.

The

subjects of these programs should achieve the following
objectives:4
1-

Revive Arabic and Islamic history,

showing the high

morality of the heavenly religion of Islam,

and portray the

honorable conduct of Islamic heroes and leaders.
2-

Revive the Gulf traditions,

to indigenous arts,

specifically those related

and work on recording them in a

documentary fashion so that they become a historical
reference and a source for upgrading the artistic and
literary level of the Gulf in various fields.
3-

Providing information concerning the Gulf region from

all aspects of geography,
4-

population,

and tourism.

Upgrade technical production od radio and television

programs,

and highlight all artistic,

literary,

and

scientific work done by the Gulf's people.
5-

Discover young talents in the field of art,

and science;

work on training them;

literature,

show their talents;

and

provide them with all mass media facilities.
6-

Give the personnel working in radio and television

stations of member states a chance to upgrade their artistic
and vocational skills,

and help them earn new experience as
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a result of their continuous

interaction with people working

in this production.

The Experiment of

''Iftah Ya Simsim"

The AGJPPI has produced many successful and
professional

educational,

and series

such as

episodes),

Your Safety

The Discovery
Mirror

(30

Medicine.

cultural,

and documentary programs

Islamic and Arab Civilization
(104

(65 episodes),

episodes),

episodes),

stop

It's Time

Our Life.

(100 episodes),

(65 episodes),

Oil and Water.

Treasures of the Red Sea.

and many other children's works.

5

(156

The

Arab

Treasures of the Gulf,
However,

the most

distinguished and prominent program for which the AGJPPI

is

known throughout the Arab world is their first production of
the children's program of
Sesame",

Iftah Ya Simsim.

260 half-hour episodes.

The popularity of the

program attracted both children and adults,

AGJPPI

"Open

an Arabic version of the Sesame Street series,

composed of

their

meaning

favorite programs.

becoming one of

The result has encouraged the

officials to produce more and more similar works and

made the AGJPPI

to give considerable attention to children's

programs.
Although the original purpose of the AGJPPI
produce programs
noticeable

for the Gulf States stations,

success encouraged

is to

its

it to respond to the various
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demands to distribute
world.

Although the AGJPPI

cultural
its

its production all

institute,

educational,

over the Arab

is neither an educational nor

it became specialized

cultural,

in and known for

objective drama,

and documentary

programs.

It presented a great mix between television and

education,

for the

first time

in the Arab world.

Director of Production of the AGJPPI,
mixed

"Pure coincidence,

however,

The

call this

but a happy one like the ones that

happen during the historical discoveries."6
The beginning was an initiative
Fund

for Economic and Social

headquartered

in Kuwait,

for the Arab children.
the American program,

in 1976

Development

from the Arab

(AFESD),

to produce an educational program
Officials at AFESD eventually chose

Sesame Street,

the Children Television Workshop

which is produced by

(CTW)

to be the

ideal

program.7
Since that time,

the AFESD invited Arab experts to

study the possibility of adapting this program to the Arabic
language.

The experts

psychologists,
the

studies

socialogists,

and linguistics.

supported the project.

they succeeded.
in Amsterdam

involved were educators,

It is very evident that

The Arabic adaptation won the first prize

for the best adapted version using the American

"Sesame Street"

format.

contest were Germany,

Among the participants

France,

Sweden,

Britain,

g
Puerto Rico,

The result of

Japan,

Holland,

and Canada.

in this
Mexico,

The AFESD
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initiative was based on five points:9
1-

The AFESD believe that

projects

is not less

financing social development

important than financing economic

development projects.
2-

The absence of a unified Arabic program addressing pre¬

school
3-

children

in the Arab television.

The positive

impact of the American program on American

children.
4-

The possibility of adapting the American program to

other languages especially after the successful adoption by
some European and Latin American languages.
gave the program an
5-

international characteristic.

The availability of the AGJPPI as a new,

production

These attempts

up coming

institute which might adopt this project since

it

has the potentials to execute such a giant project.
After many preliminary meetings of experts and
specialists,

the three main

project met together

institutions

involved

in the

in order to start planning and carry¬

out the project.

These three main institutions were:

1-

for Economic and Social Development

The Arab Fund

(AFESD).
2-

The Arabian Gulf States Joint Programs Production

Institute
3-

(AGJPPI).

The Children Television Workshop in New York

In May

1977,

the AGJPPI

(CTW).

signed an agreement with the
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CTW

for $2.5 million.

rights of,
agreement

The AGJPP1 paid $1,000,000

Sesame Street,10 valid for 9 years.

for the

The

included:

™thevA!;ab ”or}d's rights to the "Sesame Street"
concept for a nine-year period, as well as CTW's
^T?iCal as®lstance» research and production advice
,
the services of a resident consulting producer
during the production period in Kuwait.
Under the
agreement, CTW was also to provide 15 hours of cross^ltJJ^al material, such as animal or nature films, from
the US programme, which would be selected by the
institution as appropriate for Arab children and dubbed
into Arabic.11
The project was to produce 130 half-hour episodes of
the program aimed

for the pre-school children from 3-6 years

old.

The AFESD

financed the

which

included conducting research,

Arab children.
($300,000) .12
resources

For this stage,
The AGJPPI

and staff,

the CTW provided
experience,

first stage of the project
studies,

and tests on

the AFESD paid KD 80,000

supplied the project with human

equipment,

its technical

training and studios,
advice,

and

consultation,

and some materials and clips which can be

adapted to Arabic.
The
five

first step of the production process was training

leadership personnel

in New york for three weeks.

The

personnel were chosen among Arab educators and media
specialists

selected

training a total
materials were

of

from different Arab states.
15 hours of clips,

selected

and

from the original American program

which were thought to be useful and
the Arab environment.

footage,

During the

After

full

fitted

for adaptation to

and extensive training,
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research, discussion, and consulting, the personnel returned
to Kuwait to undertake the project as a well trained team.13
The team work was formed of experts who specialized in
Arabic language, education, psychology, researchers,
writers, producers, and other production staff.

The whole

team worked under the supervision of a resident consultant
producer and education researchers from the CTW.U
in mid-1977,

and by September 29,

That was

1979, the Arabic program

was on the air of the Arabian Gulf States televisions.
The production of the 130 episodes took 30 months and
the final cost reached $7,500,000; it was distributed to 14
Arabic stations.15

The total amount of cost brings down the

cost for each 30-minute episode of about $7,500.

It is

rather expensive when compared to the average price of $1000
per hour of foreign imported programs, but for this kind of
good-quality of Arabic program make such costs reasonable.
The work experience of people involved in producing this
show cannot be measured in terms of money.16

Although the

AGJPPI programs sells to non-members Arab states for low
prices,

there was some complaints from states of the high

prices in contrast to foreign imported programs.

Prices to

non-member Arab states is determined by the financial
capability of the state.
instance,

An hour of AGJPPI programs,

for

costs Libya $4000, Algeria and Syria $2000, Jordan

$1500, Tunisia,

Yemen,

and Sudan $1000.17

The remarkable success and the positive results of the
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project,

ascertained through studies and feedback undertaken

during and after the program,

has encouraged the AGJPPI

make a decision to produce another

to

130 half-hour episodes

directed to the children of age 3-9 years old with several
developments and

improvements

learned from production of the

first part.

The Secret of the AGJPPI

Yasir Al-Malih,
who

is

Success

the Production Director of the AGJPPI

one of the prominent figures of the Institute since

its establishment,

attributes the success of the AGJPPI

experiment to several major reasons seldom to be

found

in

other Arabic television work:
1-

The support of the regional governments: The AGJPPI is a

governmental

institute shared by the Arab Gulf

the Board of

Directors

the Ministries of

states;

is formed by the Under Secretary of

Information of these member states.

AGJPPI

gets

either

financially or materially.

is

The

all kinds of support from the member states,
The member states offer

and provide their television facilities to the AGJPPI.
AGJPPI

and

The

supported financially through a contribution quota

distributed over the member states'

governments.

For the

time being,

the AGJPPI does not have financial deficiencies;

however,

in

its

support,

the AGJPPI

first stages and despite the governmental
ran

into some financial difficulties and
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almost went bankrupt four years after its establishment.18
Mohammad Al-Sanousi,

the first Director of the AGJPPI noted

that some member states did not pay their quota and did not
take the matter seriously.19

Fortunately,

it was rescued by

other institutions and departments such as Education,
Health,

and Interior Departments which sponsored some of the

projects and charged it to execute some projects on their
behalf.

Otherwise,

it couldn't continue,

Information Ministries'

2-

when depending on

quota only.20

Freedom and Independence: Although the AGJPPI is a

governmental

institution,

one of its advantages is that it

enjoys a complete independence in authority and decision¬
making and none of the member governments has direct
influence on it.

This privilege also gave the Institute the

freedom to maneuver in selecting and hiring the best and
most qualified staff,

more than any other formal television

enjoys.

3-

Careful planning: Planning is probably the essential

element that distinguishes the work of AGJPPI from any other
Arab television works and is the basic, vital secret of
success.

The Institute has two departments which carry out

all the required planning.

Among other jobs,

Planning and

Programming department studies and reviews all local,
Arabic,

and foreign

television,

radio or film program-script
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proposal
contest

efforts;

and

finally,

for the best script.

department

is responsible

plans a program-script
The Public Relations

for all

field studies and audience

surveys on all the AGJPPI programs as well
and

as other public

foreign relations.21
From the beginning,

planning.

every step was preceded by careful

Planning was not confined to the AGJPPI

organizational

structure but was also carried out in

coordination with other Arab televisions and specialized
institutions.

Planning was based on studies and research

conducted by AGJPPI
academic

in conjunction with educational and

institutions.

Experts and specialists were

invited to assess

projects before any action was taken and to make final
judgments
the

on the out come of the project.

"Iftah Ya Simsim",

of Arab children.

Before starting

about $300,000 were spent on studies

Seminars and conferences were held to

analyze and evaluate the results of these studies.
Evaluation technique was undertaken for every AGJPPI project
before and after telecasting any project to overcome as many
as possible disadvantages and mistakes so future works can
be enhanced.
Field tests

and

feedback were taken among the public

and viewers during and after the programs were broadcast.
Public and viewers'
AGJPPI has

sought;

feedback was not the only
formal

feedback that

feedback from the Ministries of
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Education and Information
sought.
AGJPPI

Also there

in some Arab states were also

is a consultants'

council

apart

structure composed of educators and media

which holds periodical meetings to discuss

from the

specialists

issues and

suggest solutions.
One of the unique techniques that AGJPPI has utilized
in

its

strategy

is the

"pilot project" tactic.

projects that have been produced,

In all

its

the AGJPPI produced two

episodes of each project and then invited Arab scholars and
consultants

in education,

Arabic language,

psychology to give their feedback,
snd reaction so the AGJPPI
producing all the
be

suggestions,

and

critiques,

can do the modifications before

episodes.

a very effective method

television,

This technique has proved to

in improving the programs

content.
Before producing the
Simsim",

first

130 episodes of

the AGJPPI produced two pilot episodes and invited

education and media experts and specialists
the Arab
March

states

1978

to discuss the two pilot episodes and the studies
The purpose of the sponsors was to get as

many of consultations,

suggestions,

for better production.

officials,

from all over

for a seminar to be held in Kuwait on 4-9

in this matter.22

possible

"Iftah Ya

and recommendations as

According to AGJPPI

much has been learned from this technique and

very often many modifications,

changes,

been made to the balance of the episodes

and improvement have
in every project.
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On top of all that has been mentioned above,
advertising campaigns were very well
the

organized and preceded

launching of every AGJPPI project.

on the public level

as well

as on a

the

The advertising was

formal

level

such as

coordinating with other Arab televisions and governmental
institutions.

4-

Enthusiasm and Faith:

faith of all
planners,

staff

The enthusiastic and the sincere

involved

producers,

in the project,

or administrators,

whether

caused them to give

the best of their effort in the project and to be
accomplished

5-

in the best professional manner.

Cooperation and Coordination: The full cooperation and

understanding of the team work in general
exceptional

coordination between the educators and the

production team
the AGJPPI

and the

in particular is a distinctive

and cannot be

found

feature of

in any other work at a

similar

level.

Although the team work is composed of

members

from different Arab states,

their true belief

in the

project as a pioneer Arab project has created an environment
of

full

understanding and set a model

for other similar

future works.

6-

Democratic Management:

every

level

Democracy was

of the managerial

implemented

in

organization of the AGJPPI as
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an

institution.

All the decisions taken within the

institution were taken as a consensus decision and according
to democratic rules after discussing them in group format.
Moreover,
various

the democratic atmosphere exists also within the

separate project units at a sub-institutional

levels.
Despite the outstanding works that AGJPPI has
presented over the years,
limited resources and
and potential

located

which has no studios.

management,

The Institute's

in a small,

seven are top personnel and the rest are

Faisal Al-Yasri,
organization,

staff.

Despite these limited

pointed out that with good

and planning these

resources could be used to capacity
high

humble rented building

The full time staff are 25 personnel,

administrative and secretarial
resources,

the AGJPPI works within

is not operating with as much ability

as one might think.

headquarters are

of which are

however,

limited

in order to present a

standard of work.23
Nonetheless,

AGJPPI
Simsim"

and despite the superior success of the

experiment and the professional work of
series,

disadvantages

Al— Malih does not,

"Iftah Ya

rule out the

and difficulties that AGJPPI

are

facing.

First among these difficulties are the talented and skilled
native human resources.
creativity are still
In the case of

Arab human resources and Arab

in shortage and deseparately needed.

"Iftah Ya Simsim"

for instance,

Yasir Al-
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Malih noted that there are no Arab staff specializing in
children's programs.
"Iftah Ya Simsim"

"First of all, we should confess that

is not a pure Arabic invention but rather

an Arabic adapted copy of the American program,
Street'."24

'Sesame

In addition to that, more than 25 hours of the

original American footage were used in producing the
episodes besides many other materials.
Another difficulty is the television scriptwriters who
specialize in the children's field.
shortage of television scriptwriters,
writers are few,
writing.

If the Arab world has a
and if television

then even fewer specialized in children's

"We tried to attract the children's programs

scriptwriters from all over the Arab world; they were 23
writers; most found that writing for children in television
is a difficult task;

so we ended up with three of them who

continued working for us."25

There have been many attempts

by the AGJPPI to reduce the production costs of its
programs.

"If there is one problem that could reduce the

production of such programs,

it is the lack of good

scriptwriters; well qualified scriptwriters do not exist n
the region."26
In addition to all these problems,

the AGJPPI

officials argue that there is lack of experience in planning
for children's programs,
producers,

qualified children's programs

and directors who specialize in directing

children's programs.
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In spite of all these disadvantages and difficulties,
the AGJPPI experiment is truly considered a pioneer
experiment in the
than that,

authentic Arab television industry.

More

it set the basic foundation and the frame work

for any Arab television industry.

The AGJPPI not only

represents a regional cooperation,

but its success proved to

be Pan-Arab success.

In the final report of the seminar

Cultural Identity and its Interaction with Foreign Cultures
in the Arabian Gulf States",
February 1988,

which was held in U.A.E.

on

the participants strongly recommended the

continues support of the joint media institutions in the
region especially the AGJPPI because of its contribution in
producing programs homogeneous with the values and
traditions of the Arab culture.27
The AGJPPI experiment has demonstrated that joint Arab
production is the only practical method of producing high
standard national programs.

This unique experiment has

encouraged many other similar regional cooperations and the
idea of Pan-Arab joint television production as the best way
of establishing grass roots Arab television production.
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Chapter VII

REASONS FOR DEPENDENCE ON IMPORTED WESTERN PROGRAMS

Introduction

This chapter is the last chapter of the study and is
composed mainly of the analysis and results of the research.
In this chapter the primary concern of the study,
is,

of that

analyzing the reasons for dependence on imported western

television programs,

will be identified.

At the same time,

some of the problems and obstacles that hinder national
television program production are identified.
Based on all these analyses,

the chapter presents some

suggestions and recommendations which might work and serve
as solutions or alternatives for importing and depending on
western television programs,
this dependency.

or at least reduce the level of

The chapter also suggests many ideas to

enhance local and national Arab television production
industry as a framework for grass roots.
The chapter also reviews and analyzes the successful
experiment of the Arab Gulf States Joint Programs Production
Institution

(AGJPPI)

as the first professional and

successful national Arab educational television production.
It explores the secrets of success of this unique
experiment,

which could be used as an excellent small scale
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model for a firm and grass-roots foundation for a pan-Arab
television industry.

Reasons_for Dependence on Western Programs

The issue of the flow of western television programs
is neither an easy nor a new issue.

It is an issue of

concern to the whole world rather than one concerning only
Kuwait or the Arab states.

Although this issue has been

under debate since the 1960's on a global level,

the debate

is still going on because the issue still exists.
The reasons for Kuwait television's dependence on
western programs are many,
with each other; however,

and intricate where they overlap
the essential reasons can be

identified:

1-

On top of these reasons comes the price of these

programs.

The prices of western programs are very seductive

to the pocketbook.

The lower cost of purchasing western

programs in contrast to the higher production costs of a
similar show from the Arab states makes the deal very
attractive.

Moreover,

the quality of Arabian-produced films

are unlikely to be equal to or even close to that of western
production.

Purchasing ready-made western programs makes

things easy,

and saves money,

time,

and effort.

an American series costs between $250 and $1000,

One hour of
depending
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on the

financial capability of the state,

while an hour of

an Egyptian or other Arab series cost an average of $1500 to

$2000.1
This tactic of manipulating the

international market

making available high quality western programs

for

cheap prices attracts many states to purchase them,
especially those with limited financial resources.
state of Bahrain's television,
hour of

"Magnum P.I"

for $1000,

for

instance,

for only $300,

while

it sells elsewhere

Bahrain television comprise more than 90%

of

its

in the Arab world.2

financial

than Bahrain.
television

can purchase an

which could explain why western programs

the highest

The

of

in

its air time,

Kuwait television because

ability pays a higher price per program

An hour of

$1142,

"The A Team"

and $1390

costs Kuwait

for each hour of "St.

Elsewhere".3
Despite the

increase

in prices

television programs over the years,
considered very
late

1960's,

for imported western
they are still

low compared to the cost of production.

however,

prices

In

for Kuwait television for half

hour episodes were ranging between $60 and $90 and prices
for

feature

films ranged between $250 and $350.4

In the case of Kuwait television,

the price of a

program hour according to television official,
by the duration,

quality,

(new or old...etc.).

But,

topic or story,
in general,

is determined

featured actors,

the price of one
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television hour
and $1200;
operas,

(for serials and shows)

ranges between $1000

the hour price for best sellers drama,

soap

light entertainment and variety shows is $1200;

long television feature films,
$1500 and $2400.5

for

the price ranges between

These prices are still considered very

cheap compared to what they sell for in other countries,
especially European countries.
is because Kuwait television,

The reason for the disparity
like other Arab television

systems is non—commercial government television and the
countries are considerably less populated than European
countries.
Kuwait television has been authorized by other Gulf
states to purchase western programs on their behalf,

a step

that can save money for the Gulf states if purchases are
made collectively.
Bahrain,

This step,

however,

does not please

which can obtain western programs for even less

than the discounted price given to the Gulf states
collectively.6

2-

Television in Kuwait is committed to broadcast at

certain times every day.

Unfortunately,

due to poor

national production and insufficient of national production
to fill

in this span of time,

the only available alternative

for filling this daily air time is the foreign alternative.
It seems that filling the daily television air time is the
obsession of Arab television officials.

Salim Al-Fahad,

the
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former Director of Kuwait television pointed out
consume hours of television programs everyday,

that »We

and faced

with this necessity one's needs massive supplies and
reserves of television programs for one's daily
consumption".7

3-

The influx of western television programs exists,

on one

hand because of the abundance and variety of the foreign
mass production.

The other side of the coin is the

incapability of Arab production to replace this influx.
alternative to foreign production is available.
does not exist in this business.

No

The choice

"It is so easy to

demonstrate the issue of foreign cultural invasion but to
our deep sorrow we do not have alternatives or even the
ability to choose.

The choice is limited to what in the

international market."8

4-

The Arab world suffers from a vast vacuum and extreme

shortage of art,

culture,

field of television.

intellect,

As a result,

programs fills the existing vacuum.

and literature in the

this influx of western
Muhammad Al-Sanousi,

former Under-Secretary Assistant for Television Affairs in
Kuwait,

describes the situation in the Arab world in this

manner:
Television work is team work and never a solo work.
All elements of the circle have to be available so it
can be inter-connected.
In most cases all elements of
the circle cannot be found in any single Arab state.
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andeQiUIo^-therLis 9°0d Work but the Packaging is bad
bad-^ I
t the £°Yer is ele9anc but the content is
® something wrong in the Arab mentality
can bL o eV,1S1°!!:
We must confess and say we are not
capable of competing with others.
We can't compete.9

5-

Television in the Arab states is a new technology,

relatively new introduction to the Arab environment.

a
It is

still considered by some to be a new science which has not
been discovered to its full capacity.

Many still have not

comprehended its real functions and purposes.
lack of this perception,

Due to this

the business of Arab television

production was neglected for years,

and it was not until the

last several years that it began to give some concern.
Television in the Arab gulf states emerged like a
mushroom, and the only best available option has been
foreign production.
Unfortunatily, the Ministries of
Information in the Arab Gulf states are the most
backward countries with respect to follow better
production".10

6-

Probably the most significant reason for depending on

imported western programs is the lack of human resources.
Human resources are the basic and most essential element in
any television production.
writers,

casts,

directors,

Lack of specialists and talented
scenarist,

technicians and other

elements of human resources of television industry make any
attempt of television production impossible.
Television is a serious business and we have to admit
that we are much behind the west in the television
field.
We cannot fool ourselves and claim we have the
capabilities of a television production industry.
Let's be realistic and deal with realities and do not
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?nduc^imKte °Ur abilities*

How can we build an

available?”611 6Ven ltS baSiC elements are not
Yasir Al-Malih,

Production Manager of The Arabian Gulf

States Joint Programs Production Institution,

observed that

in the Arab world everything may be purchased except for the
human resources element which is the most important element
in the production process.12

7—

Although the factor of human resources is essential,

however,

it becomes meaningless if it lacks the element of

creativity.

Unfortunately,

the element of creativity almost

does not exist in Arab human resources.

Despite the modest

number of human resources in the Arab states,

very few of

them have the talent of creativity in presenting new ideas
and tackling new issues.
Yasir Al-Malih explained that if we take television
writers in the Arab world,
they are few.

for instance,

they are many and

They are many because we see so many of them

every day and they are few because few have the talent of
creativity and originality.

In the Arab world such are very

rare.13

8-

The high professional western standard of quality cannot

compared with those programs produced in the Arab states.
There are so many type of series and selections of western
programs that cannot be produced in any Arab states.
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Resources for professional quality production are not to be
found together within any Arab states.

Abdullah Al-Rushaid,

the Director of the Foreign Channel at Kuwait television
noted that "The foreign programs exist because there is a
necessity for them and they have very high production
features that Arab programs still cannot reach.".14

9-

The people have become used to viewing a high quality

level or standard of production through western produced
programs;

they always looking for better,

and cannot accept

the lower standard of locally produced programs.
The people have become attached to foreign programs and
they are connected mentally with American characters.
Therefore, they are indispensable and they will
continue.
With the age of direct satellite
broadcasting, the problem will continue and become even
more complicated even if we have sufficient national
production.
National production is not the solution.
We feel we cannot do anything about it.15
Hamza Bait Al-Mal noted that viewers'

level of

appreciation for technically advanced television programs
has risen as a result of exposure to professional foreign
productions.16

Both views are supported by Sydney Head's

view regarding this matter of viewers'

acceptance in terms

of the comparitive quality of foreign and local production.
"People throughout the world have became knowledgeable about
production quality,

and most will not tolerate poor quality

just because it comes from domestic sources.

Programs must

be attractive enough to motivate audience members to invest
in receivers.".17
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10-

The competition among television systems in the Arab

s^a^es

and attract as many viewers as possible

contributes to dependence on foreign production.

This

approach has led them to increase transmission hours,
establish other channels,

and offer western top shows and

considerable diversity in western programs in order to
compete with other neighboring states,

knowing that people

in these neighboring states would tune in to their station.
Noticeably,

the Arab states always get arrogant in

their reports regarding the development of their television
service in terms of the programs they offer,
time they broadcast,

the long air

and the availability of channels they

offer regardless of the content of programs.

Some Arab

states do not have the capability of offering all these
services,

nevertheless,

they strain to do so in order not to

be in less advantage position than other states.

11-

Other tough competition is coming from the videotape

market which has led television to gamble on the same horse
by providing similar programs to those available in the
video market in order to attract viewers.18

Officials of

Kuwait television indicate that even if western
entertainment programs were not offered on Kuwait
television,

they are available in local theaters or in local

home video store for home video system.19
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Obstacles Facing National

1-

Prodimtinn

The field of television production is considered a new

field in the Arab states.

it is still does not have a full

grasp of its function and purpose.

Although national

television in the Arab states appeared decades ago,

the

national production industry did not start simultaneously.
In fact,

It was ignored for years and it was not given

attention until in the last several years.
Unlike theater,

cinema,

and press industries,

television production in the Arab world began and grew
within a government system.
governments,
the process.

For years it was manipulated by

long before private production become part of
Private production started in mid-1970s,

especially in those states who built their systems in early
1960s.

Nonetheless,

the entrance to this industry was not

fully equipped with enough preparation to deal with this
kind of business.

Thus,

the start was very primitive and

the result was very weak.
Therefore,

the ground in industry for national

television production is still not firm or reliable.

The

industry's role in the daily national broadcasting is still
ineffective and its participation in the national
programming is still poor,

2-

weak,

limited,

and marginal.

The Arab television market is very limited market for
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commercial purposes and does not encourage any television
production marketing.
geographical,

Furthermore,

political barriers,

the complicated

and the intricate states

marketting laws among the Arab states hinder any attempt to
market on a large scale.

Therefore, many Arab enterprises

and companies who lost profits moved their businesses from
Arab states to Europe and United States,

aiming for better

market and uncomplicated marketting barriers.
Many of these enterprises have achieved success in
western countries while they failed in their Arab states.
Those enterprises who preferred to keep their businesses in
the Arab states found themselves in a position where they
had to reduce their production budget to a minimum,

and many

of them refused to produce a major work with big budget on
the ground that the marketing of the production within the
Arabic television market cannot cover the cost of the
production.

Therefore,

many of them do not even bother to

produce professional or high quality programs.
Investing in television production in the Arab states
is considered unprofitable business with a high risk and
involving in it is a losing battle. Many enterprises prefer
to invest their capital

in fields other than the television

field.

3-

The high cost of production is one of the main obstacles

that hinders either high standard productions or very large
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productions.

Under financial pressures,

many enterprises

squeeze production costs to the minimum by hiring a low-paid
unskilled writer,

untalented cast,

and uncreative director.

The natural result of all this is a low quality program.
Even in the case of highly professional standard nationally
produced programs of considerable budgets,

Arab televisions

usually refuse to purchase the program for a high price,

and

treat it as if they were purchasing any low priced imported
program.

The newly established Arab production enterprises

with limited financial and human resources cannot be
compared in any way with the giant western multi-national
corporations.

4-

Even though it is hard to find all elements of

production available in a single Arab state to make the
circle of work complete,

on many lucky occasions when the

circle of the team work of production was completed and
available,

and the work was done,

the censorship department

interfered and rejected the production on the ground that
the topic or the theme of the program's content was not
compatible with the media policy of the state or other
reasons.
Many executive managers in the private sector have
expressed their resentment of the censorship department
policy and how it discourages them and restricts their work
They explain that they have produced many good works with
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great ideas and they're capable of producing more if they
given the chance,

but censorship departments freguently

reject their production for one reason or another.
the obstacles is lack of creativity,
found,

"One of

but when creativity is

censorship becomes the obstacle."20

For them the

production is becoming too risky and the censorship judgment
is unpredictable.
After spending all this money we were surprised to find
out that no one would buy it from us and the loss was
doubled.
Sometimes we wish they would say what they
would accept and what they would reject before we start
working on any project; in many cases we worry about
the censorship more than our work itself."21
Moreover,

there are no standard policies for accepting

programs.

The stipulations of the censorship departments to

accept programs vary from one Arab state to another.
this complexed situation,

Given

the production companies become

uncertain of whom they should please.
Consequently,
programs,

to satisfy the censorship, most of the

especially the drama programs,

try to escape

tackling critical current issues and problems if the
programs are not trying to sustain them.

This has resulted

in deterioration in the production content, with long and
repeated monotonous dialogues with no significant end.
Therefore,

the fear of rejection from television stations

became the major obsession of producers and the anxiety of
getting approval
production work.

from the censor became the aim of every
The result of all this is a dull content

and low standard of production which can be suitable for any
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time and place as long as it gets the consent of the
censors,

5-

since it touches no sebsitive issue.

Lack of freedom of expression:

Because of the nature

itical system in the Arab states and due to the nature of
the broadcasting system in the Arab states as a governmental
system operated,

controlled,

and financed by the government,

freedom of expression does not exist within their television
systems.

Many producers feel that they lack the freedom to

present a bold theme,

fearing that their act might arouse

the anger of the governments against them.
producers feel insecure,

As a result,

the

which hinders the creativity of

their work.
There are so many vital and sensitive national issues
concerning the society that we do not dare to present
or discuss on television and the reason is because of
the censorship.
The censorship department does not
want any topic which provokes or stimulates the
public. 2

6-

Lack of human and material resources:

Needless to say,

many essential elements for television production are not
available in the most Arab states.

Formost among these

elements is the human resources element.
lack of creative writers,
directors,

scenarists,

and technical staff.

There is a severe

casting personnel,

"We're wrong if we

exaggerated and say we have creative capability of human
resources.

Actually we don't."23

Although governments

might bear the major share of causing this situation;
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Perhaps people's perspective toward television might also be
blamed

for this situation.

noted that

A producer

in the private sector

"People's approach toward television still

passive and something must be done to provoke their
imagination and creativity toward television work."24

Suggestions and Alternatives for Importing Western Programs

Since the reasons of
somewhat complicated,
solutions

the alternatives and suggested

are also somewhat

Before getting

importing western programs are

inter-connected and overlapped.

into any further details,

general

agreement on and the broad direction of any solution must
come through national endeavors.
culture depends
H.

Schiller

Protection of

indigenous

in the first place on indigenous efforts.

supported the point that developing countries

must depend on no one but themselves

in developing their own

authentic broadcast materials and reviving their culture.
He noted:
If there is a prospect that cultural diversity will
surface anywhere on this planet, it depends largely on
the willingness and ability of scores of weak countries
to forgo the cellophane-wrapped articles of the west's
entertainment industries and persistently to develop,
however much time it takes, their own broadcast
material.25
Foregoing western materials
it

seems to those of

programs

is not as

limited vision,

and materials

is not

inconceivable as

and developing national

"mission impossible."
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1-

The

first solution must come

because of many reasons;
toward the

from national governments

the mistaken government policies

function of television are actually the main

factor which has led to the deterioration of this
second,

issue;

since the television system has been always a

government property under full government control,
government holds
consequences
government

full

the

responsibility for all outcomes and

inconnection with this medium;

third,

the

is the only authority which has the power of

decision-making to decide any such policy toward television.

Therefore,
attitudes
the

Arab governments must change their

and reconsider their approach and mentality toward

function of television,

and start

immediate and serious

action through their effective and vital
whole
what

issue revolves around one point.
should we broadcast,

as planners.".26
answer
the

So

contribution.

"The

Why we broadcast,

and how we broadcast if we think

far there

for this main question.

is no clear and definite
Most of the literature

in

subject observed that one of the negative aspects of

Arab television
policies

is the

lack of planning and clear national

and strategies toward television.

Planning in Arab production almost does not exist, the
minimum of production criterias is almost not
available, performance is carried out extemporaneously,
and no one presently cares to evaluate the
after it's been broadcast to measure its feedback a
effects on viewers.27
Regarding this point,

Arab television experts

in
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their seminar,

Issues of Arab Television Production,

recommended in one of their suggestions on improving
production in government sector that Arab national
television institutions should set long range production
strategy,

taking into consideration the future outlook of

television in terms of the audience it addresses.

Within

this process there should be a balance between available
resources and viewers growing needs to avoid any kind of
spontaneous and quick production.28
This queer mix between Arab and foreign programs is
not based on clear and decisive strategy.

Some Arab states

provide some programs while other states do not;

and

sometimes this situation occurs within a single state where
sometimes they allow certain programs and other times they
do not.

Very often the selection of this mix depends upon

the personal mood and the temper of programs selection and
censorship committees,
time.

Therefore,

mainly to fill in the space of air

many of these programs come inharmonious

with the culture values.

All this outcome is a result of

the lack of national programming planning.

The structure of

Arab television systems lack serious studies and research
into their programming planning.

Unfortunately,

few Arab

televisions give this subject serious attention and few Arab
televisions have research and studies departments within
their structures.
In support of the previous point,

a study conducted by

325
the ASBU through the Center of Audience and Viewers Research
on Arab televisions regarding this matter concluded that 25%
of Arab television institutions have no intention to
establish studies and research in their systems because they
believe there is no need or necessity for this kind of
departments;

the other 75%,

however,

believe that it is a

necessity but they do not have the available financial and
human resources.29
The Arab television experts also suggested that Arab
governments should undertake evaluation research about a
production after it has been broadcast to measure its effect
on the audience and to know its cultural and social impact;
planners and producers,

in turn,

should make use of the

results of these studies and take them into consideration
when setting up later production plans and strategies.30
Moreover,

the selection of broadcast programs should

not be left to the whims of selection or censorship
committees who may be incompetent because their judgment
should not be the only criterion.

The programs selection

should be judged by specialized committees composed of
religious scholars,

educators,

psychologists,

sociologists,

as well as media specialists who operate within definite and
clear criteria.

For the time being,

these television

committees do not have these specific qualifications.

2-

The business of television production is a big and vital
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economic industry and part of the fundamental structure of a
modern state.
industrial,

As they are establishing political,

economic,

social and other infrastructures of the state,

national governments must give similar concern to
establishing a complete and firm national grassroots
television industry structure.

It has become clear,

especially in the last decades,

that it is not less

important than other structures.

While ecognizing the

substantial cost and the great effort especially in the
first stages,

in the long run it would be a profitable

industry and great national investment.

The lack of

economic resources for television production has resulted,
to great extent,

in the lack of a firm industrial basis for

the television production industry.
However,

the critical question which remains is

whether Arab producers can ever satisfy Arab viewers'

demand

after seeing so many western programs or whether the
homegrown production may or may not improve the overall
quality of Arab television.

The answer to this significant

question is that sacrifice is actually needed from both
sides,

the government as a sender and the Arab public as a

receiver,

to cope with the various expected difficulties in

the first stages so that there will be enough time for the
standard of production materials to develop and grow.
Otherwise,

as Jacques Delors said,

"all televisions will be

made in Japan and all programs will be American.".51
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3

National television production as a government concern

should not be confined to or rely mostly on governmental
production,

as is presently the situation.

Governmental

work is always given priority and privileges over other
private works.

Private producers should also have the same

privileges as government productions do.
government production is not a solution,

Relying mostly on
and the

government's capabilities by itself cannot meet all the
demands of national production.
Fuad Ballat,

the Director of Syrian television,

in his

analysis of the problems of television production in the
public sector emphasized the importance of separation
between television as a whole

(as a broadcasting system)

and

the production departments within the government television
system,

as a first step.

The second step is to establish

production centers financially and administratively
independent from the television stations which would serve
as economic centers with economic ends to avoid complicated
bureaucratic procedures which often hinder the work.32
In fact,
Al-Sanousi,

there was a similar suggestion by Muhammad

the former Under-Secretary Assistant for

Television Affairs to convert Kuwait television to an
independent government institution with economic goals,
which would serve as a profitable,

one

as in source to the

government like the case of governmental airlines
enterprises.

Al-Sanousi cited that television attachment to
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direct government administration and codes is restricting
its development;

television must be independent and

operating far from government routines and bureaucratic
system.33

4-

The private producers as a newly established

institution in the industry, with limited human and
financial resources,

need the support and encouragement of

the national government.

Financial subsidies because of the

high cost of professional production are the primary
requirement.

Many producers hesitate to produce high

standard programs because of the high cost and less expected
profit.

Other kind of supports could be also offered

through technical aids such as building or providing
facilities,

and giving priorities and privileges of using

governmental utilities.
There is a consensus among Arab television experts
that Arab television production should not be a monopoly by
government institutions only but rather multinational
sources between which both sectors should cooperate.

Such

cooperation between the government stations and the private
producers to set a strategy of national programming is a
very useful method to enhance nationally broadcast
materials.

The governments can charge private producers to

carry out their projects according to their plan and
according to government stipulations.

This technigue also
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prevents the private producers from producing purely
commercial,

cheap programs.

The government should also encourage the national
production of these producers by giving them priority on air
time and through purchasing their production in
distinguished and special prices.

The present status does

not deal with this kind of preference.

Foreign and national

programs are purchased for the same price according to the
length fo the programs.

In the seminar,

"Television

Production Issues In the Arab States",

the participants

pointed out that the current programs'

price list of Arab

televisions does not encourage Arab producers,

and that they

are an obstacle in achieving the required high quality;
therefore,

it is illogical to compare Arab production with

the foreign international production.34
Private producers argue that they are unwilling to
produce high quality programs because the purchased price
would be the same as average programs as long as they run
for the same period of time.

They also indicated that they

are highly unlikely to produce any kind of educational or
cultural programs because the purchased price for this kind
of program is less than the price of drama or entertainment
programs.

Therefore,

since educational or cultural

production is not profitable for them,

the best way to make

a profit is through producing entertainment or drama series
Therefore,

national governments should reconsider
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their programs'

price scale.

As a way of support,

the

nationally produced programs should be valued at a higher
price than the internationally produced programs.
addition,

In

prices of national programs should be based

according to quality rather than program span,

the situation

in the international market at the present time.

This

tactic can create competition among producers for better
quality production and at the same time discourage them from
producing low standard materials.
Moreover,

educational or cultural programs also should

be encouraged and supported,

and should not be treated as

marginal programs at lower prices.

This point supports the

previous idea that a program's price should be based on
quality.

Otherwise,

the market would be encouraged to be

entertainment-dominated rather than concentrating on
educational and cultural programs.
In a meeting between UNESCO and the Arab States
Broadcasting Union

(ASBU),

it was warned that even though it

might be an advantage to import ready-made educational
materials because they may be of good production quality and
save time and money,

selections should be based on local

conditions and subjects matter must be relevant to the
society's problems,
meeting,

however,

concerns,

and developmental needs.

emphasized making use of local production

elements.
in 1978,

The

the Arab Educational Technology Center
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requested its member states to submit reports on the extent
to which they were using educational media materials to a
seminar about educational technology in the Arab states
which was held in Kuwait.

All the reports raised the issue

of educational film and video production and all states
expressed the fact that they lack capabilities in this
field,

ranging from equipment,

specialists.

staff,

funds,

and

Reports have shown that imported educational

films had not been found suitable for local educational
programs.

At the end of the conference,

recommended

the member states

establishing an Arab institution for the

production of educational films.

Nevertheless,

So far no

action has been taken with regard to this vital
recommendation.35

5-

Muhammad Al-Sanousi,

however,

argues that the core of

the crisis with respect to national Arab television
production is not merely lack of financial or building
facilities.

It goes much deeper,

to the issue of creativity

and talented human resources capable of creativity and
competition,
worthless.

without which television work becomes
"So far,

the competition is far and away extreme

between Arab and western industries,
creativity."36

and the main reason is

It is true that the Arab world is

experiencing a creativity crises.
The paucity of intellectual grassroots in the Arab
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world can be attributed to the collapse and deterioration
the Arab cultural and intellectual institutions.

This

sterile situation was reflected deeply and directly by all
aspects of arts,
production.

including the art of Arab television

The lack of self- expression and creativity in

the Arab world is the outcome of the absence of clear media
and cultural policies.

Arab governments bear the biggest

part of responsibility in creating this crisis.

Nearly

since the First world War and the Arab world is living in
continues and complicated political and ideological crises.
The disappearance of political and ideological stability has
led to lack of freedom of expression and atmosphere within
which creativity can flourish.
Arab television experts,

meeting in Tunisia to discuss

the crisis of Arab television production,

emphasized the

subject of creativity and suggested several points in order
to activate and cultivate creativity,
A-

as follows:37

Arab governments should provide as much freedom as

possible to creative people on the ground that any kind of
artistic expression can flourish only in the climate of
intellectual freedom.

Fuad Ballat pointed out "The real

reasons that prevent the development of art to be a
fundamental factor in any given people's civilization
incarnate when hypocrisy and fearing become

the ground of

any decision in artistic production.'
B-

The governments should endeavor to enact legislation and
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laws which guarantee all

literature and financial

rights of

creative people and enhance their rank in the society.
C“

The Arab States Broadcasting Union

to support the trend of

(ASBU)

should strive

its members to set the rules which

organize the artistic and intellectual ownership and reserve
all

rights of creative personnel who work in the

field of

television production.
D-

All

government and private production institutions

should work on providing the proper circumstances which help
the development of the specialized television writer through
arranging workshops and training sessions,

or through incor¬

porating writers with production teams to stimulate
as writers,
seen
E-

in

in them,

the creativity and perception of television work

its different stages.

The Arab television institutions should establish resea¬

rch units within

its

systems.

The mission of these units is

to produce pilot programs aimed at checking ways of
possibilities to produce creative or programs derived from
the civilization of the Islamic and Arabic heritage.
Noticeably,

television

in the Arab states has been

brainwashed by a western style taste.
television style,
was reflected

Some see no Arab

merely a spinoff of western style.

in western model types of production.

This
Most of

the content of Arab programs is an imitation of western
materials and rarely the content is originated from
indigenous Arab culture.

D.

Boyd observed that television
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in the Arab states has a predominantly western style.
brainwashing process usually occurs during training
western countries as agreements call

for,

The

in

reinforced

automatically with the fascination of western techniques,
and the constant viewing pattern of western programs.
concluded that

"The natural result of all this

type television programs
F-

Academic people,

Boyd

is western-

in Arabic."39

on their part,

should design curricula

and research tools which can be used as criteria by televis¬
ion critics to evaluate television programs.

6-

There

private
always

is a great necessity to allow the establishment of

stations.

Television in all Arab states has been

a government property and the voice of government

with one or two exceptions.
their

Many producers have expressed

frustration that many national,

productions

regional,

and local

are rejected by these government stations

for

one reason or another such as low standard of production or
incompatibility with government policy.
producers

Therefore,

these

found no other alternatives to market their

productions.

Moreover,

these private stations expand and

enlarge the ground of Arab television market

in addition to

their great potential of participating in democracy of
broadcasting.
vital

Also,

these private stations might serve as a

and sincere supporter of the government system in

achieving

its national goals of

informing,

educating,

and
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entertaining.
Nevertheless,

there

is a general concern that these

private stations should be under government auspices and
supervision,

similar to the case of the private press

some Arab states.

in

The reason for the government supervision

is to avoid the negatives aspects and the misuses of being a
commercial

stations,

like what happened to the European

commercial

stations when they came more dependent on

imported programs and entertainment- oriented stations and
the situation necame more critical.

7-

Arab television must decrease their daily broadcasting

hours

in order to depend less on imported western programs.

Through the years Arab television expanded air time very
dramatically,

and always looked at this as a big leap

in

television development at the same time that national
production was
In

fact,

far less developed in the same proportion.

the more air time

increased,

dependent on western programs.

the more they became

Arab states are in constant

competition regarding the span of air time.
states

Many Arab

feel that they are less advantaged than other states

if they have

short air time.

the air time and

fill

Their solution is to expand

it with western programs.

establishment of second channels,
and the

With the

the situation deteriorated

issue became even worse.

After all,

from a

logical point of view,

there

is
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virtually no need for the bulk of western programs.
Actually,

there is no need for television at all,

worse cases,

in the

if it has to be filled with western programs.

People and the native culture are much better off without
it.

Most of the literatures confirms that the Arab people

were more attached to their culture and were more enriched
by their culture before the emergence of television.
In this regard,

we aver that there is no need for such a

long span of air time,
span of air time.

nor is it shamful to have a short

To have a few hours a day of national

programs on a single channel is much better than to have two
channels broadcast for many hours a week of imported
programs.

Many countries either developed or developing are

enacting legislation to restrict importation of foreign
programs to allow
United Kingdom,

more air time for national programs.

for instance,

stipulates that a minimum of

86% of air time must be of commonwealth origin,
time must be 55%

Canadian air

locally produced and Australia 50%,

similar trends in Japan,

Argentina,

Italy,

and many other countries/0 In 1984,
Economic Community)

The

Mexico,

the EEC

and

Brazil

(European

suggested a local-content quota of 60%

of television air time.41
In the case of the Arab states,
need at all

for the foreign channel.

actually there is no
The real purpose for

the existence of these kind of channels is still not yet
clear despite the governments’

excuses.

The governments’
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justifications of these channels cannot be taken for granted
and accepted as definite answers.

Many Arab specialists

believe that these channels are a premature development.
8-

One of the easiest methods to reduce reliance on western

programs

and to

fill

air time

programs among Arab states.

is to increase the exchange of
At the present time,

the

exchange of national television programs among Arab states
is very

low.

The Arab states

countries more than they

import programs

import from each other.

At the time when Arab states
countries more than 50%
serials,

drama,

programs),

shows,

entertainment,

for only 13%

of the total

in the Arab world presented

production to other Arab stations,
importation to the half

Indeed,
level

and children

(mostly news and news programs and reports) ,u2

each television station

foreign

(mostly films,

exchange of television programs

within the Arab states constitutes
air time

import from western

of their air time

the average

from western

there

"If

its

we could have reduce the

in each station.".43

is a great demand for expansion of the

of programs exchange within the Arab world to make

Arab people

familiar with different life,

customs,

traditions of other parts of the Arab world.

and

Unfortunately,

because Arab viewers watch western programs more than
programs

from neighboring Arab states,

they know more about

life

in western countries than they know about the other

Arab

states.

Sa'id

Al-Harithi noted that "television offers
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Arab viewers a wealth of information about western culturefar more than it brings them information about their own
culture.44

9-

Needless to say,

cooperation and coordination among Arab

states regarding this matter is extremely essential to carry
out successfully any such alternatives and suggestions.

Ex-

have shown that cooperation and coordination among
Arab states is weak,

if non-existent.

Very often political

and ideological disagreements among Arab governments'
policies are the main obstacle hindering any such
cooperation.
Meanwhile,

experience has also demonstrated that an

action by a single state is courting failure.

One state

cannot solve the whole problem because all elements to
establish a firm national grassroots production industry
cannot be found in a single Arab state.
previously,

As mentioned

all elements of the circle of television work

have to be available so the circle can be connected
otherwise,

there won't be a solid foundation for an Arab

industry.

The issue needs full and serious cooperation

among Arab states.
The Arab governments realize this point very well.
The Arab delegates focused on this point in the Government
International Conference for Cooperation in Communication
development which was held in Paris on April 1980 under the
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auspices

of UNESCO.

The delegates expressed the need for

cooperation among themselves and the necessity of
cooperation

in this

field with industrially developed

countries.45
There have been many attempts and suggestions for Panjoint production,

but political disagreement among Arab

states always hinders such agreement.
point,

failure of creating a unified Arab

media policy and joint production.
studies

states

at one

encouraged sub-regional grouping among Arab states as

a primary step after the

least

The ASBU,

All Arab conferences and

of this subject emphasized the

regional
in the

importance of at

cooperation and coordination among Arab
field of production.

Experience has shown

that this technique of joint production is very effective
all

aspects.

The best successful example of this kind of

regional

cooperation

is the Arabian Gulf States Joint

Programs

Production Institution.

in
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Final Conclusion—Closing Remarks,

and Recommendations

for Future Studies

The issue of cultural invasion of the Arab national
culture through importing western television programs is a
serious and dangerous issue needing serious and prompt
action in order to confront it.

All literature as well as

the analysis of this study have shown that the Arab national
culture is in deep jeopardy and the rift in the Arab culture
is great.
fading out,

Many aspects of the indigenous Arab culture are
primarily as a result of western culture

domination in particular through a large exposure to
imported western television programs.

The text also

indicated that imported western television programs have had
profound long-term effects on Arab culture.
western programs,

Imported

especially entertainment programs,

are the

chief carrier in transmitting alien western values.
Unfortunately,

the issue of importing western

television software was ignored for quite a long period of
time by Arab governments,

and was not given much attention

until the last several years.
issue to worsen.

This situation caused the

Despite the governments'

attention to the issue,

concern and

the problem still exists and is

becoming more aggravated.
The issue of cultural invasion and importing western
television programs in the Arab states is part of the big
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problem that the Arab world
many negative

factors

complexity of the

is experiencing.

in the Arab world,

such as the

ideological and political
lack of consensus,

Along with

situation in the

Arab world,

disunity,

Arab unity,

the Arab states cannot take a unified stance

countering this dangerous
television

is not

issue.

and the myth of

Beside the

functioning positively

in

fact that Arab

in terms of

enhancing and promoting the national Arab culture,

the study

shows that Arab television systems are not taking serious
precautionary measures to protect and preserve the Arab
culture

from the alien values which penetrate through the

content of the western

imported programs.

Despite the dominant global
despite the
programs,

strong current of the

the

aspect of the

issue and

flow of western television

study rebuts the allegation that dependence on

western programs

is unavoidable and any solution for the

problem

is

options

and solutions which might work as alternative

solutions

impossible.

The study presents and suggests many

for these problems

Throughout the research

if they were acted upon.
,

it became very evident that

Arab governments bear a great deal of responsibility
dealing with and solving this crucial question.

in

The current

situations require that the Arab governments act promptly by
taking serious measures to protect the Arab indigenous
culture.

The purpose and uses of television are not

specified

in most Arab states;

when they are specified,

no
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provisions are made for their implementation.

Arab

television is mainly entertainment-oriented and is not
effectively used for educational and cultural purposes; when
it is,

such efforts are fragmentary and not well planned.
It is worth noting that the diagnosis and the results

of the issue reported in this text are neither final nor
absolute.

Other studies might tackle the issue from

different approaches and perspectives,
different circumstances.

Once again,

and probably under
to remind the reader,

this study deals with the situation in the state of Kuwait
as a case study for this research and Kuwait television as a
model of Arab television.

However,

the situation and

conditions might vary in other Arab states and not
necessarily be the same.
Other studies and research are strongly encouraged and
recommended as a follow-up to this study.
the beginning of this study,
in this field,

As mentioned in

Arabic libraries lack sources

and Arab studies and research into this issue

are in extremely short supply.
It is not claimed that the options and suggestions
presented in this study are the only and best solutions to
the problem.

Certainly other suggestions which may not have

been touched on within this study might be presented as
additional solutions.

This study's main concern is the

relationship between television and culture.

Different

options from various perspectives might also apply.

In
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general,

there is an urgent need for Arab studies and

research to explore the many different ways that Arab
television can contribute effectively,

not only toward the

preservation and protection of the Arab indigenous culture,
but also toward its enhancement.
The function of Arab television has to be re-invented.
The Arab culture,

through the television medium,

must be re¬

discovered by the indigenous people who have their own
style,

technique and approach for survival.

A cultural gap

still exist between the people and broadcasting;

there is a

need to create programs that give authentic expression,

to

help in the process of confronting with westernization in
order to preserve the national heritage.

Such indigenous

culture broadcasting must be connected to traditions,
customs,

values,

However,

and all aspects of art.

it's worth emphasizing that preserving the

Arab culture is not a responsibility of broadcasters and
governments only.
collectively,
researchers,

Rather it is a responsibility shared

especially by scholars,
artists,

clerics, historians,

and all educated people.
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